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I. INTRODUCTION
Summary proceedings have an exceptionally long history in
England. During Antiquity, a disgruntled complainant could file
a writ of audita querela' and petition a court of equity for sum-
mary relief. Put simply, the plaintiff had to affirm he was exper-
iencing or about to experience some "legal oppression."'2 In
1. See Turner v. Davies, 2 Wms. Saund. 137, 148, 85 Eng. Rep. 871, 878-79 n.1 (K.B.
1670) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *405) (defining audita querela as
"an equitable action ... [it] is ... remedial").
2. Id.
An audita querela ... lies for a person who either is in execution, or in danger of being
so, upon a judgment, statute-merchant, statute-staple, or recognisance, when he has
matter to shew that such execution ought not to have issued, or should not issue ...
[and it appears] to have been invented, lest in any case there would be an oppressive
defect of justice, where the party has a good defence, but had not, nor has any other
means to take advantage of it.
[Vol. 36:535
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addition, the petitioner had to prove he had no other recourse at
law.3
Without doubt, an audita querela hearing was a full-blown trial
on the merits rather than just a procedural maneuver.4 And under
favorable circumstances,5 a court would award both summary and
equitable relief. Courts of equity, however, had no authority "to
extend the ground of equitable relief beyond that, which [could] be
obtained by audita querela."6 Furthermore, judges were highly un-
likely to award summary relief if there were disputed facts.7
By the late 1660s, the ancient and remedial audita querela pro-
ceeding had fallen into disrepute as a way to secure summary re-
lief, in part because it was too burdensome, inefficient, and
expensive. To repeat, a writ of audita querela actually petitioned a
court to conduct a complete trial on the merits. But fairly often, a
plaintiff only wanted a summary remedy. Perhaps that reason
more than any other provides the best explanation of the audita
querela's demise.8 In addition, over the centuries, English courts of
Id.
3. See id. at 879 (reporting that "[ain audita querela is a commission to the Judges to
examine the cause .... And it does not lie where there is any other remedy at law either
by plea, or otherwise.").
4. See Supposed Doctrine of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Eldon, C.P. Cooper 507, 638,
47 Eng. Rep. 624, 693 (Ch. 1839) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406)
(finding that "[when a petitioner] hath [a] good matter to plead, but hath had no opportu-
nity of pleading it .... an audita querela lies in the nature of a bill in equity, to be relieved
against the oppression").
5. See Boyton's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 43a, 43b, 76 Eng. Rep. 733, 735 (K.B. 1592) (stating:
"In general, [a court] will not put the [petitioner through] the trouble and expense of [a
full-blown] audita querela; but will relieve him in a summary way on motion... but where
the ground of his application for relief is a release, the execution of which, or some other
matter of fact, cannot be clearly ascertained without a trial, the [c]ourt will leave him to his
audita querela.").
6. See Supposed Doctrine of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Eldon, C.P. Cooper 507, 638,
47 Eng. Rep. 624, 691 (Ch. 1839) (commenting: "[Courts could only] substitute for that
proceeding [a remedy] of a more summary and less expensive nature").
7. See Underhill v. Devereux, 2 Wins. Saund. 71, 72, 85 Eng. Rep. 715, 739 (K.B. 1670)
(observing that courts "will relieve the party upon motion, without putting him to an audita
querela; ... but they will never interfere in a summary way, where the fact is disputed").
8. See Supposed Doctrine of Lord Hardwicke and Lord Eldon, C.P. Cooper 507, 639,
47 Eng. Rep. 624, 693 (Ch. 1839) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *406)
(observing that the writ of audita querela "is a writ of a most remedial nature, and [was
apparently] invented [to remove the] oppressive defect of justice, where a party who hath a
good defence is too late to make it in the ordinary forms of law. But the indulgence now
shewn by the Courts in granting a summary relief upon motion in cases of such evident
20051
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law became increasingly indulgent and more willing to entertain a
simple motion for summary relief.9
During the 1800s, the popularity of summary-judgment practice
increased substantially. Consequently, Parliament enacted statutes
allowing plaintiffs to file simple affidavits in ex parte proceedings to
secure summary relief.1" Two statutes are fairly renowned and
worth mentioning. First, England enacted the Charities Procedure
Act of 1812, also known as Sir Samuel Romilly's Act." That act
allowed multiple divisions12 of England's judiciary to review affida-
vits and award summary relief, even if only a smidgen of uncontro-
verted evidence suggested a breach of trust or irregularities in
charitable trusts.13
oppression, has almost rendered useless the writ of audita querela, and driven it quite out
of practice.").
9. See Turner v. Davies, 2 Wins. Saund., 137, 148, 85 Eng. Rep 871, 880 (K.B. 1670)
(analyzing that "the indulgence which of late has been shewn by Courts of law in granting a
summary relief upon motion in most cases of evident oppression, for which the only rem-
edy formerly was by audita querela, has [caused] this remedy. . . to be seldom [used]. It is
however sometimes adopted at present.").
10. Cf. Angus v. Montgomery, 3 Bligh 98, 107-08, 4 Eng. Rep. 541, 545 (H.L. 1821)
(stating that "[t]his is a summary proceeding under the statute not according to the ordi-
nary course of the Court. The proceeding intended by the Legislature is not one for deter-
mining a question of right. In such a case the party must be left to his remedy by the
common course of the law .... "). This was a case in which a movant filed a summary
complaint under the Act of 16 Geo. II c. 11, s. 24. The movant alleged that irregularities
occurred during the election of magistrates and councillors of a Scotch burgh. Id. There
was a question of whether, under the provisions of the Act, all the magistrates and council-
lors should be parties in the proceedings. Id. at 544-45.
11. Charities Procedure Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1812) (Eng.); see also Bignold v.
Springfield, 7 Clark & Finnelly 71, 73-74, 7 Eng. Rep. 992, 993 (H.L. 1837) (reporting that
under the Charities Procedure Act-the so-called Sir Samuel Romilly's Act, 52 Geo. 3, c.
101-the court has authority "to give summary relief by petition").
12. Charities Procedure Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 101 (1812) (Eng.).
[I]t shall be lawful for the Lord Chancellor, Lord Keeper and Commissioners for the
custody of the great seal,.., the Master of the Rolls and the Court of Exchequer-
and they are hereby required-to hear such petition in a summary way[.] [A]nd upon
affidavits or such other evidence as shall be produced .... [these judges may] deter-
mine the same, and ... make such order therein and with respect to the costs of such
applications as to him or them shall seem just.
Id.
13. See Bignold v. Springfield, 7 Clark & Finnelly 71, 73-74, 7 Eng. Rep. 992, 993
(H.L. 1837-39) (reporting that under Sir Samuel Romilly's Act, 52 Geo. 3, c. 101, a court
has authority "to give summary relief by petition in cases of abuses of charitable trusts").
2005] SUMMARY JUDGMENTS 539
Nearly forty years later, Parliament enacted the Summary Proce-
dure on Bills of Exchange Act of 1855.14 Under this statute, an
aggrieved party holding a promissory note 15 or an endorsed bill of
exchange 16 could commence an ex parte proceeding 17 and petition
a court for summary relief. The plaintiff only had to file a simple
affidavit.18 However, to ensure adverse rulings were not arbitrary
or capricious, the Bills of Exchange Act required several judges to
14. Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67 (Eng.).
15. See Maltby v. Murrells, 5 H. & N. 813, 813, 157 Eng. Rep. 1405, 1406 (Exch. Div.
1860) (describing applicability of the Act to a case involving suit on a promissory note).
The affidavits [supporting] the application stated, that in the month of December,
1858, the defendant purchased . . . his stock and business of a stationer [from the
plaintiff], and [gave the plaintiff a promissory note] dated the 13th January, 1859, for
12401. [and] payable on demand. On the 15th March, 1836, the note [was still] unpaid,
[therefore, plaintiff served] the defendant... with a writ of summons ... in the form
provided by "The Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855," [along] with a
copy of the promissory note, including the date, indorsed thereon. On the 27th of the
same month, [the court signed the judgment and issued the execution], of which the
defendant had notice ... , and on the 28th the sheriff seized [defendant's property].
Id.
16. See Travis Bank & Trust v. State, 660 S.W.2d 851, 854-55 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983,
no writ) (discussing bills of exchange).
The word "draft" is a common synonym for "bill of exchange." In the law merchant,
the term "bill of exchange" was defined ... as a requirement or request in writing for
the payment of a specified sum of money to a third person or the drawer himself, at a
stated time, absolutely and at all events, directed by the drawer of the writing to the
one of whom payment was required.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 797-
98 (Tex. 1984) (finding the reasoning of the Travis Bank & Trust court persuasive).
17. See West v. Farlar, 1 El. & El. 179, 180, 120 Eng. Rep. 876, 876 (K.B. 1858)
(describing an ex parte proceeding under the Act).
[Tihe plaintiff.., brought an action, under sect. 6 of The Summary Procedure on Bills
of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict. c. 67, against the defendant, as drawer, and John
E. Reading, as acceptor, of [an indorsed] bill of exchange for [fifteen pounds] .... No
appearance was entered to the action . . . ,[so the court signed a judgment] against the
defendant for 151. 4s. 6d. debt and interest, and 51. 16s. costs ....
Id.
18. See Hall v. Coates, 11 Ex. 480, 481, 156 Eng. Rep. 920, 920 (Exch. Div. 1855)
(considering whether an endorsement on a writ under the Act is in proper form).
The question [is] ... whether the indorsement on a writ under the Summary Proce-
dure on Bills of Exchange Act, 18 & 19 Vict c. 67, . . . is in a proper form .... "The
plaintiff claims pounds, principal, and interest due to him as the payee of a bill of
exchange or promissory note .... And if the amount thereof be paid to the plaintiff,
or his attorney, within days from the service hereof, [he asks whether] further pro-
ceedings will be stayed."
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review the evidence supporting the justification for summary re-
lief. 9 To be sure, petitioning courts for summary relief became
even more popular after England enacted the Sir Romilly's and
Bills of Exchange Acts, expanding rapidly and widely to resolve
other types of controversies.2 0
Texas, however, did not embrace summary-judgment practice as
quickly. In fact, when England enacted the Summary Procedure
Act in 1855, the Supreme Court of Texas had been functioning for
at least ten years under the State Constitution of 1845.21 Yet the
Texas Supreme Court did not adopt the summary-judgment rule
19. See Healey v. Johns, 8 El. & BI. 946, 946-47, 120 Eng. Rep. 353, 353 (K.B. 1858)
(describing the procedure for review under the Act).
[Plaintiff filed this] application [under] sect. 1 of The Summary Procedure on Bills of
Exchange Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 67). That section [states that] unless defendant
obtains leave to appear, and does appear, the plaintiff may sign [the] final judgment
for any sum not exceeding the sum indorsed, with interest, [and that] "the Masters of
the Superior Courts or any three of them [may set a sum for costs], subject to the
approval of the Judges. . . or any eight of them (of whom the Lord Chief Justices and
the Lord Chief Baron shall be three), unless the plaintiff claim[s] more than such fixed
sum,... the costs shall be taxed in the ordinary way."
Id.
20. See Forte v. Beete, 9 Moore 336, 337, 14 Eng. Rep. 324, 325 (P.C. 1854) (discussing
the summary procedure for levying and executing on property for enforcement of unpaid
taxes).
An action at law [can commence] against the proprietor or representative of the plan-
tation [for a debt of unpaid taxes].... [However,] there is a more summary method of
procedure. Without going through the form of an action at law, the Receiver-General
causes a "summary summons" to be affixed to the principal building on the plantation,
requiring "the proprietor or representative" to pay the taxes due within twenty-four
hours. In default of payment, an order from a Judge [may be] obtained, declaring the
plantation executable for the amount due; [then] the Marshal proceeds to levy on and
take in execution the plantation, .... as if it had been made executable by a sentence
pronounced in an ordinary suit ....
Id.
21. See Angela Allen, Note, The Judicial Election Gag Is Removed-Now Texas
Should Remove Its Gag and Respond, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 201, 208 (2003) (noting
that the question of how judges were chosen in early Texas history was "in a great state of
turmoil").
Beginning with the Constitution of the Republic, judicial positions in the Texas Su-
preme Court were filled by a joint-ballot election of the House of Representatives and
Senate. The Texas Constitution of 1845, following the United States Constitution,
changed the process by providing that the governor, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, would appoint the justices who would serve a six-year term. It was not
until 1850, with an amendment to the Constitution of 1845, that Texas began using the
general election system to select its judges.
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until 1949.22 Interestingly, as of that year, the supreme court had
been reviewing various appeals and deciding all types of cases for
more than one hundred years; and England had codified the right
to obtain summary relief under the Summary Procedure Act nearly
one hundred years earlier.2 3
Without doubt, summary-judgment proceedings were and are
enormously controversial among jurists and commentators in both
England and Texas. Efficient,24 expeditious,25 and economical
26
are the most celebratory and frequently used terms that many ju-
rists use to describe summary relief. A significant number of dis-
senters, however, assert that all too often summary-judgment
practice is highly unwarranted,27 unfair,28 and unconstitutional.29
22. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1952)
(recognizing the influence of English and other states' summary-judgment procedures on
Texas's rules of civil procedure).
[W]hen the Advisory Committee of the Supreme Court of Texas began its labors in
1940 on the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, there was ample experience to warrant
the recommendation of a summary judgment rule for the state.... During the follow-
ing years there was persuasive advocacy of a rule authorizing summary judgment.
This was rewarded in the amendments of 1949, which became effective March 1, 1950.
Id.
23. See Summary Procedure on Bills of Exchange Act, 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67
(Eng.) (giving a party holding a promissory note or endorsed bill of exchange the ability to
petition a court for summary relief).
24. See Melinda Harmon & Gerri M. Fore, Summary Judgment in Complex Antitrust
Cases, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 381, 388 (1990) (citing evidence of an "apparent shift towards
acceptance of summary judgment as a means of efficiently disposing of non-meritorious
suits").
25. See Jeff Rambin, Attacking Errors in Affidavits Used As Summary Judgment
Proof, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 789, 789 (1994) (arguing that summary judgment "allows an
expedited resolution of a case"); Sheila A. Leute, Comment, The Effective Use of Sum-
mary Judgment: A Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 617,
639 (1988) (arguing that time and expense of litigation are other factors to consider when
advocating a more pervasive use of the summary judgment, and suggesting that the selec-
tive use of summary judgment in proper cases can reduce time and costs); see also 5B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1357 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that "the motion for summary judgment provides a more
expeditious and effective procedure than the Rule 12(b)(6) motion for quickly terminating
an action that does not appear to [merit] relief on its substantive merits").
26. See David F. Johnson, Employers' Liability for Independent Contractors' Injuries,
52 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (observing that "a summary judgment is a quick and eco-
nomical way of determining what duty, if any, an employer owes an independent
contractor").
27. See Sims v. Davis, 388 S.W.2d 752, 756 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1965, no writ)
(noting that the party opposing the motion should be given the benefit of every reasonable
inference).
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Perhaps the worst that has been said about the summary-judgment
rule originated centuries ago in England. During the 1800s,
learned jurists strongly asserted that summary proceedings were
dangerous or, certainly, potentially dangerous.3"
Consider, for example, the heated debate among Lords Hart and
Redesdale, and Sir Samuel Romilly-the author of the Charities
Procedure Act of 1812-and others in a string of decisions involv-
ing a single dispute. In Ex parte Greenhouse,31 a group of inter-
ested persons filed a summary-judgment motion under the
Charities Procedure Act.3 2 They asked the court to revoke Ludlow
The law is well settled that in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, all doubts
as to the existence of a genuine issue of fact must be resolved against the moving
party, and the opposite party is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference
which can properly be drawn in his favor. Since there were issues of fact raised in the
instant case, the granting of the summary judgment was unwarranted.
Id. (citations omitted).
28. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. Chernoff/Silver & Assocs., Inc., 137 S.W.3d 231, 237-38 (Tex.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ("As grounds for its motion, Chernoff argued
that Dr. Ginsburg [filed his third amended petition] fewer than seven days before the sum-
mary judgment hearing and [that] constituted unfair surprise and prejudice."); Gibson v.
Ellis, 126 S.W.3d 324, 332 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.) ("In support of the motion,
counsel indicated he needed additional time to prepare for trial and to prepare a defense
to Ellis's amended counterclaim .... The attorney claimed Ellis's last-minute motion for
summary judgment created an additional unfair burden upon Gibson's ability to address
Ellis's counterclaim.").
29. See generally Robert W. Clore, Comment, Texas Rule of Ciil Procedure 166a(i):
A New Weapon for Texas Defendants, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 813, 852 (1998) (observing that
because of "the uncertain 'adequate time for discovery' standard and the omission of pro-
cedural safeguards to deter parties from filing frivolous [summary judgment] motions,
plaintiffs may be further denied their day in court"). But see Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252
S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1952) (holding that summary judgments are designed to eliminate
unmeritorious claims or defenses and are not "intended to deprive litigants of their right to
a full hearing on the merits of any real issue of fact" (quoting Kaufman v. Blackman, 239
S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.))); Carrabba v. Employers
Cas. Co., 742 S.W.2d 709, 717 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (restating
the principle that, absent "controverted material issues, the grant of summary judgment
does not deny the losing party its constitutional rights to a jury trial").
30. See, e.g., Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Wils. Ch. 18, 20, 26 Eng. Rep. 9, 9 (Ch. 1818)
(containing commentary from Lord Hart about "[t]he danger of proceeding on affidavits"
without the benefit of cross-examination); In re Parish of Upton Warren, 1 My. & K. 410,
412-13, 39 Eng. Rep. 736, 738 (Ch. 1833) (indicating that the summary remedy provided for
by the Charities Procedure Act should be given very narrow limits).
31. 1 Swans. 60, 36 Eng. Rep. 297 (Ch. 1818).
32. See Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Swans. 60, 60, 36 Eng. Rep. 297, 297 (Ch. 1818) (indi-
cating that a "petition [was] presented under the act providing a summary remedy in cases
of abuses of trusts created for charitable purposes"); see also Ex parte Greenhouse, 1
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Corporation's right to serve as trustee of a charitable estate. Ac-
cording to the affidavit, the corporation breached a sacred trust
when it demolished a historical chapel and sold the materials.
33
The court awarded summary relief.
34
Sir Romilly supported the lower court's award of summary relief
and observed,
[Neither the court] nor the Master acting as its organ, has any au-
thority to proceed otherwise than as directed by the act. The express
direction is to proceed in a summary way, and by affidavit. It is vain
to insist on the conveyance of cross-examination; the Court has no
power to exhibit interrogatories. It has been argued on the other
side that no evidence can be good against a person who has [no]
opportunity of cross-examination; but that argument is confronted
by whole classes of cases [suggesting otherwise].35
Of course, Lord Hart thought differently and asserted:
Madd. 92, 103-05, 56 Eng. Rep. 36, 37 (1815) (noting that the petitioners wanted to pre-
serve the charity).
33. Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Madd. 92, 103-05, 56 Eng. Rep. 36, 40 (V.C. 1815).
Petitioners [wanted to preserve the charity and obtain] the directions of the Court[;]
[they also wanted to restore the] chapel-yard [for] the purposes of burial, and [wanted]
the funds of the said charity, and the materials of the said chapel, duly accounted for,
and the produce thereof accumulated for the purposes of rebuilding the said chapel.
The prayer of the petition [asked] ... one of the masters of the Court to inquire into
the [charity's] trusts . . . and ... approve a proper scheme for the due regulation and
management thereof ....
Affidavits were filed, verifying the statements made in the petition. On the part of the
corporation, affidavits were adduced to shew the ruinous state of the chapel, when the
same was pulled down.
Id. (emphasis added).
34. Exparte Greenhouse, 1 Wils. Ch. 18, 19,37 Eng. Rep. 9, 9 (Ch. 1818). "[A]n order
was made ... , declaring that the corporation of Ludlow had been guilty of a breach of trust
in pulling down St. Leonard's chapel, and converting and disposing of the materials, and
that they should be discharged from being feoffees or trustees of the charity estate ......
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
35. Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Swans. at 61-62, 36 Eng. Rep. at 298.
In bankruptcy, in lunacy, on interlocutory applications in courts of law as well as [in]
equity, on motions to set aside judgments, and for delivery of annuity deeds; in all
these instances, evidence is taken on affidavit. . . . The examination of the party on
interrogatories, proceeds on very different principles, from the examination of a wit-
ness; and is only a mode of compelling that discovery to which his opponent is enti-
tled. Under this statute neither the Court nor the Master has any authority to enforce
the attendance of witnesses.
Id.
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[T]he purposes of justice are better attained by [examining] interrog-
atories, with the opportunity of cross-examination, than by affidavits
... a deponent, instead of being sworn to divulge the whole truth,
swears only to the truth of what he states ... [and he carefully in-
serts] nothing unfavourable to his case .... [This is a] dangerous...
innovation in the rules of evidence.36
Lord Redesdale was even more cynical and emphatic about the
pitfalls of summary-judgment practice. He argued:
[T]his Act ought to be construed ... merely ... for the purpose of
saving either time or expense. Unquestionably, [the Charities Proce-
dure Act is] loosely and incorrectly worded .... It was not intended
to alter the law ....
I conceive that the [intent] of this Act . . . was simply . . . to
substitute a summary proceeding [for] a more regular proceeding.
[Still,] I have an objection, a fixed and rooted objection, to any rash
alterations of established laws, because I am thoroughly persuaded
that, generally speaking, such alterations lead to mischief. [Acts of
Parliament] are generally ill understood, . . . precipitately under-
taken,... loosely expressed ... [and] often extremely difficult to
interpret.37
36. Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Swans. at 61, 36 Eng. Rep. at 298; see also Ex parte Green-
house, 1 Wils. Ch. 18, 20-22, 37 Eng. Rep. 9, 10 (Ch. 1818) (noting Lord Hart's comments
on the dangers of proceeding on affidavits alone).
[Sir Samuel Romilly's Act] was intended merely to facilitate the proceedings as in a
cause [of action]. If this had been a reference in a cause instituted by information, the
[master] must have proceeded on interrogatories in the usual way, and we should have
been entitled to the benefit of cross-examination. There can be no difference in prin-
ciple between the proceedings instituted under the summary mode, authorised by the
act, and those under an information. The act only provides what shall be the proceed-
ings in court on the petition . . . it cannot be considered as taking away the ordinary
mode of [a] proceeding. The danger of proceeding on affidavits is strongly evinced in
the present case ....
Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Wils. Ch. at 20, 36 Eng. Rep. at 9 (emphasis added). "It is a first
principle of evidence that a party is not to be bound by the testimony of a witness whom he
has not an opportunity of cross-examining." Ex parte Greenhouse, 1 Wils. Ch. at 22, 36
Eng. Rep. at 10.
37. Corp. of Ludlow v. Greenhouse, 1 Bligh N.S. 17, 47-50, 4 Eng. Rep. 780, 791-92
(H.L. 1827); see also In re Parish of Upton Warren, 1 My. & K. 410, 412-13, 39 Eng. Rep.
736, 738 (1833) (recalling the decree from Ludlow).
[Sir Samuel Romilly's Act] applied exclusively to cases of a simple kind, where the
nature of the trust was clear and undisputed, and the charity merely required regula-
tion or the appointment of new trustees; but it could not be extended to cases in which
the facts were complicated or doubtful, [where parties allegedly breached a trust], or
[Vol. 36:535
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Early on, Texas jurists and commentators voiced similar alarms
about the real and potential dangers associated with summary-
judgment motions. For example, three years after the Texas Su-
preme Court approved summary proceedings, Roy McDonald-
the renowned commentator on Texas Civil Procedure-warned:
"[S]ummary judgment practice is not without its dangers. ' 3  To
prove his point, he cited trial judges' comments, rulings, and exper-
iences. 39 McDonald suggested, however, that the fear of audita-
querela-like summary judgments in Texas-based solely on the evi-
dence in the petitioners' affidavits-was probably premature. 40 At
that time, he correctly observed that the newly adopted rule "[did]
not envisage a trial on affidavits stripped of the benefit of oral
cross-examination. 41
[where] grave questions of law were to be litigated and determined. . . . [I]n The
Corporation of Ludlow v. Greenhouse in the House of Lords .... Lord Eldon and
Lord Redesdale.. . entered into a critical examination of the statute, and came to the
conclusion that the summary remedy thereby given ought to be confined within very
narrow limits. [A previous court had declared that a charity could not receive sum-
mary relief respecting] an adverse claim to property, or ... a breach of trust [that a
constructive trustee had allegedly committed].
Id. (citation omitted).
38. Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 287 (1952).
39. Id. at 287-88 nn.6-9.
40. id. at 290.
Although the court may believe that the weight of the evidence clearly favors the
movant, that does not justify sustaining the motion. . . .These motions require the
exercise of similar judicial talents, and their effectiveness as procedural techniques
depends in no small measure on the ability and conscientiousness of the judge.
... Though the affidavits appear ever so positive, the court may well determine that
the interests of justice require that the statements be tested by oral cross-examination.
Id.
41. Id. at 288. Fifty years ago, McDonald also stated that "summary judgment may
well be denied in cases of particular types ... where the controversy involves important
elements of public policy." Id. at 290. Of course, nearly fifty years later, the converse is
true. Texas's judges often award summary relief to one party or the other in heated con-
troversies involving serious issues of public policy. Compare Dover v. Baker, Brown,
Sharman & Parker, 859 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)
(noting that Dover's claims for damages resulted from illegal business transactions in
which Dover knowingly and willingly participated; thus "[h]is illegal conduct is not inciden-
tal to his claims; it is inextricably intertwined with those claims. Because Dover's illegal act
contributed to his injury, the trial court correctly granted appellees' summary judgment on
the grounds of public policy."), with Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 76 S.W.3d 555, 564 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("[The Lehmanns also claimed] that the trial
court erred [by] granting Har-Con's motion for summary judgment and [by] denying their
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Still, more than fifty years later, a significant number of highly
talented jurists in Texas continue to proclaim that summary-judg-
ment practice is inherently or potentially dangerous for a variety of
reasons. Just two years after the supreme court approved the rule,
the Beaumont Court of Appeals stated that permitting a motion
for summary judgment was potentially dangerous. And the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals concluded that the rule could encourage
"sham"42 proceedings, thereby causing "grave injustice"43 in Texas.
Fifteen years later, Justice Massey, the Chief Justice of the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals, suggested that summary proceedings
were dangerous. 44 From his viewpoint, there was little to prevent
lower courts from granting summary relief to less-than-credible pe-
titioners, or on the basis of less-than-credible evidence appearing
in petitioners' affidavits.45
An examination of commentators' research in Texas law journals
also reveals genuine concerns about summary-judgment practice in
motion for summary judgment because the indemnity violates public policy.... We reject
the Lehmanns' conclusion ....").
42. Cf Dunn v. Tillman, 255 S.W.2d 933, 937-38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, no
writ) (commenting about the dangers of improvident use of summary judgments).
[Where a defendant's] credibility ... is crucial, summary judgment becomes improper
and a trial indispensible .... We think that Rule 56 was not designed ... to foreclose
plaintiff's privilege of examining defendant at a trial, especially [regarding] matters
peculiarly within defendant's knowledge. [A recent case in the court below illustrates]
the dangers... of summary judgments, if not cautiously employed .... There the judge
refused to grant summary judgment for defendants, despite a mass of impressive affi-
davits .. .which on their face made plaintiffs' case seem nothing but a sham ....
Id. (emphasis added).
43. Cf Dunn v. Tillman, 255 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1953, no
writ) (illustrating how "[g]rave injustice might easily result" from use of summary
judgments).
[During the trial], cross examination of the defendants revealed facts... unknown by
plaintiffs, that so riddled the defendants' case . . .that the judge entered judgment
against them for several million dollars ....
"We do not believe that [where a] decision must turn on the reliability of witnesses,
the Supreme Court, by authorizing summary judgments, intended to permit a 'trial by
affidavits,' if either party objects. That procedure ... began to be outmoded at com-
mon law in the 16th century, [and, if now revived, it would] often favor unduly the
party with the more ingenious and better paid lawyer. Grave injustice might easily
result."
Id. (emphasis added).
44. Hardy v. Johnson, 434 S.W.2d 932, 937 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, no writ)
(Massey, C.J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 937-38 (explaining why the court should reverse and remand).
2005] SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Texas as well as in the federal circuits. To illustrate, Judge Patricia
Wald, the former Chief Judge for the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, produced this conclusion in her
research: "[A] sample of summary judgments suggests that, at the
very least, there is a real danger of summary judgment being
stretched far beyond its originally intended or proper limits.
46
Another commentator even suggested that courts' willingness to
accelerate and expedite summary judgments is dangerous for two
additional reasons. First, such tolerance for expediency will deter
truly aggrieved parties from filing legitimate suits and asking for a
trial by jury.47 Second, courts' eagerness to award summary relief
will decrease legitimate plaintiffs' access to court. 48 Finally, in re-
Certainly it must be conceded that in the form in which Exhibit D appears as a part of
Mr. Jones' affidavit it could not constitute evidence of any [cancellation notice for] any
insurance policy....
Furthermore I am of the opinion that his credibility would have been [an issue] even if
Mr. Jones' affidavit had been sufficient[.] [W]here such is the case[,] summary judg-
ment is improper.... A fact finder presented [with] such testimony could accept such
evidence as positive proof .... [I]t would be a dangerous practice in summary judg-
ment proceedings to found a judgment upon [an assertion in one's] affidavit that he
had performed the duty when evidence to the contrary ... would be completely un-
available to the respondent party and impossible for him to attack in any manner
other than by cross-examination.
Id. (emphasis added).
46. See Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1917
(1998) (commenting on the results of a summary-judgment survey).
[The D.C. Circuit] is very friendly to summary judgment, and while we often reverse
summary judgments on the merits of a legal question involved (nine times in my six-
month survey), we send them back because of the existence of genuine issues of mate-
rial fact far less frequently (three times).
Id.; see also Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 343 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The dangers of robust
use of summary judgment to clear trial dockets are particularly acute in current sex dis-
crimination cases.").
47. J.P. Kumar, "Fair Game": Leveling the Playing Field in Scientology Litigation, 16
REV. LITIG. 747, 763 (1997).
48. See J.P. Kumar, "Fair Game": Leveling the Playing Field in Scientology Litigation,
16 REV. LITIG. 747, 763 (1997) (observing that "[s]ummary judgment is generally inappro-
priate until sufficient discovery has been conducted, but discovery alone may present
enough trauma and expense to eliminate the ill-equipped plaintiff"). "While accelerating
and expediting summary judgment proceedings may partly address this concern, the dan-
gers of deterring legitimate suits and infringing on plaintiffs' access to court rise accord-
ingly." Id.; see also Conley v. Bd. of Trs. of Gren. County Hosp., 707 F.2d 175, 178 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1983) (declining "to review the procedural propriety of the sua sponte grant of sum-
mary judgment"). The court concluded "that the entry of summary judgment on the prop-
erty interest question without a cross-motion by plaintiffs was not procedurally erroneous,"
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cent years, summary-judgment practice in Texas has become argua-
bly more dangerous for reasons that have very little to do with its
legal complexities or technicalities. 49 An examination of those con-
cerns appears shortly.
But first, consider this general observation: Many Texans have
negative views about the state's judiciary and its judges. Even a
cursory reading of Texas's newspapers reveals a disturbing truth.
Fairly large portions of various groups in Texas-the public at
large, consumers, small businesses, professionals, corporations, and
partnerships-believe intensely that the judiciary branch of gov-
ernment is as corrupt 50 and partisan 51 as the legislative and execu-
recognized "that the sua sponte grant of summary judgment is a dangerous practice," but
concluded that those dangers were not present in the controversy. Id.; see also Capital
Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods., 628 F.2d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1980) (declaring that the
lower court's sua sponte grant of summary judgment that was adverse to Capital's causes of
action was improper and a deviation from the court's duty to strictly comply with procedu-
ral safeguards).
49. Cf. David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 54 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1, 131 (2002) (explaining that successful summary-judgment practice depends on both
technical and non-technical factors).
While following the technically complex summary judgment procedures detailed in
this article is fundamental, it does not ensure successful prosecution of, or defense
against, a motion for summary judgment. Effective advocacy in summary judgment
practice depends on strategic timing decisions, development and use of evidence, writ-
ten persuasion, and knowledge of the judge. These factors, combined with technical
correctness, ultimately determine success in summary judgment practice.
Id.; cf. also Lynne Liberato & Kent Rutter, Evaluating Appeals by the Numbers, 66 TEX.
B.J. 768, 771-72 (2003) ("At the trial court level, summary judgment practice remains
highly technical .... [And] [s]ummary judgment practice deserves its reputation for being
complex and technical,").
50. See Editorial, Texas Judges: Give Texans a Vote on Appointment-Retention Elec-
tions, Hous. CHRON., May 9, 2003, at A46 (arguing for a new method of choosing judges).
Money and politics play too great a role today in the way Texans choose their judges.
The current system of electing judges is haphazard in the quality of jurists it produces
and too open to corruptive influences.
Texans deserve better.
Campaign contributions to judicial candidates from well-heeled lawyers and big law
firms-whether the candidates are running for state district benches, lower appellate
positions or the Texas Supreme Court-raise questions about fairness and impartiality
when those same lawyers appear before judges to whom they've given money.
As for politics, the law is neither Republican nor Democrat. It should be blind.
Id.; see also Richard A. Roman, Editorial, Texas Must Review How It Picks Judges, EL
PASO TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at B9 (suggesting "[t]here is a crises within the Texas judicial
system").
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tive branches. In fact, given that the public's perception of judges
is so negative, many Texans want a system that appoints judges ini-
tially; and, if judges "[are] fit to remain on the bench," voters
would return them to office.52
The "Justice at Stake Campaign" is a national partnership that seeks to keep courts
fair and impartial. Recently it commissioned a poll among judges and registered
voters.
Results of the poll "are both alarming and encouraging," according to the American
Bar Association ....
Many state judges are deeply concerned about how much influence campaign contri-
butions have in judicial elections.
Judges are concerned about the public's view that money, privilege and power have
more influence on our legal system than fairness and impartiality.
Id.
51. See Linda Campbell, Merit Selection a Win, Not a Loss, for Voters, FT. WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, May 1, 2003, at B13 (advocating merit selection of judges).
Plenty of fallacies were tossed about [during a recent debate on the subject] . . . ,most
of them trashing a bill that proposes a system of gubernatorial appointments with
retention elections.
The biggest misimplication may have been that it threatens the very foundations of
democracy.
SJR 33... calls for a constitutional amendment to switch the way that Texas selects its
judges.
If voters approved the amendment, the governor would appoint judges to the Texas
Supreme Court, Court of Criminal Appeals, intermediate appellate courts and state
district courts.
This debate shouldn't center on whether left-wing social engineers or right-wing trog-
lodytes are gaining control of our state benches.
It's about whether a judge can judge impartially, independent of party agendas, unin-
fluenced by high-faluting contributors, unimpeded by eroding public trust, beholden
only to the law and the public interest.
Id.
52. See Editorial, Texas Judges: Give Texans a Vote on Appointment-Retention Elec-
tions, Hous. CHRON., May 9, 2003, at A46 (commenting on the movement to revamp the
way Texas's judges are selected).
Reformers like Supreme Court Chief Justice Tom Phillips, a Republican, and former
Chief Justice John Hill, a Democrat, have long sought to overhaul the way Texans
select their judges, yet haven't gotten much traction. [They] believe the public would
be better served if there were a system in which judges were first appointed and then
faced retention elections allowing voters to determine if they were fit to remain on the
bench.
Fortunately, the momentum may be shifting in the reformers' favor.
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There is more. Many Texans believe adamantly that the Texas
Supreme Court and lower courts are particularly biased against
powerless plaintiffs.53 In addition, consumers believe Texas's
judges systematically ignore consumers' concerns and deliver bi-
ased pro-business decisions.54 More specifically, insurance con-
sumers think the Texas Supreme Court's decisions are generally
biased in favor of powerful insurance companies, because insureds
are significantly less likely to receive favorable rulings.55 Further-
Texas' system has been in place since 1850. It's about time Texans had a vote on
whether . they want to reform a 19th-century judicial selection process.
Id.
53. See Walter Borges, Editorial, Rule Puts Plaintiffs in Tougher Spot, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 9B ("Anyone who has found it necessary to sue someone
in the Texas courts in the last five years knows that the legal system is badly skewed in
favor of defendants. Since 1990, the Texas Supreme Court has made it increasingly diffi-
cult for plaintiffs to prove their cases and collect damages.").
54. See, e.g., Editorial, Avoid This Crash: Tort Reform Would Protect Negligent Doc-
tors, Businesses, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 2, 2003, at 24 ("In Harris County, every civil court
judge above justice of the peace is a conservative Republican. Most are impartial, a few
are openly biased in favor of business, and none is unfairly sympathetic to personal injury
lawyers."); Texas Justices Alter Burden for Some Trials, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 20,
1997, at B5 (noting Texas Citizen Action's warning that current Texas Supreme Court rul-
ings favor defendants); Walter Borges, Rule Puts Plaintiffs in Tougher Spot, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, May 22, 1997, at 9B (reporting the conflict of recent decisions with the
goals of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
[The Texas Supreme Court's decisions] have gutted the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act-the most important state consumer law statute-limited the ability of Texas con-
sumers to sue doctors and lawyers for malpractice and repeatedly overruled juries on
whim to ambiguously redefine what constitutes evidence.
Now the court is proposing a procedural change that will limit plaintiffs' rights even
more.
Id. But see David Pasztor, Insurance Lawsuit Shadows State Race: Cornyn's Attack on
Farmers May Hurt Republican Candidate for Attorney General, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN,
Aug. 8, 2002, at Al ("[Austin Mayor Kirk Watson] harshly criticized [Justice Greg] Ab-
bott's record on the [Texas] Supreme Court, saying [that] Abbott often favored insurance
companies over consumers when he was on the bench. [Jason] Johnson said Abbott's judi-
cial record demonstrates a mixed bag of rulings sometimes favoring businesses, sometimes
consumers.").
55. See Mental Anguish Isn't 'Bodily Injury,' State's Supreme Court Rules, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 17, 1997, at 40A (quoting a plaintiff's attorney, who was frustrated
with the court's recent decisions and the apparent correlation with the court's political
makeup).
A woman who alleged mental anguish after revealing photos of her were duplicated
and passed around by a supermarket photo lab technician has lost a battle in the Texas
Supreme Court.
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more, a significant number of Texans believe the Texas Supreme
Court and appellate courts generate unduly tortuous and complex
analyses to justify arguably extremely biased, highly questionable,
and wildly unwarranted decisions. 56
"In insurance cases and in personal injury cases, it seems like the defense is winning 95
percent of those over the last few years in the Texas Supreme Court," Mr. Chester
said. "So, given the political bent of the court, it's not surprising."
Id.; see also Bruce Hight, Court Limits Liabilities of Truck Manufacturers, Insurance Com-
panies, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 25, 1993, at G1 (citing the mixed emotion of corpo-
rate and consumer advocacy groups in response to the court's current trend ostensibly
favoring manufacturers and insurers).
The Texas Supreme Court awarded the business community two victories... in rulings
that limit the liability of manufacturers and insurance companies.
Ted Roberts, a spokesman for the Texas Association of Business [praised the ruling
and stated that this is a good thing] ....
But the two rulings drew criticism from [the] executive director of Consumer Union's
southwest regional office in Austin.
"This is a continuation of a trend on the court's part to consistently find in favor of
manufacturers and insurers and against the interests of individual consumers who
have been injured, killed or maimed as the result of corporate irresponsibility," [the
executive director] said.
Id.
56. See Editorial, An Activist: Owen's Record Gives Reason for Pause on Judicial
Post, Hous. CHRON., May 12, 2003, at A18 (referring to the filibuster of United States
Senators that prevented the appointment of Texas Supreme Court Justice Priscilla Owen
on grounds that her decisions parallel her personal political agenda).
[Forty-four] U.S. senators refused to [end] a filibuster on the nomination of Priscilla
Owen to the [Fifth] Circuit Court of Appeals. Good. Owen's judicial record shows
less interest in impartially interpreting the law than in pushing an agenda.
The problem is not that Owen is "too conservative," as some of her critics complain,
but that she too often contorts rulings to conform to her particular conservative out-
look. It's saying something that Owen is a regular dissenter on a Texas Supreme
Court made up mostly of other conservative Republicans.
On cases that have reached the [Texas] Supreme Court in which minor girls have tried
to get a judge's permission to avoid having to tell their parents they want to have an
abortion, Owen and fellow-Justice Nathan Hecht have tried to set up legal hurdles so
high hardly any girl in Texas could qualify.
The complaints against Owen's conduct on the bench run from a penchant for over-
turning jury verdicts on tortuous readings of the law to a distinct bias against consum-
ers and in favor of large corporations. Some detractors find her demeanor
unbecoming of a judge ....
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Undeniably, these perceptions are exceedingly unsettling and
potentially dangerous, for they could seriously erode the public's
confidence in judges and respect for judicial decisions." Arguably,
some corrosive effects of such negative sentiments have occurred
already. A critical review of what plaintiffs think about summary-
judgment practice in Texas reveals widespread hostility, bitterness,
and anger toward judges.5 ' Often, when trial courts grant defend-
ants' motions for summary relief, those decisions affect an ex-
tremely large number of plaintiffs. Very possibly, plaintiffs as well
as the public at large find it dreadfully disconcerting that trial
judges, rather than juries, are deciding so many enormously per-
sonal and controversial issues.
To illuminate the degree and severity of the frustration, consider
a few widely circulated reports that appeared in several major
57. Judge Rejects Complaints About Air Force Noise, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2003, at
A36.
58. Cf Texas Justices Alter Burden for Some Trials, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 20,
1997, at B5 (noting Justice Spector's opinion that frivolous cases are rare under existing
rules).
[The Texas Supreme Court approved a "no-evidence" summary judgment rule that]
will make lawsuits in Texas more expensive and could keep legitimate cases from go-
ing to trial [according to Texas Citizen Action's director].
Supreme Court Justice Rose Spector ... agreed. "Truly frivolous cases are relatively
rare and are readily disposed of under the existing rule," Spector wrote in a dissenting
opinion.
ld.; cf Zeke MacCormack, Court Permits Lawsuit Against 3 Police Officers: Fredericks-
burg Man Claims Dispute About a Softball Led to Assault, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Nov. 2, 2002, at 5B (noting the frustration of the plaintiff's attorney regarding repeated
summary judgments against his clients).
An appeals court has cleared the way for a Fredericksburg man to pursue a civil rights
lawsuit against three police officers he says assaulted him over a wayward softball.
[The court] upheld a district court judge's dismissal of Vern Hallmark's claims against
the city of Fredericksburg ....
Hallmark's attorney, Harry Skeins... expressed frustration at the protracted litigation
in the case ....
Three summary judgments issued by State District Judge Steve Ables have stalled
justice, he said.




Texas newspapers over an eighteen-month period. In 2001, claim-
ants who represented arguably thousands of homeowners and re-
sidents sued the City of San Antonio and developers.5 9 The
complaint alleged that the city did not follow its own subdivision
rules and regulations and that the developers' implemented plan
deviated substantially from the original plan.60 San Antonio filed a
summary-judgment motion in a state district court.61 The city ar-
gued that the implemented plan conformed to the platting rules.62
San Antonio also asserted that the residents had no standing to sue
because only the city could enforce its rules and regulations.63 In
May 2003, the trial judge accepted San Antonio's argument,
awarded summary relief, and "[threw] out the suit before it could
go to trial."64
In January 2003, a state district judge "derailed a longstanding
claim by hundreds of descendants of Jose Manuel Balli Villarreal
who [argued] that decades ago they were cheated out of 83,000
acres in Kenedy County .... The case was set [for trial, but the
judge granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment]. 65
59. See, e.g., Gleason v. Isbeld, 145 S.w.3d 354, 361 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, pet. filed) ("Inappropriate conduct and incivility threaten the pursuit and administra-
tion of justice in that they damage the public's perception of our legal system, [and] under-
mine the credulity and authority of the courts ...."); In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 647
(Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998, rev. denied) (noting Texas's "scheme of judicial accountability arises
in part from a justifiable concern for the relationship between judicial conduct and public
perception").
60. Fernandez v. City of San Antonio, No. 04-03-00512, 2004 WL 2997712, at *1 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio Dec. 29, 2004, no pet. h.); see also Lety Laurel, Alamo Farmsteads Suit
Thrown Out, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jun. 11, 2002, at 1H ("Residents Fernando
Fernandez and AJ Imad, along with the Alamo Farmsteads Babcock Road Homeowners
Association .... [claimed that the originally adopted neighborhood plan did not] allow for
[a] 66-home community that [developers had] planned to develop on a 15-acre tract in
Alamo Farmsteads.").
61. Fernandez, 2004 WL 2997712, at *1 (noting that "[t]he City ... sought summary
judgment on numerous grounds").
62. Lety Laurel, Alamo Farmsteads Suit Thrown Out, SAN ANTONIo EXPRESS-NEWS,
June 11, 2002, at 1H.
63. Id.
64. Id. ("Judge John Gabriel in the 285th District Court granted the city's motion for
summary judgment.., ruling [that] there were no genuine issues [of fact] to take before a
jury .... Kitchener Land Development and [developer Bill] Jackson are expecting the
judge soon to rule in their favor as well.").
65. Kate Hunger, Judge Hobbles Ballis' Claim to Land: Descendants' Papers Are Not
Persuasive in Kenedy County Dispute, SAN ANTONio EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 8, 2003, at lB.
"[Senior District Judge Pat] McDowell ruled that two key pieces of evidence for the de-
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In May of that year, the same newspaper revealed that a "lengthy
legal battle . . . over property valuations in an upscale Kendall
County subdivision stalled.., when [the] judge ruled that property
owners [were ineligible] for wildlife management exemptions. 66
The date for the jury trial had been set, but the district judge
granted Kendall Appraisal District's motion for summary
judgment.67
And in March of 2003, a different newspaper reported that land-
owners in sixteen Texas counties commenced a nuisance action
against the United States Air Force.68 Quite simply, the landown-
ers argued that jet noise and exhaust pollution reduced the prop-
erty value.69 In addition, they complained that the pollution
produced physical and mental distress. 70  Still, a federal district
judge in West Texas awarded summary relief to the Air Force,
scendants, an 1804 title transfer document and a 1949 lease, were unreliable and therefore
inadmissible." Id.
66. Kate Hunger, Judge Kills Subdivision's Wildlife Tax Break Claim: Residents of
Upscale Cordillera Ranch Must Pay 1998-2000 Taxes, SAN AroNlo EXPRESS-NEWS, May
21, 2003, at 5B.
Cordillera Ranch Ltd. and hundreds of property owners have filed five lawsuits-one
each year from 1998 through 2002-seeking a refund of about $3 million in taxes paid
to Kendall County and the Boerne School District. [The latest] ruling applies to the
first three lawsuits-1998, 1999 and 2000-which had been consolidated into one case.
Id.
67. Id.
68. Judge Rejects Complaints About Air Force Noise, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28, 2003, at
A36. See generally Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n v. United States Air
Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 763 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (mem. op.) (providing a factual background on
the suit and summary-judgment motions), vacated sub nom. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos
Heritage Ass'n v. F.A.A., No. 02-60288, 2004 WL 2295986, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004);
Welch v. United States Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797 (N.D. Tex. 2003) (mem. op.) (provid-
ing a factual background on the suit and summary-judgment motion by the West Texas
landowners), vacated sub nom. Davis Mountains Trans-Pecos Heritage Ass'n v. F.A.A.,
No. 02-60288, 2004 WL 2295986, at *1 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2004).
69. See Judge Rejects Complaints About Air Force Noise, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28,
2003, at A36 (stating that the plaintiffs said the noise from the daily training flights of U.S.
Air Force bombers was a nuisance and infringed on the use and enjoyment of the plaintiffs'
property).
70. See Welch v. United States Air Force, 249 F. Supp. 2d 797, 804 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(mem. op.) (complaining that the defendants "failed to take a hard look at the environ-
mental impacts of the [flights] on noise levels; human safety and health; ... human and
livestock annoyance; air quality; ... private property values; local customs and cultures ...
and the overall human environment and human condition").
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thereby effectively blocking a trial by jury.71 For sure, the land-
owners in this case-like the residents and property owners in the
other illustrated cases-were outraged.72 And to a great extent,
their extreme disgust evolved from the rule that judges have power
to decide such personal and important issues summarily without
the aid of or input from a jury of peers.
Certainly, Texas's courts have awarded summary relief to large
classes of plaintiffs.7 3 But all too often judges do not explain their
summary rulings or why they blocked trials by jury. Yet efforts to
71. See Judge Rejects Complaints About Air Force Noise, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28,
2003, at A36 (noting that Judge Sam Cummings signed the summary-judgment order).
The Air Force can continue its low-level bomber training flights over West Texas, a
federal judge has ruled, rejecting arguments from landowners that the daily flights
would create a nuisance and infringe on the use and enjoyment of their property.
U.S. District Judge Sam R. Cummings signed a summary judgment.., in the lawsuit
that 28 plaintiffs in 16 counties had brought against the government in November
2000. The plaintiffs own 530,000 acres....
He granted a summary judgment for the Air Force in a similar lawsuit filed by land-
owners in the Davis Mountains area.
Id.
72. See Judge Rejects Complaints About Air Force Noise, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28,
2003, at A36 ("'This is obviously disappointing to my clients because the long-term ef-
fects . . . of this program [on them] are rather severe,' lead plaintiff's attorney Frank M.
Bond... told the Lubbock Avalanche-Journal.").
73. See Peggy Fikac, Order Sets Stage for Appeal in USAA Case: Judge Verbally Re-
jected Company's Tax Refund Request in May, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 5,
2002, at 1E (providing an example of a summary-judgment ruling).
State District Judge Margaret Cooper of Travis County, in a final summary judgment
.... declared insurance companies' payment of gross premium taxes "does not exempt
them from paying all other types of taxes, such as the motor vehicle tax, the motor fuel
tax, and the sales and use tax."
Cooper initially sided with the state in a verbal ruling from the bench in May.
Id.; see also Robert W. Gee, Judge Will Support Church in Parking Garage Dispute: Hyde
Park Residents Had Fought Five-Story Project for 13 Years, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb.
13, 2003, at Al (noting a summary judgment in favor of a large church).
A state district judge said ... that he will rule in favor of Hyde Park Baptist Church in
its bid to build a five-story parking garage, ending, for now, a 13-year feud between
the church and its neighbors.
:* . Judge Pete Lowry said he would grant the church's motion for summary judgment
in its lawsuit against the city, effectively allowing a parking garage project to go for-
ward at the corner of 39th Street and Speedway ....
The dispute between the church and Hyde Park residents over the garage, perhaps the
most contentious chapter in a history of sour relations dating to the 1970s, ended up in
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force courts to state explicitly and intelligibly their reasons for
granting or denying summary relief have been ineffective. 74 Ar-
guably, this omission-more than any other reason-explains why
there is so much anger and frustration among a wide spectrum of
Texans and why so many Texans have negative attitudes toward
judges and summary-judgment practice.
At this point, it is worth stating that the Texas Supreme Court
adopted the summary-judgment rule primarily to prevent juries
from considering arguably groundless causes, to reduce costs, and
to increase "the efficient administration of justice."75 And by all
objective measures, the rule has achieved the intended goals.
court after the City Council backed a neighborhood appeal to the project and blocked
the garage from being built as planned.
Id. But see Jessica Deleon, Court to Consider Election Dispute, FT. WoRTH STAR-TELE-
GRAM, Mar. 8, 2003, at B6 (reporting the denial of a neighborhood association's motion for
summary judgment).
Judge Dana Womack of the 348th state District Court set a trial date ... to determine
whether the association had a right to cancel its Sept. 12 election of officers. The
scheduling decision . . . came after she denied a motion from the association's attor-
neys for a summary judgment, which equates to a dismissal, on the case.
The controversy began when the scheduled Sept. 12 election was canceled because the
newsletter containing the ballot was not distributed to all houses.
Id.
74. See generally John Williams & Janet Elliott, Top Donor Spends Big, Stays in Backz
ground, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 22, 2002, at Al (discussing legislation that would have re-
quired judges to state why they granted motions for summary judgment).
To some, Houston homebuilder Bob Perry is a well-intentioned man of legendary lar-
gesse who wants to shape Texas and the nation by chunking giant doses of money to
Republicans and their efforts.
But Perry has expressed his opinion about issues being debated at the Capitol. In May
1999 he wrote to [Lieutenant Governor Rick Perry], opposing a bill by Rep. Harold
Dutton, D-Houston.
The bill would have required judges to state the grounds when they grant a summary
judgment dismissing a lawsuit. Proponents of lawsuit limitations feared it would lead
to fewer dismissals.
"Please do what you can to make sure HB 2186 does not pass the Senate," Perry
wrote to the lieutenant governor.
The bill passed the Senate but was vetoed by then-Gov. George W. Bush.
Id.
75. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REv. 285, 286 (1952)
(noting that "[tihe rule is intended to eliminate the delay and expense which result from
paper issues which in truth are not factual issues").
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Therefore, it should not be surprising that summary proceedings
have generated extensive hostility among the general public. Even
some "trial and appellate courts [view] summary judgment practice
with hostility."76 The latter find the practice to be a harsh7 7 and
drastic78 procedure. Without doubt, it is a rule that demands strict
application and every indulgence for the nonmovant.79
76. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L. REV.
1497, 1516 (2000); see also Roy W. McDonald, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment, 15
Sw. L.J. 365, 373 (1961) (remarking that "[s]ome trial judges come to a motion for sum-
mary judgment reluctantly, predisposed to its denial"); Patrick K. Sheehan, Summary Judg-
ment: Let the Movant Beware, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 253, 254-55 (1976) (suggesting "Texas
courts tenaciously cling to the historical principle that the right to a trial should be jeal-
ously safeguarded").
77. See Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996,
writ denied) (stating that "Texas law recognizes summary judgment to be a harsh remedy
requiring strict construction"). "The reason for applying such a strict standard is because a
summary proceeding is 'not a conventional trial, but an exception to the usual and tradi-
tional formal procedure whereby witnesses are heard in open court and documentary proof
is offered and received into evidence."' Id. (quoting Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life
Ins. Co., 859 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied)). A summary
judgment is not intended to permit a trial by deposition or affidavit and should not be
resolved by weighing the relative strength of the conflicting facts and inferences. Id.
78. See Robinson v. Warner-Lambert, 998 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999,
no pet.) (commenting on the drastic nature of the remedy).
Robinson asserts that the court erred in granting summary judgment "as such a drastic
remedy is not appropriate where good-faith disagreements exist as to the type and
level of evidence required." . . . We have already detailed the standard of review to be
used in a no-evidence summary judgment. This is a significant change in summary
judgment practice in Texas. The court did not abuse its discretion in granting "such a
drastic remedy."
Id.
79. See generally Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 618, 358 S.W.2d 557, 562-63 (1962)
(commenting on the appropriate use of summary judgments).
Obviously mere conclusions will not suffice and cases so holding do not support the
thesis that in cases of inconsistency or conflict, the deposition prevails over the affida-
vit.... It is not the purpose of the summary judgment rule to provide either a trial by
deposition or a trial by affidavit, but rather to provide a method of summarily termi-
nating a case when it clearly appears that only a question of law is involved and that
there is no genuine issue of fact.
Id. See generally Garcia v. John Hancock Variable Life Ins. Co., 859 S.W.2d 427, 435 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1993, writ denied) (discussing summary judgment use).
The law in Texas is well settled that summary judgment is a harsh remedy which must
be strictly construed. This is because a summary proceeding is "not a conventional
trial, but an exception to the usual and traditional formal procedure whereby wit-
nesses are heard in open court and documentary proof is offered and received into
evidence."
Id. (quoting Richards v. Allen, 402, S.W.2d 158 (Tex. 1966)) (citation omitted).
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But this commentary does not concern whether the Texas Su-
preme Court should abolish the summary-judgment rule alto-
gether, even though it is a drastic and harsh rule that generates
widespread anger and hostility. Bluntly put, courts should never
permit juries to decide controversies where plaintiffs' claims are
indeed frivolous. Or stated more elegantly, all too often plaintiffs
simply cannot amass enough credible evidence to support a prima
facie case. Therefore, under those circumstances, trial judges
should perform a thorough good-faith analysis of affidavits and
other evidence, and dismiss clearly frivolous causes immediately.80
80. Cf Jeff Caplan, Baylor Ruled Not Liable for Player's Death, FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Feb. 7, 2004, at B5 (describing Baylor University's successful motion for sum-
mary judgment).
A state judge threw out six of seven counts of the wrongful death lawsuit filed against
Baylor University by the biological father of slain basketball player Patrick Dennehy.
Judge Ralph Strother of the 19th District Court ... ruled that Baylor was not liable for
the younger Dennehy's death because the university could not have foreseen the slay-
ing and because it could not control the behavior of an adult student-athlete off the
Baylor campus.
"Essentially our motion for summary http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ijudgment
http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - lwas granted in entirety," said attorney Wayne
Fisher, who represents Baylor ....
The lawsuit named Baylor and eight individual defendants ....
... [Athletics booster William F. Stevens, who attended the hearing,] called the law-
suit "a prototype of a frivolous http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ilawsuithttp://
web2.westlaw.comlresult/ - I."
Id.; cf also Chuck McCollough, Losers Told to Pay City for Lawsuit: Dispute Over 2000
Council Elections Ends with Selma's Court Victory, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Feb. 19,
2003, at 1H (describing a summary-judgment order involving city elections).
The City Council election of 2000 finally is over [after] three losing candidates lost a
lawsuit and have been ordered to pay the city more than $86,000.
The lawsuit ... alleged voter irregularities and sought to invalidate the election and
keep winners from being seated.
[A] three-judge panel issued a summary http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ijudg-
ment http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ifor the city [and settled the lawsuit] ....
[Mayor Jim Parma asserted that] "the plaintiffs ... missed an opportunity to file an
appeal of the three-judge panel ruling ... and Selma wins" .....
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On the other hand, however, we know the Supreme Court of
Texas approved summary-judgment practice to reduce costs and to
increase the efficient administration of justice. And under Rule
166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a claimant or a defend-
ing party may petition a court for summary relief in a declaratory-
judgment action.8" But it appears that the 1949 Texas Supreme
Court embraced the use of summary-judgment motions in declara-
tory-judgment trials without carefully or seriously weighing the
negative consequences of its decision.8 2 This Article, therefore, re-
views the practice and strongly recommends that the current su-
preme court prevent summary-judgment practice in declaratory-
judgment trials. Even a cursory review of declaratory-judgment
trials shows lower courts have great difficulty trying to harmonize
the legal requirements and expectations under Rule 166a and
Texas's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). 83
To repeat, the Texas Supreme Court approved the summary-
judgment rule to terminate legal controversies quickly, economi-
cally, and efficiently "when it clearly appears that only questions of
law are involved and... there are no genuine issues of fact."'8 4 But
the Texas Legislature also adopted the UDJA "to diminish the de-
lay and expense of proceedings in court. ' 85 Unlike the summary-
[But, he added that] the city has a responsibility to recoup the money because tax-
payer funds were spent on "a frivolous http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ilawsuithttp://
web2.westlaw.com/result/ - I."
Id.
81. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(a) (stating in pertinent part that "[a] party seeking ... to
obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the adverse party has appeared or
answered, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
upon all or any part thereof"); TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(b) (stating in pertinent part that "[a]
party against whom . . . a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part
thereof").
82. See generally Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 285-
86 (1952) (discussing the general background behind the Texas Supreme Court's adoption
of the summary-judgment rule).
83. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002 (Vernon 1997).
84. Marts ex rel. Marts v. Transp. Ins. Co., 11 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, pet. denied) (emphasis added).
85. Henry W. Simon, Declaratory Judgments-Questions of Fact, 11 TEX. L. REV. 351,
354 (1933); see also Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. 2004) ("The Declara-
tory Judgments Act provides an efficient vehicle for parties to seek a declaration of rights
under certain instruments .... "); Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d
440, 472 (Tex. 1993) ("In enacting the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, the Texas Leg-
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judgment rule, however, the UDJA gives Texas's courts the power
to resolve questions of fact and questions of law.86 Moreover, the
legislature enacted the UDJA to encourage courts to settle dis-
putes and provide relief "from uncertainty and insecurity with re-
spect to rights, status and other legal relations. '8 7 And unlike the
requirements under Rule 166a, the UDJA requires courts to con-
strue and administer the act very liberally to achieve the -act's
stated goals.88
Therefore, at this juncture, the following question begs for an
answer: What are the real benefits of allowing or encouraging
summary-judgment practice in declaratory-judgment trials?
Clearly, the UDJA gives courts considerable discretion and power
to settle disputes without entertaining a motion for summary judg-
ment. Furthermore, as discussed more thoroughly in later sections,
a critical examination of Texas's case law over the last fifty-five
years discloses surprisingly that summary-judgment practice actu-
ally increases litigation costs and substantially decreases the effi-
cient administration of justice in declaratory-judgment trials.
But more important, those same analyses also show that sum-
mary-judgment practice in declaratory-judgment trials has pro-
duced several unintended and undesirable consequences. First, the
summary-judgment rule promotes highly superficial, unintelligible,
and convoluted rulings. Second, trial judges rarely mention or dis-
cuss intelligibly plaintiffs' petitions for declaratory judgment when
islature has granted a broad right of standing: any person 'whose rights, status or other
legal relations are affected by a statute' may seek a declaration of those rights."); infra Parts
III and Ill(A).
86. See, e.g., In re K.T., 107 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.)
("For instance, if a trial court makes an award of attorney's fees under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, it resolves both questions of fact (whether the fees sought are reasonable
and necessary), as well as questions of law (whether an award of fees is equitable and
just) .... "); Henry W. Simon, Declaratory Judgments-Questions of Fact, 11 TEX. L. REv.
351, 354 (1933) ("There is no reason [to believe that a desire to diminish court delays and
expenses cannot] be accomplished as fully by allowing courts to enter declaratory judg-
ments on questions of fact as [well as] on questions of law.").
87. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997); see also City of
Waco v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 83 S.W.3d 169, 177 (Tex. App.-Austin
2002, pet. denied) (concluding that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) "pro-
vides a basis by which a claimant can obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal
relations under a writing or a statute .... The legislature intended the UDJA to be reme-
dial, to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, and to
be liberally construed.").
88. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997).
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opposing parties file motions for summary judgment. Also, al-
lowing trial judges to apply this "harsh" and "drastic" procedural
rule in declaratory-judgment trials-without compelling judges to
explain intelligibly their reasons for awarding or denying summary
relief-lends credence to the argument: Texas judges are biased.
Finally, summary-judgment practice encourages judges to ignore
their duty and authority under the UDJA. Again, lower courts
have authority to construe and administer the UDJA liberally as
well as power to decide both questions of law and questions of fact.
However, a motion for summary judgment typically forces trial
judges to focus on a single issue-to determine whether a genuine
issue of fact exists. Arguably, such narrow concentration causes
judges to waste an enormous amount of precious resources.
Instead of weighing whether to grant or deny a motion for sum-
mary relief, it would be exceedingly more economical and efficient
if judges invested time and limited resources deciding whether to
award declaratory relief. Focusing solely on the latter would allow
and force Texas's judges to perform a proposed two-step analysis,
one that would address both questions of fact and questions of law.
After all, when declaratory-judgment petitioners ask courts of ap-
peals to review adverse summary rulings, many appellate courts
perform a two-step analysis to determine whether petitioners
should receive a declaratory judgment.
To help illustrate this and related points, consider the brief facts
and the extraordinarily simple controversy in Gray v. Town of
Westlake.89 Gray owned a boarding business for dogs located in a
residential neighborhood. 90 Gray's neighbors complained about
the level of noise and accused Gray of violating Westlake's noise
ordinances. 91 Gray insisted, however, that her property was lo-
cated beyond Westlake's city limits.92 Out of frustration, the neigh-
bors and Gray sued each other." To help settle the dispute,
Westlake intervened and filed a declaratory-judgment action.94 In
89. No. 2-02-173-CV, 2003 WL 22351652 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2003, pet.
denied) (mem. op.).
90. Gray v. Town of Westlake, No. 2-02-173-CV, 2003 WL 22351652, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mer. op.).
91. See id. (noting that Gray's neighbors filed suit to reduce the noise level).
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the petition, the town asked the court to declare (1) that Gray's
property was indeed located within city limits, and (2) that Gray's
conduct violated the city's noise ordinances. 95
Gray and Westlake filed competing motions for partial summary
judgment regarding a question of fact-whether Gray's property
was actually within Westlake's jurisdiction.96 Collectively, both
parties submitted an abundance of summary-judgment evidence-
a residency affidavit, a plethora of paid utility bills, police reports,
zoning applications, ordinance applications, sales tax receipts, and
maps.97 By the way, it is important to note that those proffered
legal documents would certainly comprise the entire body of evi-
dence that the trial court would have used to help decide whether
to award declaratory relief.
Ultimately, the trial court denied Gray's summary-judgment mo-
tion, but the judge granted Westlake's motion for partial summary-
judgment.98 Gray then filed a motion for severance, asking the
court to sever the city's declaratory-judgment action from her law-
suit.99 She also asked the judge to finalize the summary judgment
order so she could file an appeal.1"' The trial court granted the
severance.10 1 Shortly thereafter, Gray appealed her adverse sum-
mary-judgment ruling and Westlake appealed the trial court's deci-
sion to sever its declaratory-judgment action from the remainder of
the actions in Gray's lawsuit. 10 2
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals quickly concluded: "[T]he
trial court did not abuse its discretion [by] severing the declaratory
judgment action."" 3 But after affirming the severance, the appel-
late court-like the trial court below-never examined or dis-
95. Gray, 2003 WL 22351652, at *1.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *1-2.
98. Id. at *2.
99. Id. at *5. "Gray's suit involves more than one cause of action (e.g., malicious
prosecution, abuse of process, civil conspiracy, violation of an ordinance, and declaratory
judgment) .... " Id.
100. Gray v. Town of Westlake, No. 2-02-173-CV, 2003 WL 22351652, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
101. Id.
102. See id. at *4 ("Westlake [argued] that the trial court erred by severing the declar-
atory judgment actions from the suit ... because the requirements for severance were not
met.").
103. Id. at *5.
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cussed the merits of Westlake's action for declaratory relief. 10 4
Incredibly, the appellate court simply ignored that equitable action
altogether.'0 5 It did not cite or discuss a single rule or standard
outlining the proper conditions under which a court should grant
or deny declaratory relief. 10 6 Instead, the Fort Worth Court of Ap-
peals-like the trial judge-discussed only the respective motions
for partial summary judgment.1 0 7
Of course, the court of appeals quoted Texas's summary-judg-
ment rules extensively, including the incessantly quoted rule: Sum-
mary judgment is proper when "no genuine issue of material fact
exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."'' 08
Finally, to resolve the conflict, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court's decisions to grant and deny, respectively,
Westlake's and Gray's motions for partial summary judgment. 0 9
Then, in the opinion's very last sentence, the court of appeals actu-
ally declared "that Gray's Property [was] not located within the
town limits of Westlake."'1 °
But again, it is important to repeat: This was an extremely sim-
ple case involving a minor conflict among neighbors. In addition,
Westlake's petition for declaratory relief was not a monumental re-
quest involving complicated facts. So, we must ask, were the trial
and appellate courts' deliberations stellar examples of prompt, effi-
cient, and inexpensive justice? Arguably, they were not. Actually,
the trial court could have reached the same result that the appel-
late court issued in a single sentence if the lower court had spent
more effort addressing the merits of Westlake's declaratory relief
petition. More important, the trial court could have reached that
conclusion more quickly, inexpensively, and efficiently than the
court of appeals if the trial court had invested less precious time
104. See id. at *4-5 (noting only that "the claims against Westlake would be the proper
subject of a suit if independently asserted; and the declaratory judgment actions are not so
interwoven with the remaining actions that they involve the same facts and issues").
105. See Gray, 2003 WL 22351652, at *4-5 (holding simply that "the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in severing the declaratory judgment actions").
106. Id.
107. See id. (discussing the validity of a Westlake ordinance that purported to include
Gray's property within the town).
108. Id. at *2.
109. Id. at *5.
110. Gray v. Town of Westlake, No. 2-02-173-CV, 2003 WL 22351652, at *5 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
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and resources deciding whether to grant competing summary
motions.
Perhaps the most egregious use of the summary-judgment rule
occurs when petitioners commence an action for declaratory judg-
ment and only ask a court to interpret allegedly ambiguous lan-
guage in a contract. In those instances, the court sitting in equity
has a relatively simple task: Examine the contract and declare the
extent of the parties' rights and obligations. Yet all too often, trial
judges waste resources considering the parties' motions for sum-
mary relief. Consider, for example, the all-too-familiar controversy
in DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc."' Playa Explora-
tion, Inc. and Michael L. Vickers-a landowner-consummated an
oil and gas lease agreement.1 1 2 Then Playa assigned its undivided
interest in the lease to several other companies, including DDD
Energy, Inc.1
1 3
Shortly thereafter, DDD and Veritas DGC Land, Inc. formed a
geophysical services agreement.1 1 4 Under that contract, Veritas
agreed to conduct surveys and perform related services on Vick-
ers's land." 5 Additionally, the service agreement contained a
clause that required Veritas to defend and indemnify DDD under
certain conditions.' 16 Veritas had to defend DDD against all third-
party claims and legal actions stemming from property damage. 117
And Veritas had to reimburse DDD when DDD paid expenses and
settlement costs associated with property damage and various
third-party claims and causes." 8
111. 60 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
112. DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. App.-





117. DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
118. Id. The agreement stated in pertinent part:
Veritas shall protect, indemnify, defend and save [DDD], . . . harmless from and
against all claims .... and causes of actions ... asserted by third parties on account
of... damage to property of such third parties, which ... damage is the result of the
negligent act or omission, breach of this Basic Agreement or the Supplemental Agree-
ment, or willful misconduct of Veritas ....
Id. (alteration and omissions in original).
[Vol. 36:535
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
During the course of the DDD-Veritas agreement, Brush Cut-
ters-one of Veritas's subcontractors-cleared Vickers's land. But
in the process, the subcontractor allegedly destroyed numerous oak
and mesquite trees.119 In an underlying lawsuit, Vickers sued
DDD for damages, citing several tort and contract-based causes of
action in the complaint.1 2 0 To secure a clear determination of Veri-
tas's obligations under the DDD-Veritas agreement upfront, DDD
filed a completely separate declaratory-judgment action, naming
Veritas as the defendant. Quite simply, DDD wanted the court sit-
ting in equity to declare (1) that Veritas had a contractual obliga-
tion to defend DDD against the underlying lawsuit, and (2) that
Veritas would have a duty to indemnify DDD in the event DDD
paid sums to settle or defend itself against the underlying
lawsuit.121
Again, because Rule 166a permits and encourages the practice,
both parties immediately filed motions for summary judgment.
More disquieting, given that DDD's declaratory-judgment petition
only asked the court to interpret words and phrases in the contract,
Veritas and DDD's proffered grounds to justify their requests for
summary relief were highly unwarranted and superfluous. Specifi-
cally, Veritas argued that it should receive summary relief because
(1) DDD's breach of contract claim did not present a justiciable
issue; (2) DDD's reliance on the indemnity provision in the con-
tract was unenforceable as a matter of law; and (3) Veritas was not
liable for the subcontractor's negligence and other torts in the un-
derlying lawsuit. 122 On the other hand, DDD claimed that it
should receive partial summary relief because the contract clearly
required Veritas "to defend and indemnify DDD from [all] claims
asserted in the [underlying] suit. '123
119. Id.
120. Id. The landowner sued DDD for (1) a breach of contract; (2) negligently
breaching a duty to manage and administer the lease; (3) simple negligence; (4) negligent
misrepresentation; (5) breaching a fiduciary duty; (6) gross negligence; (7) malicious tres-
pass; and (8) for committing other intentional torts. Id.
121. Id. "DDD [commenced a] suit against Veritas in Harris County seeking a declar-
atory judgment that Veritas [was] obligated to defend and indemnify DDD, under the
terms of the parties' agreement, against claims based on damage to [Vickers's land]." Id.
122. Id. at 882-83.
123. DDD Energy, Inc. v. Veritas DGC Land, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
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Veritas received only partial summary relief; the trial judge held
that the broad "liability indemnity" clause was unenforceable. 124
But DDD asserted that Veritas had two clearly separate contrac-
tual duties under that clause-a duty to defend and a duty to in-
demnify.125  However, when the trial court awarded partial
summary relief to Veritas, it did so without distinguishing those
separate contractual obligations and without providing a full, intel-
ligible explanation of its summary ruling. Similarly, the trial judge
denied DDD's motion for partial summary judgment outright with-
out an explanation. Veritas appealed its adverse ruling; DDD did
not.
1 26
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the lower
court's summary-judgment ruling in part, finding that Veritas had
no duty to defend DDD against or reimburse DDD for the cost
associated with third-party negligence claims appearing in the un-
derlying lawsuit.127 But the appellate court reversed the judgment
and remanded the case for further proceedings. 128 It instructed the
trial judge to decide whether Veritas had an obligation to defend
DDD against non-negligence based actions in the underlying
case. 12 9 The court of appeals also told the lower court to determine
whether Veritas must reimburse DDD for settling any non-negli-
gence based claims in the underlying lawsuit.1 30
Clearly, the trial court should have addressed those questions
right away. Even more relevant, the trial judge could have decided
those questions quicker, more efficiently, and less expensively if
those multi-pronged and competing motions for summary relief
124. Id.
125. Id. at 882.
126. Id. at 883.
On appeal, DDD [argued] the trial court incorrectly held [that] the indemnity clause
[was] unenforceable and assert[ed] three separate arguments: the express negligence
rule [did] not govern this case because only Veritas was negligent; the fair notice re-
quirements [were] not applicable ... because Veritas had actual notice of the indem-
nity provision; and, even if the express negligence rule [was] applicable, it [did] not bar
DDD's request for indemnification [regarding] the non-negligence claims [appearing
in the underlying lawsuit].
Id.






had not distracted the trial court and demanded greater attention.
Once more, a full-blown declaratory-judgment hearing-on the
merits-would have allowed the trial court to carefully consider
and decide both questions of fact and questions of law surrounding
whether Veritas had a duty to defend and a duty to indemnity.
Without a doubt, illustrating two cases to prove a point will not
convince a skeptical audience that summary-judgment practice is a
major problem in Texas's declaratory-judgment trials. That aware-
ness, therefore, explains the impetus behind this Article. Briefly,
here is the essence of the problem. Generally, in ever-increasing
numbers, alleged third-party victims are suing insured Texans in
"underlying" personal injury lawsuits. 131 And just as frequently,
131. See, e.g., David Pasztor, Second Death for Asbestos Proposal, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, July 26, 2003, at B3 ("[The] insurance companies http://web2.westlaw.com/
result/ - land business lobbyists have invested significant time and effort seeking legislation
to cut the number http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - lof asbestos lawsuits http://
web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Iin Texas. They say frivolous and inconsequential asbestos law-
suits http://web2.westlaw.con/result/ - Jare clogging courts and bankrupting companies.");
Premium Importance, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 24, 2003, at B12 (considering
reasons for the rise in liability insurance premiums).
Gov. Rick Perry said "in many parts of the state, access to quality care is increasingly
threatened by a medical lawsuit abuse crisis."
But evidence doesn't support the conclusion that frivolous suits and runaway juries
are driving medical malpractice insurance rates through the roof.
For instance, the Office of Court Administration has recorded a steady drop in the
number http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Iof personal http://web2.westlaw.comresult/
- linjury http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Ilawsuits http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ -
Inot involving a motor vehicle, the category that would include medical malpractice:
from 31,050 suits http://web2.westlaw.com/result/ - Iin 1994-95 to 19,590 in 2000-2001.
[But the] Texas Department of Insurance showed a 4 percent increase in claims since
1996 . . . , far short of the surge in insurance rates.
Litigation costs have, indeed, gone up. But at least one study shows that they directly
follow medical inflation.
A bigger culprit appears to be business practices by the insurance industry.
[W]hen investments faltered, and companies found themselves financially strapped,
rates started rising and some companies cratered.
Id. (emphasis added).
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insureds are asking insurers to defend them against third-party
suits and to make reimbursements for out-of-pocket and settle-
ment expenses in those underlying suits. But significant numbers
of insurers refuse to defend or indemnify, causing both insurers
and insureds to commence declaratory-judgment actions.
Ostensibly, insurers and insureds petition Texas's courts to de-
clare rights and obligations under various liability and indemnity
insurance contracts. But in the process, both parties frequently file
thousands of remarkably unnecessary, burdensome, and expensive
motions for summary judgment. Therefore, the limited purpose of
this Article is to highlight and discuss summary-judgment abuses
and misapplications in Texas's declaratory-judgment trials within
these vast and important areas of litigation.
Part II presents a fairly brief overview of the evolution, scope,
and purpose of summary-judgment practice in Texas. In the pro-
cess, we compare the similarities and differences between Texas's
and federal summary-judgment rules. In Part II, the important dis-
tinctions between Texas's "traditional" and "no-evidence" sum-
mary-judgment rules appear.
Part III presents a review of Texas's Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act and the act's stated purpose. Additionally, a careful re-
view of Texas's cases reveals that confusion exists over whether an
action for a declaratory judgment is a "lawsuit," "trial," or "trial by
judge," because a petition for declaratory relief is an equitable ac-
tion. In addition, serious debate exists over whether a petition for
declaratory judgment is a cause of action-one that requires a
plaintiff to prove a prima facie case. Therefore, Part III addresses
those questions, for they have contributed to awkward and unintel-
ligible rulings involving summary-judgment motions in declaratory-
judgment proceedings.
Part IV highlights trial courts' mandatory duties and their level
of discretion when deciding whether to grant summary judgment in
Texas. Part IV also discusses trial judges' duties and discretionary
powers under Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. Evi-
dence appearing in Part IV shows unequivocally that Texas's
judges have the power to decide questions of fact and law when
considering whether to award declaratory relief, which negates the
perceived need to entertain motions for summary relief.
As mentioned earlier, collectively Texas's insurers and disgrun-
tled insureds commence an inordinate number of declaratory-judg-
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ment actions each year. They ask courts to declare whether
insurers have a contractual duty to defend insureds against third-
party underlying lawsuit claims. They also petition trial judges to
declare whether insurers have a duty to indemnify insureds after
insureds pay out-of-pocket expenses for first-party injuries and af-
ter insureds pay money to settle third-party claims. Insurers are
significantly more likely to commence declaratory actions to de-
fend themselves; therefore, the insurance industry, practitioners,
and others called such filings a form of "insurance defense."
Part V, therefore, outlines (1) the important distinction between
liability and indemnity (reimbursement) insurance contracts, and
(2) the difference between first-party and third-party claims and
causes of action. In addition, Part V highlights and reviews several
settled doctrines for construing and interpreting insurance con-
tracts in Texas. Put simply, trial judges must employ those doc-
trines to interpret insureds' and insurers' duties and rights under
liability and indemnity insurance contracts.
Part VI presents a careful analysis of judges' mandatory duties
when they agree to declare rights and obligations under insurance
contracts. To repeat, they must use settled principles of contract
construction and interpretation. And of course, those settled doc-
trines allow courts to entertain and resolve both questions of fact
and questions of law. But Texas currently allows litigants to file
summary-judgment motions in declaratory-judgment trials. Theo-
retically, under settled summary-judgment doctrine, judges may
consider only questions of law. In addition when evidence suggests
there are no genuine issues of fact, judges must grant the motion
and render judgment in the action-including declaratory-judg-
ment actions.
Clearly, these competing sets of legal doctrines can generate and
have generated extremely inconsistent rulings, very bad law, and
highly unintelligible decisions where insurers and insureds simply
asked courts to declare legal rights and obligations under liability
and indemnity insurance contracts. More worrisome, Part VI
reveals that an exceedingly large number of trial judges do not
even mention, discuss, appreciate, or understand the magnitude of
this problem. Instead, courts cavalierly or intentionally apply sum-
mary-judgment rules automatically and quite inappropriately to
achieve an outcome.
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Texas's appellate courts, therefore, often inherit the expensive
and hefty burden of trying to decipher trial courts' unduly superfi-
cial, unintelligible, and unwarranted rulings. However, Part VI
also reveals that Texas's courts of appeals' interventions often
make matters worse. Several examples of appellate courts' highly
questionable summary-judgment rulings appear in Part VI. Those
duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify decisions contribute to the
notion that Texas's declaratory-judgment trials are unfair. Even
more disturbing, those opinions support the view that Texas's ap-
pellate courts-either consciously or unconsciously-support
lower courts' allegedly biased, convoluted, and unwarranted de-
claratory-judgment rulings.
Finally, the Conclusion invites the Texas Supreme Court to
weigh critically the summary-judgment problems outlined in this
Article. It asks the supreme court to consider former Texas Su-
preme Court justices' arguments about the pitfalls, dangers, and
cavalier use of summary-judgment practice generally. And more
important, the Article calls for the abolishment of summary-judg-
ment practice from declaratory-judgment trials in Texas.
II. BRIEF OVERVIEW-FEDERAL AND TEXAS'S SUMMARY-
JUDGMENT RULES
A. Federal Motions for Summary Judgment
Over the years, federal courts have listed several reasons for
supporting a summary-judgment rule: (1) to "facilitate litiga-
tion,"' 132 (2) "to expedite trial procedure," 133 (3) "to assess whether
trial is necessary," 134 and (4) to allow courts to award summary
relief where evidence on file reveals there are no genuine questions
of fact remaining for a trier of facts.135 Thus, Rule 56(a) of the
132. Barkhausen v. Cont'l Il1. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 115 N.E.2d 640, 645
(Ill. App. Ct. 1953) ("The purpose of the statute is to facilitate litigation and to expedite
trial procedure . .
133. Id.
134. Halprin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034
(D. Colo. 2003) (declaring that "[t]he purpose of a summary judgment motion is to assess
whether trial is necessary").
135. See Engi v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1943) (discussing the
appropriateness of summary judgments).
[W]e should go beyond the bare words of the summary-judgment rule to the reasons
behind it .... [T]he history ... of this procedure shows that it is intended to permit "a
[Vol. 36:535
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a claimant to "move with
or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment" in an
action at law or in a declaratory-judgment action.136 And under
Rule 56(b), a defendant may move for summary relief-with or
without supporting affidavits-in the same suit.137
Unquestionably, federal courts may grant a motion for summary
judgment in actions at law or in equity, including an action for de-
claratory judgment. 38 But a close reading of many federal cases
strongly suggests a pending trial by jury or a request for a jury trial
is a necessary condition before a party can petition a court for sum-
mary relief. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's language
in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,139 arguably the seminal sum-
mary-judgment case. In Anderson, the Court stated: "[S]ummary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is 'genu-
ine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party."1 40 Similar language also
appears frequently in federal appellate courts' decisions.141
party to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings and to obtain relief by summary
judgment where [detailed] facts . . . in affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file
show that there are no genuine issues of fact to be tried."
Id. (quoting 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3175).
136. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the com-
mencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the
adverse party, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
the party's favor upon all or any part thereof.
Id.
137. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(b). "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part
thereof." Id.; see also Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469, 472 (2d Cir. 1943) (ex-
plaining that "[t]he federal summary judgment proceeding is the most extensive of any
jurisdiction in that it is equally available to plaintiffs and defendants and in all forms and
kinds of civil actions").
138. Cf. Barkhausen v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 115 N.E.2d 640,
645 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953) (noting that "summary judgment may be entered 'in any action ...
at law or in equity .... upon a contract, express or implied"'). "The purpose of the statute
is to ... expedite trial procedure, an end as desirable in a suit for a declaratory judgment as
in any other proceeding based on a contract." Id. (citation omitted).
139. 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
140. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
141. See, e.g., Roberts v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 61 Fed. Appx. 587, 590 (10th
Cir. 2003) (holding "that summary judgment was proper because no reasonable jury could
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Moreover, federal summary-judgment cases are replete with an-
other arguably misleading or narrow rule: A plaintiff who moves
for summary judgment must prove all elements of a cause of ac-
tion. 42 Among other implications, this suggests that federal judges
will consider a motion for summary judgment and award relief only
in those instances where plaintiffs have presented prima facie evi-
dence 143 to prove previously enumerated elements of a prima facie
case involving a tort, a breach of contract, or some statutory
violation. 14
4
have concluded that State Farm's investigation and evaluation of his claim was unreasona-
ble"); Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Matsushita Elec., 266 F.3d 1358, 1361 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing
Anderson and embracing the view that "[slummary judgment is proper only when no rea-
sonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"); Bell Atl. Network Servs.,
Inc. v. Covad Communications Group, 262 F.3d 1258, 1267 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Ander-
son and adopting the view that summary judgment is proper only when "no reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party"); Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp
Telecom, Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Summary judgment is proper if no
reasonable jury could find that the patent is not anticipated."); Halperin v. Kissinger, 807
F.2d 180, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (commenting on application of the rule).
A straightforward application of [the summary-judgment rule] . . . requires ... that
defendants adduce sufficient facts that no reasonable jury, looking at the evidence in
the light most favorable to, and drawing all inferences most favorable to, the plaintiffs,
could conclude that it was objectively unreasonable for the defendants to be acting for
national security reasons.
Id.
142. See, e.g., Lowe v. Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565, 1569 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding that
"[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must at least establish the neces-
sary elements of his or her cause of action"); MacCormack v. City of Prairie Vill., No. 00-
2405-CM, 2001 WL 309412, at *1 (D. Kan. Mar. 12, 2001) (granting defendant's motion
because the plaintiff did not meet "his burden on summary judgment to establish essential
elements of his causes of action against defendant"); In re McKenzie, 225 B.R. 377, 379
(N.D. Ohio 1998) (concluding that a plaintiff who moves for summary judgment "must
demonstrate all elements of the cause of action").
143. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 369 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (defining
prima facie evidence).
Typically, "prima facie evidence" is defined as: "Such evidence as, in the judgment of
the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact ... and which if not rebutted or contra-
dicted, will remain sufficient. [Such evidence], if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain a judgment in favor of the issue which it supports, but [it] may be
contradicted by other evidence."
Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1190 (6th ed. 1990)) (alterations and omission in
original).
144. See Pace v. S. Ry. Sys., 701 F.2d 1383, 1391 (11th Cir. 1983) ("By definition,
failure to establish a prima facie case means that the plaintiff has failed to proffer proof
sufficient to impose even a burden of rebuttal on the defendant."). "While establishing a
prima facie case in and of itself does not always suffice ... to survive a motion for summary
judgment, [a] failure to establish a prima facie case warrants summary judgment." Id. (ci-
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It is exceedingly clear, however, that plaintiffs petition federal
courts for declaratory relief all the time; they ask district court
judges-rather than juries-to interpret the language in, say, con-
tracts; and they ask federal district judges to declare rights and ob-
ligations under those contractual agreements. Yet it is equally
clear that plaintiffs do not have to prove specific, identifiable ele-
ments to establish a prima facie case to receive declaratory relief.145
On the other hand, plaintiffs certainly have to present some prima
facie evidence before federal courts award declaratory relief. 46
Additionally, federal district courts often award summary relief
to movants-who might be plaintiffs, defendants, or both. Of
course, under Rule 56, the party requesting a summary judgment
has an initial burden.1 47 The movant must explain to the court the
basis for the motion; and the movant must identify "those portions
of the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, and admissions ...
that . . . demonstrate the absence of genuine issues for trial. ' 148
After the movant properly presents evidence supporting a sum-
mary-judgment motion, the opposing party "must respond with
tation omitted); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings in Matter of Fine, 641 F.2d 199, 203
(5th Cir. 1981) (adopting the definition of a prima facie case appearing in Black's Law
Dictionary: "[A] case which has proceeded upon sufficient proof to that stage where it will
support [a] finding if evidence to [the] contrary is disregarded").
145. Unlike the requirements involving an action for negligence where the plaintiff
has asked for a trial by jury, a petitioner for declaratory relief has no duty to present prima
facie evidence that will support specific elements. Quite simply, the petitioner need only
produce the contract or instrument that contains the controversial language. And unlike
trials on the merits involving various causes of action, declaratory-judgment actions rarely
involve genuine issues or questions of fact. Instead, the petitioner wants the court to de-
clare as a matter of law that a clause means this or that. And like Texas's courts, federal
district courts increasingly entertained motions for summary judgment in declaratory-judg-
ment trials.
146. Cf United States v. Stephens, 445 F.2d 192, 198 (3d Cir. 1971) ("By definition, a
prima facie case entails a quantum of facts supporting a given legal proposition. Without
facts, the case is simply not made. Conclusory averments are insufficient, and a statement
of the ultimate legal principle is no substitute for the necessary specifics to support it.");
Allied Princess Bay Co. No. 2 v. Atochem N. Am., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 595, 605 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (declaring that "[a]fter a plaintiff has established its prima facie case, the plaintiff is
entitled to a declaratory judgment unless the defendant establishes one of three statutory
affirmative defenses").
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
148. Halprin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1034
(D. Colo. 2003); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (noting that "a
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the
district court of the basis for its motion").
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specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be
tried." 14 9 These facts may be established "by any of the kinds of
evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c),1 50 except the mere plead-
ings themselves. 151
B. Texas's "Traditional" Summary-Judgment Motion-Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(a) and 166a(b)
Two fairly important points should be mentioned at this junc-
ture. First, once the Texas Supreme Court decided to allow sum-
mary-judgment practice in Texas, it did not follow the federal
model completely. Although the court embraced the original ver-
sion of Federal Rule 56,152 it refused to adopt later amendments to
that rule. 153 Furthermore, in fairly recent years, commentators and
others have encouraged the supreme court to harmonize summary-
149. Halprin, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 1034; see also Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516,
519 (10th Cir. 1980) (quoting Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533, 536 (10th Cir. 1979)); FED.
R. Civ. P. 56(e) (setting the requirements for the adverse party to respond).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse
party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial. If the adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against the adverse party.
Id.
150. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the
amount of damages.
Id.
151. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
152. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952)
("In accepting the practice, the supreme court elected to adopt, with minor textual
changes, the language of Federal Rule 56 as promulgated in 1938.").
153. Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952)
("[T]he court ignored the amendments to the federal rule which became effective March
19, 1948.").
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judgment practice in Texas with that found in federal courts. 154
But, as of this writing, the Texas Supreme Court continues to ig-
nore those suggestions. 155
Second, although Texas summary-judgment practice differs sig-
nificantly from federal practice, 156 both jurisdictions approved the
use of summary-judgment motions for similar reasons. In particu-
lar, Texas selected the procedural rule "to eliminate the delay and
expense which result from paper issues [rather than from] factual
issues. '  Also, summary relief allows the trial judge "to brush
aside groundless allegations in the pleadings and to [dispose of an
action promptly] where a trial would be an empty formality. '1 58
However, there are two types of summary-judgment motions in
Texas-the traditional and the no-evidence motions.
Under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(a) 5 9 and 166a(b)1 60
respectively, plaintiffs and defendants may file and seek relief
under a traditional summary-judgment motion. And whether the
154. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556-57 (Tex. 1989) ("[S]ome commentators
have urged us to adopt the current federal approach to summary judgments generally
155. See id. ("[W]e believe our own procedure eliminates patently unmeritorious
cases while giving due regard for the right to a jury determination of disputed fact
questions.").
156. See generally Sheila A. Leute, Comment, The Effective Use of Summary Judg-
ment: A Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 617, 619-22
(1988) (outlining major differences between summary-judgment practice in Texas and in
federal courts).
157. Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952); see
also Cluett v. Med. Protective Co., 829 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied) (concluding that summary relief to provide a procedure to terminate a controversy
summarily when it clearly appears that only a question of law is present and genuine issues
of fact are not).
158. Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952); see
also Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952) (embracing the
view that the purpose of summary judgment is to eliminate "patently unmeritorious claims
or untenable defenses; not ... to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing on the
merits of any real issue of fact" (quoting Kaufman v. Blackman, 239 S.W.2d 422, 428 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.c.))).
159. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(a).
A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the adverse party has appeared or an-
swered, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor upon all or any part thereof. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
amount of damages.
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movant is a plaintiff or defendant, the movant's burden of proof
does not vary. 161 First, a movant must state specific grounds to jus-
tify relief under a traditional summary-judgment motion. 162 Sec-
ond, where a plaintiff has filed an action and asked for a trial by
jury or judge, the defendant or nonmoving party must overcome a
specific burden to prevail. The defendant must either (1) disprove
at least one element of the plaintiff's theories of recovery,163 or (2)
plead and conclusively establish each element of an affirmative de-
fense,164 thereby rebutting the plaintiff's cause of action.165
160. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(b). "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or with-
out supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof."
Id.
161. See Pa. Pulp & Paper Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (holding that "[w]hen both parties move for
summary judgment, each party must carry its own burden, and neither can prevail because
of the failure of the other to discharge its burden" (quoting INAC, 56 S.W.3d at 247));
INAC Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 56 S.W.3d 242, 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, pet. dism'd) (concluding that because "[e]ach [party was] a movant, the burden
is the same for both parties: to establish entitlement to a summary judgment by conclu-
sively proving all the elements of the claim or defense as a matter of law" (emphasis
added)).
162. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (stating, in relevant part, that the "motion for summary
judgment shall state the specific grounds [for summary relief]"); see also Nixon v. Mr. Prop.
Mgmt., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985) (adopting the position that a "movant for
summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law").
163. See Havlen v. McDougall, 22 S.W.3d 343, 345 (Tex. 2000) (concluding that "[a]
party moving for summary judgment must establish its right to summary judgment on the
issues expressly presented to the trial court by conclusively proving all elements of the
movant's cause of action or defense as a matter of law" (emphasis added)); Cathey v.
Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995) (ruling that "[a] defendant who conclusively ne-
gates at least one of the essential elements of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or who
conclusively establishes all of the elements of an affirmative defense is entitled to summary
judgment").
164. See Pustejovsky v. Rapid-Am. Corp., 35 S.W.3d 643, 646 (Tex. 2000) (declaring
that a defendant must establish each element of an affirmative defense when it moves for
summary judgment based on that affirmative defense); Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669
S.W.2d 309, 310-11 (Tex. 1984) (articulating that defendants moving for summary judgment
must conclusively prove all the elements of the defense).
165. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979)
(declaring that a "trial court may not grant a summary judgment by default for lack of an
answer or response [from] the non-movant when the movant's summary judgment proof is
legally insufficient"). "[T]he non-movant's failure to answer or respond cannot supply by
default the summary judgment proof necessary to establish the movant's right." Id. "[T]he
non-movant must expressly present to the trial court any reasons [that attempt] to avoid [a]
movant's entitlement ... ." Id.
2005] SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
Finally, an earlier observation involving federal cases needs re-
peating here. A close reading of Texas's cases suggests that mov-
ants must establish two conditions before a court will consider a
request for summary relief: (1) a trial is pending,166 and (2) evi-
dence that the movant intends to raise a particular theory of recov-
ery in a court of law and establish a prima facie case or a legal
defense by proving specific elements.1 67 However, the traditional
summary-judgment rule permits a court to award summary relief in
every civil action168-at law and in equity, including actions for de-
claratory judgment169-as long as the court finds a "meritorious
ground." 170
C. Texas's "No-Evidence" Summary-Judgment Motion-Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i)
In 1997, the Texas Supreme Court approved an addition to Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 166a. 171 Under the then-new paragraph
166. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1952)
(noting that "[a] summary judgment disposing of the entire action is proper when the trial
court ... is satisfied that 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"'). "The court's problem on such
a motion is whether the evidence ... would compel the submission of issues of fact to the
jury .... So applied, the rule does not violate the constitutional right to a jury trial .... "
Id.; see also Investors Ins. Co. of Am. v. Breck Operating Corp., No. Civ.A. 1:02-CV-122-
C, 2003 WL 21056849, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) ("To defeat a properly supported
motion for summary judgment, the non-movant must present more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. Rather, the non-movant must present sufficient evidence upon which a jury
could reasonably find in the non-movant's favor." (citation omitted)).
167. See Holy Cross Church of God in Christ v. Wolf, 44 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2001)
(citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) and concluding that "[a] party moving for summary judg-
ment must conclusively prove all elements of its cause of action or defense as a matter of
law").
168. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REv. 285, 286 (1952)
(indicating that the summary-judgment rule applies to all types of civil actions).
169. See Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Tex. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 320 S.W.2d 915, 916
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stressing that "Rule 166-A of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a summary judgment may be granted in favor of the
movant upon all or any part of the law suit where plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judg-
ment [and noting that this] rule has been followed and upheld many times").
170. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 113 S.W.3d 37, 39
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (concluding that "[wihen a motion for
summary judgment raises multiple grounds, [an appellate court] may affirm to the extent
that any ground is meritorious").
171. The Texas Supreme Court amended Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a on Au-
gust 15, 1997, by including a new subsection (i). That section became effective on Septem-
ber 1, 1997. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a, 948-49 S.W.2d (Tex. Cases) XXXV, XXXV-XLI (1997).
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(i), a party may petition a court for summary relief by filing a no-
evidence summary-judgment motion.172 Put simply, "[t]he purpose
of a no-evidence summary judgment motion is to pierce the plead-
ings and to assess the proof [for determining] whether there is a
genuine need for trial."1 73 Certainly, this goal comports with the
stated purpose of the traditional summary-judgment rule.'
Under the no-evidence rule, however, the movant and nonmov-
ant have different rights and burdens. Rule 166a(i) permits a mo-
vant to petition a court for summary judgment after an "adequate
opportunity for discovery. ' 175 Furthermore, to receive relief, the
movant must establish that no evidence exists to support an essen-
tial element of a nonmovant's claim or defense. 176  It must be
stressed, however, that the no-evidence motion "must specifically
state the elements for which there is no evidence. 177 But there
appears to be a paradox: A movant does not have to present any
172. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
No-Evidence Motion. After adequate time for discovery, a party without presenting
summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on the ground that
there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which
an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. The motion must state the
elements as to which there is no evidence. The court must grant the motion unless the
respondent produces summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material
fact.
Id.
173. Benitz v. Gould Group, 27 S.W.3d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no
pet.).
174. See Marts ex rel. Marts v. Transp. Ins. Co,. 111 S.W.3d 699, 706 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2003, pet. denied) (concluding that "[tihe purpose of the summary judgment rule is
to provide a method of summarily terminating a case when it clearly appears that only
questions of law are involved and that there are no genuine issues of fact").
175. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997) ("A discovery period set by pretrial order
should be adequate opportunity for discovery unless there is a showing to the contrary, and
ordinarily a motion under paragraph (i) would be permitted after the period but not
before."). The Texas Supreme Court's August 15, 1997, order approving subsection (i)
stated: "The comment appended to these changes, unlike other notes and comments in the
rules, is intended to inform the construction and application of the rule .... " TEX. R. Civ.
P. 166a, 948-49 S.W.2d (Tex. Cases) XXXV (1997).
176. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (stating that a movant's claim must establish that there is
no evidence for one or more essential elements of a claim or defense).
177. Springer v. Am. Zurich Ins. Co., 115 S.W.3d 582, 584 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003,
pet. denied); TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997) ("The motion must be specific in challenging
the evidentiary support for an element of a claim or defense; paragraph (i) does not au-
thorize conclusory motions or general no-evidence challenges to an opponent's case.").
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evidence to support the motion. 7 ' To be sure, the movant's argua-
bly light burden 179 has generated a substantial amount of contro-
versy."' 0 Very likely, it will continue to do so.
On the other hand, the no-evidence rule puts the greater burden
on the nonmovant to garner sufficient evidence to go to trial.1
81
Rule 166a(i) does not require the nonmovant "to marshal its
proof." Instead, the nonmovant "need[s] only [to] point out evi-
dence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements. ' 182 If the
nonmovant does not produce evidence on one or more essential
elements of his claim, the court must grant the summary judg-
ment.'8 3  Conversely, a no-evidence summary judgment is not
proper if the nonmovant presents "more than a scintilla of proba-
tive evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact." ' 4
Finally, unlike a traditional motion for summary relief, "[a] no-
evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed ver-
dict." '8 5 Stated simply, "the party with the burden of proof at trial
will have the same burden of proof in a [no-evidence] summary
178. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997) ("Paragraph (i) authorizes a motion for sum-
mary judgment based on the assertion that.., there is no evidence to support one or more
specified elements of an adverse party's claim or defense." (emphasis added)).
179. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997) (contrasting 166a(i) with 166a(a) and
166a(b)). "Paragraph (i) does not apply to ordinary motions for summary judgment under
paragraphs (a) or (b), in which the movant must prove it is entitled to judgment by estab-
lishing each element of its own claim or defense as a matter of law or by negating an
element of the respondent's claim or defense as a matter of law." Id.
180. Cf Robert W. Clore, Comment, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i): A New
Weapon for Texas Defendants, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 813, 816-17 (1998) (noting that
"[p]roponents laud the no-evidence motion for its capacity -o relieve an overburdened
state judiciary and reduce exorbitant litigation expenses by allowing judges to remove un-
meritorious cases from their dockets"). "By contrast, those opposed to the no-evidence
motion contend that it ... further shifts the balance of power in Texas courts to defendants.
Notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the rule, summary judgments in Texas are
now more likely to be granted under the amended rule than under the old rule .... " Id.
181. See Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 432 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (explaining that "[t]he new no evidence summary judgment
shifts the burden of proof to the nonmovant to present enough evidence to be entitled to a
trial").
182. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a cmt. (1997).
183. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
184. Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied).
185. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. 2003); see also Taylor-
Made Hose, Inc. v. Wilkerson, 21 S.W.3d 484, 490 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet.
denied) (op. on reh'g) ("'A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial di-
rected verdict,' and we apply the same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evi-
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judgment proceeding."'18 6 In addition, "[t]he amount of evidence
required to defeat a no-evidence motion for summary judgment
parallels the directed verdict and the no-evidence standard on ap-
peal of jury trials. ' 187 This raises, therefore, a fairly interesting
question: May litigants file a no-evidence summary-judgment mo-
tion in a declaratory-judgment hearing?
Clearly, Rules 166a(a) and 166a(b) permit litigants to file a tradi-
tional motion for summary judgment in a declaratory-judgment ac-
tion. Rule 166a(i), however, does not state explicitly that a movant
has a right to file a no-evidence motion in such a proceeding, and
the 1997 comments do not discuss the issue. Arguably, granting a
no-evidence motion in a declaratory-judgment hearing is highly im-
proper when petitioners only ask the judge to interpret rights and
obligations under, say, a disputed contract. And the reasons for
this position are not terribly complicated.
First, unlike their burden in a court of law before a jury, petition-
ers do not have to produce prima facie evidence in a declaratory
judgment before the judge interprets the contract. Second, if a no-
evidence summary judgment is indeed a pretrial directed verdict, it
is hard to see its relevance in a declaratory-judgment proceeding
where complainants simply ask a court for an interpretation of
rights and obligations. Yet some of Texas's trial courts have enter-
tained no-evidence summary-judgment motions in a declaratory-
judgment action. 88 And they have done so without clearly ex-
dence summary judgment as we apply in reviewing a directed verdict." (quoting Moore,
981 S.W.2d at 269)).
186. Barraza v. Eureka Co., 25 S.W.3d 225, 231 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, pet.
denied).
187. David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 54 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1, 66 (2000); see also Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1998, no pet.) ("Like a directed verdict, then, the task of the appellate court is to
determine whether the plaintiff has produced any evidence of probative force to raise fact
issues on the material questions presented."). "The appellate court must consider all of the
evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary
judgment was rendered; every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-
movant, and any doubts resolved in its favor." Id.
188. See, e.g., Sunnyside Feedyard, L.C. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 106 S.W.3d 169, 171
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (permitting Metropolitan Life to file a no-evidence
summary-judgment motion in a declaratory-judgment action and awarding both summary
relief under the motion and declaratory relief); Pace Concerts, Ltd. v. Resendez, 72 S.W.3d
700, 701-02 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (allowing a no-evidence motion
where the complainant filed a declaratory-judgment action as an affirmative defense to a
breach-of-contract lawsuit); Law Offices of Lin & Assocs. v. Ho, No. 14-01-01265-CV, 2002
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plaining how a no-evidence summary-judgment motion contributes
to the inexpensive, efficient, and timely administration of justice in
a declaratory-judgment hearing when petitioners only want a court
to interpret rights and obligations under arguably ambiguous
contracts.
To help illustrate the problem, consider the litigants' and courts'
actions in Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston General Insurance
Co.189 Chickasha owned and operated an electric cotton gin in
Commerce, Texas.190 The gin was located next to a chemical com-
pany that manufactured and distributed arsenic-laced pesticides. 9
Chickasha used arsenic acid as a defoliant to treat its cotton fields
before harvesting the cotton. 192 In an underlying suit, third-party
complainants sued Chickasha for polluting the atmosphere and
nearby land with arsenic.193 Shortly thereafter, Chickasha filed a
declaratory-judgment action.1 94 The alleged polluter asked the
trial judge to determine whether Chickasha's primary and secon-
dary liability insurers had a contractual duty to defend Chickasha
against the third-party pollution lawsuit under pre- and post-1972
liability and indemnity insurance contracts. 195
Immediately after filing the declaratory-judgment action, Chick-
asha filed a traditional motion for partial summary judgment as-
serting that the insurer had a duty to defend Chickasha in the
underlying litigation under both pre- and post-1972 liability and in-
demnity insurance contracts. 196 The trial court, however, denied
that motion.197 In their original and supplemental motions, the in-
surers moved for a no-evidence summary judgment under Rule
WL 31319191, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 17, 2002, pet. denied) (not
designated for publication) (allowing a party to file a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment in a declaratory-judgment action where the parties wanted the trial court to de-
clare the rights and duties of the parties under a contingency-fee contract).
189. No. 05-00-01789-CV, 2002 WL 1792467 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 6, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
190. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co. v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., No. 05-00-01789-CV, 2002






195. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co., 2002 WL 1792467, at *1.
196. Id. at *2.
197. Id.
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166a(i), arguing that Chickasha could not produce evidence of in-
surability under the pre-1972 policies.198 The trial court entered a
no-evidence summary judgment in favor of the insurers, and
Chickasha appealed. 199
The Dallas Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred
when the latter court granted the insurers' no-evidence motion. 0°
The appeals court found that Chickasha had presented some evi-
dence of insurability under the pre-1972 policies.20 1 Those liability
contracts, therefore, required the insurers to defend Chickasha
where the covered claims generated the third-party lawsuit.20 2 But
the court of appeals declared that Chickasha failed to present any
evidence showing that the indemnity contracts covered the third-
party pollution claims.20 3 Therefore, the trial court's decision to
grant the no-evidence motion regarding this latter issue was
20proper. 04 Of course, as discussed earlier, the trial and appellate
courts could have decided these questions of fact and reached the
same conclusions without wasting time and precious resources de-
ciding whether to grant or deny the no-evidence motion. After all,
this was an action for a declaratory judgment.
III. BRIEF OVERVIEW-TEXAS'S UNIFORM DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS ACT
A. The Purpose and Subject Matter of Declaratory Relief
At the outset, it is worth noting that declaratory judgments have
a relatively long history throughout western jurisprudence. The
practice of awarding declaratory relief dates from Roman law dur-
ing the pre-classical period2 0 5 and matured during the Middle
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Chickasha Cotton Oil Co., 2002 WL 1792467, at *5.
201. Id. at *4.
202. See id. at *5 (holding that the trial court erred when it granted the no-evidence
portion of the insurers' motion for summary judgment, which addressed whether the insur-
ers had a duty to defend Chickasha under the pre-1972 policies).
203. Id. at *4.
204. See id. at *5 ("However, we also hold the trial court did not err in granting the
no-evidence motion for summary judgment concerning [the insurers'] duty under the pre
1972 policies to indemnify Chickasha in the underlying litigation.").
205. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs 92 (1934) (tracing the
origins of declaratory judgments).
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Ages.2 °6 For centuries, Scottish courts had power to award declara-
tory relief.207  In the mid-nineteenth century, the English Parlia-
ment embraced Scotland's model and enacted a statute 20 that gave
the Chancery authority to award declaratory judgments. 20 9  Of
course, most of the declaratory-judgment statutes in this country
are more or less derivatives of the English statute.210
In 1943, the Texas Legislature gave Texas's courts the authority
to award declaratory relief when it enacted a slightly modified ver-
sion211 of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA). 12 The
206. See Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV.
793, 799 (1932) (reporting that by the middle of the nineteenth century many countries had
codified the action for a declaration of rights and the resulting declaratory judgment).
207. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 237-40 (1934) (tracing
the Scottish history of the action back nearly 400 years); Robert W. Calvert, Declaratory
Judgments in Texas-Mandatory or Discretionary?, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 2 (1982) ("[I]n
Scotland [the history of declaratory judgment] runs back several hundred years.").
208. 13 & 14 Vict., c. 35 (1850) (Eng.); see also Schick Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing
& Textile Workers Union, 533 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1987) (noting that the declara-
tory judgment is relatively new to Anglo-American law).
While continental systems have long recognized a form of legal action for the non-
executory declaration of lawful status or legal rights, the declaratory judgment action
as a distinct form of action under Anglo-American law finds its genesis no earlier than
a series of three English acts passed in the 1850s which were narrowly construed. The
form of action received its first full expression in English Supreme Court Rules
adopted in 1883.
Id.; see also EDWIN M. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 132-35,237-43 (1934) (dis-
cussing the English and Scottish origins of the action).
209. See Henry W. Simon, Declaratory Judgments-Questions of Fact, 11 TEX. L. REV.
351, 352 (1933) ("[An 1850 English statute gave Chancery] the power to enter declaratory
judgment on the construction of any act of Parliament, will, deed .... or any contract,
or ... any other matter falling within the original jurisdiction of a court of equity.").
210. Henry W. Simon, Declaratory Judgments-Questions of Fact, 11 TEX. L. REV.
351, 352 (1933); see also George W. Pugh, The Federal Declaratory Remedy: Justiciability,
Jurisdiction and Related Problems, 6 VAND. L. REV. 79, 79-80 (1952) (observing "that from
time immemorial Anglo-American courts of equity [awarded] declaratory relief in nar-
rowly restricted areas (such as the action to quiet title)," but stressing that "there was no
concept, even in equity, of a general declaratory action").
211. See generally TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-37.011 (Vernon
1997) (codifying the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act).
212. See Schick Inc. v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, 533 A.2d
1235, 1237-38 n.1 (Del. Ch. 1987) (commenting on the origins of declaratory judgments).
In the U.S., recognition of such an action started in a few jurisdictions in the late 19th
century, but the development of the form of action is largely a twentieth century phe-
nomenon spurred on by influential academic writing. In 1922, the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the first Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ment Act and, by 1939, some forty American states and territories had adopted a
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stated purpose of the remedy is "to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other
legal relations." '213 The Texas Supreme Court, however, has em-
braced the view that declaratory relief "is an alternative or addi-
tional remedy to facilitate the administration of justice more
readily.'214
Therefore, the remedy has multiple intended goals, which are:
(1) to ensure "preventative justice"; 215 (2) to serve as "a speedy
and effective remedy for the determination of [parties' rights]
when a real controversy has arisen and ... before the wrong has
actually been committed";2 16 and (3) to make the declaratory judg-
ment "a useful tool in the solution of legal problems. '21 7 More rel-
statute providing for declaratory relief. In 1934 the federal act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, was
signed into law.
Id. (citations omitted).
213. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997); see also Edwin
M. Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV. 793, 806-07 (1932)
(reflecting on the rationale for declaratory judgments).
The effort to avoid a threatened or impending danger or risk may involve contractual
or non-contractual legal relations. Equity is already familiar with numerous types of
actions [where litigants seek] the aid of a court ... to remove, by mere declaration, a
cloud from the title and to quiet the title to property. The practice of instituting an
action for a declaratory judgment has identical purposes in a wider field by quieting
challenged and doubtful rights with respect to property or other relations ....
Id. at 807.
214. See Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 367, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945) (quoting
WALTER H. ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 3, at 11-12 (1940)).
215. Id. (embracing the view that "the action for declaratory judgment 'is an instru-
mentality to be wielded in the interest of preventative justice'" (quoting WALTER H. AN-
DERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 3, at 11-12 (1940))).
216. Id.; see also Sylvester v. Watkins, 538 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Cobb and noting that "[a]lthough the existence of another
adequate remedy does not necessarily deprive the court of jurisdiction to grant declaratory
relief, the office of a declaratory judgment is the speedy determination of the rights of the
parties when a real controversy has arisen and even before the wrong has actually been
committed" (citation omitted)); R.R. Comm'n v. Hous. Natural Gas Corp., 186 S.W.2d
117, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.) ("[T]he declaratory judgments
proceeding is an effective and speedy remedy provided by the Legislature to adjudicate or
declare whether the power or authority sought to be exercised by the Commission come
within the provisions of the statutes under which it acts in the premises.").
217. Robert W. Calvert, Declaratory Judgments in Texas-Mandatory or Discretion-
ary?, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 12 (1982).
The rules laid down in Cobb v. Harrington marked out very clearly the duty of Texas
courts to make the Declaratory Judgments Act a useful tool in the solution of legal
problems and controversies, either before or after a legal wrong has been committed.
It was not contrived as a tool for use solely by the advocate to get a favorable declara-
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evant, "[a]s applied to contracts, the purpose of declaratory relief is
to obtain an interpretation of the contract, and [secure] a determi-
nation of the [intended purposes under] the instrument. '12 18
B. Whether a Declaratory-Judgment Proceeding Is a "Lawsuit"
or a Trial
Texas's UDJA permits any interested person to obtain "a decla-
ration of rights, status, or other legal relations. '219 But here are
some relevant questions: What is the nature of the action when a
litigant petitions a court for declaratory relief? Is the proceeding
an action in law or an equitable action? Several jurisdictions view
a declaratory-judgment action as either an action in law220 or an
action in equity.221 In Texas, however, a declaratory-judgment
hearing is "neither legal nor equitable, but sui generis. "222 And, as
tion; rather, it was intended as a tool for use by the courts to make a correct declara-
tion of the matters at issue, once jurisdiction has attached, whether the particular
declaration is sought by several or none of the parties to the litigation.
Id.
218. Emmco Ins. Co. v Burrows, 419 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ).
219. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 1997).
A person interested under a... written contract, or other writings constituting a con-
tract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a ... contract,...
may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the...
contract ... and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.
Id.
220. See, e.g., United Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Zullo, 120 A.2d 73, 76 (Conn. 1956) (reaf-
firming that "[an] action for a declaratory judgment is an action at law and not in equity, at
least when ...the rights or immunities to be declared are such as would normally be
decided in an action at law"); Hobgood v. Black, 241 S.E.2d 60, 62 (Ga. App. 1978) (reaf-
firming that "[a] petition for declaratory judgment is an action at law, and it is not con-
verted into an equitable action simply because a temporary restraining order is granted in
order to maintain the status quo pending adjudication").
221. See, e.g., Lake Arrowhead, Inc. v. Jolliffe, 639 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Neb. 2002) (de-
claring that "[i]n reviewing an equity action for a declaratory judgment, an appellate court
tries factual issues de novo on the record and reaches a conclusion independent of the
findings of the trial court"); White v. Keystone Ins. Co., 775 A.2d 812, 813 (Pa. Super.
2001) (concluding that "[d]eclaratory judgment actions follow the practice and procedure
of an action in equity"); Town of Manchester v. Town of Townshend, 192 A. 22, 23 (Vt.
1937) (declaring that "[ajn action under the [declaratory judgment] statute is equitable in
its nature"); Baxter v. Wis. Dep't of Natural Res., 477 N.W.2d 648, 650 n.5 (Wis. App.
1991) (describing a declaratory judgment as an equitable remedy).
222. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 367, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945); see also Tex.
Liquor Control Bd. v. Canyon Creek Land Corp., 456 S.W.2d 891, 895 (Tex. 1970) (reaf-
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it is "the only one of its kind,"' 23 the legislature adopted the rem-
edy to "fill the gap between law and equity. 224
There are, however, several additional questions: (1) whether it
is proper to call a declaratory-judgment action a "lawsuit"; (2)
whether it is appropriate to label a declaratory proceeding a
"trial"; and (3) whether a declaratory-relief petition in Texas is a
cause of action, which requires the petitioner to establish a tradi-
tional prima facie case by proving all pertinent elements of the
cause. The answers to the first two questions are clear. Texas's
courts have repeatedly stated that an action for declaratory relief is
a lawsuit. 225 And, of course, under the Texas Civil Practices and
Remedies Code, a declaratory hearing is a trial.22 6
firming the ruling in Cobb that "an action for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor
equitable but is sui generis").
223. See Beadle v. Bonham State Bank, 880 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1994) (concluding that "[a]n action for declaratory judgment is neither legal nor equitable,
but is sui generis, i.e., the only one of its kind, peculiar"), affd in part and rev'd in part, 907
S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995).
224. See Cobb, 190 S.W.2d at 713 (quoting Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Findlay, 18
N.E.2d 263, 267 (Ohio 1938)) (embracing the position that "[i]f [a declaratory judgment
remedy] does not at least in part fill the gap between law and equity there would be little
purpose in enacting [a statute] providing for such procedure").
225. See, e.g., Serna v. Cochrum, 290 S.W.2d 383, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (reporting that "[tihis suit was instituted under the Declaratory
Judgments Act... [to determine whether the court should relieve plaintiffs from] all liabil-
ity"); Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 215 S.W.2d 349, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1948, no writ) (reporting that "a corporation engaged in the insurance business, brought
this suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act ... seeking [a] judgment declaring that [a
certain insurance contract] was not in force and [had no] effect"); Dial v. Fisk, 197 S.W.2d
598, 598-99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (describing the action as "a
suit for a declaratory judgment under the Texas Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act" that
concerned the interpretation of an insurance contract and entitlement "to the proceeds
under the policy").
226. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.007 (Vernon 1997) (noting
that, under the UDJA, fact questions are to be tried in the same manner as they would in
other civil actions); Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs. v. Schutz, 101 S.W.3d 512, 514
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (reporting that "[tihis is an appeal from a
bench trial in a declaratory-judgment action"); Mack v. Landry, 22 S.W.3d 524, 526 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (reporting that this was an "appeal from a de-
claratory judgment in a bench trial"). But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 296 (stating, in pertinent
part, that "[i]n any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any party may
request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law"); Appraisal
Review Bd. of the El Paso County Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Fisher, 88 S.W.3d 807, 815 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 2002, pet. denied) (concluding that "[i]n a bench trial, the trial court's find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law have the same effect as a jury verdict on special issues").
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On the other hand, neither the Texas Legislature nor the Texas
Supreme Court has presented a definitive answer to the third ques-
tion. Eleven years before Texas adopted the UDJA, Edwin
Borchard-the renowned jurist of equity law-observed, "Much
has been written [about] the nature of the cause of action [in a
declaratory-judgment trial], especially since [civil procedure codes]
have abolished the distinction between actions at law and in eq-
uity." '227 To be sure, Texas has abolished the distinction between
courts of law and courts of equity.228 Of course, the Texas Supreme
Court has been exceedingly clear about a related matter: "In spite
of [the] blended system of law and equity the distinction between
them is as absolute as ever ... 229
But there is widespread confusion among Texas's courts regard-
ing what is or is not a cause of action.23 ° There are "equitable
cause[s] of action. '23 1 Also, there are many types of common-law
227. Edwin M. Borchard, Judicial Relieffor Peril and Insecurity, 45 HARV. L. REV.
793, 802 (1932).
228. See Rogers v. Daniel Oil & Royalty Co., 130 Tex. 386, 392, 110 S.W.2d 891, 894
(1937) (declaring "that under our system law and equity are so blended as to remove all
distinctions, procedural or otherwise, as between courts of law and court[s] of equity");
Weaver v. Head, 984 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.) ("There is no
distinction in Texas jurisprudence between courts of equity and courts of law. District
courts in Texas are no longer limited to specialized areas of jurisdiction. All district courts
in Texas are empowered with general jurisdiction, although some are designated with pri-
mary responsibility in certain fields.").
229. Rogers, 110 S.W.2d at 894; see also Storey v. Cent. Hide & Rendering Co., 148
Tex. 504, 515, 226 S.W.2d 615, 619 (1950) (reaffirming that the Texas Supreme Court never
intended "to abrogate the distinction between law and equity in the application of...
remedies").
230. 1 Roy W. McDONALD & ELAINE GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRAcrICE
§ 4:3, at 401-07 (West 1992).
Courts ... have not always consciously considered the impact of their language when
applied to the same term in another aspect. The result was unavoidable: A cause of
action may mean one thing for one purpose and something different for another. Fail-
ure to recognize that the term has different meanings in different contexts produces,
on occasion, marked confusion.
Id. at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. See Doyle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 1 N.Y.2d 439, 442-43 (N.Y. 1956) (citing 1 POME-
ROY ON EourTY JURISPRUDENCE § 237(d) (5th ed. 1929) and reaffirming "that when the
plaintiff pleads an equitable cause of action only and fails to prove the facts relied on to
sustain the equity jurisdiction, equity will not retain the cause for the purpose of awarding
him damages"). But see I Roy W. McDONALD & ELAINE GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS
CIVIL PRACTICE § 4:3, at 405 (West 1992) (discussing Pomeroy's assertions about what con-
stitutes a cause of action).
ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:535
and statutory causes of action.23 2 Arguably, a petition for declara-
tory relief falls into the latter category. Still, the Texas Supreme
Court and lower courts repeatedly declare that a declaratory-judg-
ment action is neither legal nor equitable, but sui generis. So the
question remains: Is a declaratory-judgment petition in Texas com-
parable to a traditional, statutory cause of action? The general
consensus in Texas's lower courts is yes. 2 33 Unlike the requirement
in some states,23 4 however, a petitioner in Texas does not have to
Pomeroy asserts that every judicial action involves the following elements: a primary
right possessed by the plaintiff, and a corresponding duty devolving upon the defen-
dant; a delict or wrong done by the defendant which consisted in a breach of such
primary right and duty; a remedial right in favor of the plaintiff, and a remedial duty
resting on the defendant springing from this delict, and finally the remedy itself.
Of these elements, the facts showing the primary right and duty and the delict or
wrong, combined, constitute the cause of action. The remedy which is sought, under
this definition, has no relation to the cause of action but constitutes the object of the
suit. The difficulty here lies in determining just what Pomeroy meant by a primary
right.
Id.; see also JON NORTON POMEROY, REMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL
ACTION §§ 413-414 (5th ed. 1929) (theorizing that the elements of a "cause of action"
comprise precise articulation of legal rules, rights, and duties underlying the action); W.
Page Keeton, Action, Cause of Action, and Theory of the Action in Texas, 11 TEX. L. REV.
145, 286 (1933) (considering "[tihe concept 'cause of action' as it exist[ed] in the Texas
law").
232. See 1 Roy W. McDONALD & ELAINE GRAFTON CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRAC-
TICE § 4:3. at 402 n.21 (West 1992) (observing that "a cause of action exists pursuant to
common law [or] statute" and listing actions for declaratory judgments as "[e]xamples of
statutory causes of action").
233. See, e.g., Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson, 127 S.W.3d 866, 875 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed) (declaring that "[a]lthough a breach-of-contract cause of
action can provide actual damages, only a declaratory-judgment cause of action can pro-
spectively enforce the breached agreement"); City of Houston v. Texan Land & Cattle Co.,
138 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (reaffirming that "a
party may not use a declaratory judgment [cause of] action to seek the same relief afforded
under another of its causes of action in an effort to obtain otherwise impermissible attor-
ney fees"); Double Diamond, Inc. v. Van Tyne, 109 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2003, no pet.) (concluding that "the trial court erred in granting a take-nothing summary
judgment in favor of Van Tyne when his motion for summary judgment failed to address
appellants' declaratory judgment cause of action"); In re Estate of Judd, 8 S.W.3d 436, 439
(Tex. App.-El Paso 1999, no writ) (reporting that "[this appeal arose] out of an unsuccess-
ful challenge to personal jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment cause of action"), overruled
on other grounds, Toscano v. Osterberg, 82 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2002, no pet.);
Tucker v. Atd. Richfield Co., 787 S.W.2d 555, 559 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied) (declaring that "[a] cause of action for a declaratory judgment does not accrue
until a justiciable controversy exists between the parties").
234. See AG Farms, Inc. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 695 N.E.2d 882, 887 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1998) (noting the elements for a declaratory-judgment action in Illinois).
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prove specific elements or establish a traditional prima facie case to
receive declaratory relief.
23 5
IV. TEXAS COURTS' MANDATORY DUTIES AND
DISCRETIONARY POWERS WHEN DECIDING
WHETHER TO AWARD SUMMARY AND
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
At this juncture, the central theme in this Article is worth re-
peating: The Texas Supreme Court should remove summary-judg-
ment practice from declaratory-judgment trials. To repeat, among
other reasons, the procedure decreases rather than increases the
This court has previously identified the elements of an action for declaratory judg-
ment: (1) a plaintiff with a tangible legal interest, (2) a defendant with an adverse
interest, and (3) an actual controversy regarding that interest. The first element ad-
dresses the standing of the plaintiff to bring an action for declaratory relief. The [Illi-
nois] supreme court has articulated a two-part test for standing: (1) there must be an
actual controversy and (2) the plaintiff must be "interested in the controversy." The
supreme court defined "actual controversy" as "a concrete dispute admitting of an
immediate and definitive determination of the parties' rights, the resolution of which
will aid in the termination of the controversy or some part thereof."
Id. (citations omitted).
235. See R.R. Comm'n v. Houston Natural Gas Corp., 186 S.W.2d 117, 122-23 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1945, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (commenting on the Texas Legislature's intent
when passing the UDJA).
[T]he old rule that the essential elements of a cause of action were a right, a violation
of such right or a wrong, and a remedy are not applicable to the declaratory judgment
proceeding. The act particularly eliminates the old essential element of wrong. It
clearly provides or empowers the court to adjudicate or declare the rights of the par-
ties where there has arisen a real controversy before the wrong actually takes place,
and "whether or not further relief is or could be claimed." In so providing the Legisla-
ture necessarily intended [for the court to] adjudge or declare the business or statutory
relations between parties with requisite interest, and inform them as to their duties,
rights, status, or obligations with respect to the justiciable issue or controversy
presented. This additional remedy does not supplant any existing remedy to right a
wrong actually committed, but affords a speedy and effective remedy against
threatened wrong.
Id.; see also Emmco Ins. Co. v. Burrows, 419 S.W.2d 665, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967,
no writ) (discussing the purpose of the statute).
The purpose of the [declaratory judgment] statute . . . is to declare existing rights,
status, or other legal relations. The statute cannot be invoked as an affirmative
ground of recovery to revise, alter, or reform such rights, status or legal relations. As
applied to contracts, the purpose of declaratory relief is to obtain an interpretation of
the contract, and a decree in such a case may provide "only for a determination of the
purposes intended by the instrument, and not a modification of its terms."
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efficient administration of justice generally, and it prevents Texas's
trial courts from delivering speedy and well-reasoned declarations
in particular. In addition, a careful analysis of courts' relative dis-
cretionary powers and responsibilities under the Texas Uniform
Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and under Texas's summary-
judgment rule reveals significant conflicts between the act and the
rule. And that disharmony has generated exceedingly strained,
highly cursory, unintelligible, and very unfair results where litigants
have petitioned courts for declaratory relief.
More relevant, the UDJA and the summary-judgment rule are
redundant in a significant way: Along with specific mandatory du-
ties, the Texas Supreme Court gave judges considerable discretion-
ary powers under the summary-judgment rule to quickly assess
whether a trial on the merits is necessary.236 However, in a sum-
mary-judgment hearing, judges can only entertain and resolve a
question of law. On the other hand, the Texas Legislature gave
trial judges substantially more discretionary authority to reach
even quicker and fairer outcomes on the merits in declaratory-
judgment trials. And as discussed more carefully below,237 Texas's
trial courts have even broader power to resolve both questions of
law and fact under the UDJA.
Therefore, this Part discusses Texas's trial judges' respective dis-
cretionary powers and duties-under the UDJA and Rule 166a(a),
(b), and (i)-during declaratory-judgment trials. And because
courts' discretionary powers under the two bodies of law are argua-
bly redundant in major respects, this discussion should help to an-
swer two important questions: (1) whether the judicially-mandated
summary-judgment rules in Texas are superior to the legislatively
enacted UDJA rules; and (2) whether the UDJA gives Texas trial
judges authority to completely remove traditional and no-evidence
summary-judgment practice from declaratory-judgment trials.
236. See infra note 238 and accompanying text.
237. See Part 111(C).
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A. Texas's Trial Judges' Duties and Discretionary Powers When
Deciding Whether to Award Summary Judgment in
Trials Generally
Texas's trial judges must perform certain mandatory duties after
a movant files a motion for summary judgment. And whether a
lawsuit involves an action for a declaratory judgment or some
other statutory or common-law action, a trial court's overarching
responsibility is to determine whether there is a need for a trial.238
More specifically, the court must "determine if there are any issues
of fact to be tried, and not to weigh the evidence or determine its
credibility, and thus try the case on the affidavits. '2 39 And if the
court finds no genuine issue regarding any material fact, the trial
court must award summary relief as a matter of law. 240
Without doubt, a trial judge must carefully examine a movant's
affidavits, transcripts, and other relevant documents for evidence
and to determine whether the movant is a proper party. For an-
other rule is clear: A court has no authority to grant summary re-
lief if the movant is not a party to the lawsuit.241 In addition, it is
238. See Channel 4, KGBT v. Briggs, 759 S.W.2d 939, 944-45 (Tex. 1988) (quoting
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 333-34 (1986), and adopting the view that "one of
the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually
unsupported claims . . . and ... it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accom-
plish this purpose"). "The inquiry is one of determining whether there is a need for a trial
and that determination depends on whether 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party."' Id. at 945 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
250 (1986)); see also Lampasas v. Spring Ctr., Inc., 988 S.W.2d 428, 436 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (concluding that a movant files a summary-judgment motion
to encourage a court "to 'pierce the pleadings and ... assess the proof in order to see
whether there is a genuine need for a trial"' (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 524, 587 (1986))).
239. Gulbenkian v. Penn, 151 Tex. 412, 416, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952).
240. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if (i) the deposition transcripts, in-
terrogatory answers, and other discovery responses referenced or set forth in the mo-
tion or response, and (ii) the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, stipulations of the
parties, and authenticated or certified public records ... show that ... there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in an answer or any other
response.
Id.
241. See Teer v. Duddlesten, 664 S.W.2d 702, 703 (Tex. 1984) (holding that "[a] sum-
mary judgment may only be granted in favor of [a] movant whose evidence offered in
support of the motion establishes the movant's right to judgment as a matter of law");
Williams v. Bank One, Tex., N.A., 15 S.W.3d 110, 116 (Tex. App.-Waco 1999, no pet.)
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impermissible for a court to grant summary relief on a cause of
action that does not appear in the summary-judgment motion.242
Or stated slightly differently, a trial court cannot award more sum-
mary relief than that requested in the movant's motion.243 And to
stress a previous observation, a trial court must grant a motion for
a traditional summary judgment if a defendant conclusively ne-
gates at least one element of the plaintiff's claim.244 But Texas's
trial judges' other duties vary a bit depending on whether a movant
files a traditional or a no-evidence summary-judgment motion. For
example, when the moving party is a plaintiff and presents a tradi-
tional summary-judgment motion, the movant has the burden to
prove he is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues
expressly set out in the motion." '245 Contrarily, if the movant for a
traditional summary judgment is a defendant, the movant must ei-
ther (1) negate at least one of the elements of the nonmovant's
cause of action, or (2) conclusively establish each element of an
affirmative defense.246
(concluding that "[a] trial court cannot grant summary judgment for a party which has not
filed a motion therefor").
242. See, e.g., Stiles v. Resolution Trust Corp., 867 S.W.2d 24, 26 (Tex. 1993) (conclud-
ing that "summary judgment cannot be affirmed on grounds not expressly set out in the
motion or response"); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist., 858 S.W.2d 337, 341 (Tex.
1993) (concluding that a summary-judgment motion must "stand or fall on the grounds
expressly presented in the motion"); Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d
563, 564 (Tex. 1983) (per curiam) (deciding that summary judgment may not be granted on
issues not "expressly presented" to the trial court).
243. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. 2001) (declaring
that a summary judgment is subject to reversal if it grants more relief than requested);
Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997) (concluding that a trial
court cannot grant more relief than that requested in a motion for summary judgment);
Walton v. City of Midland, 24 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.) (ac-
cepting the appellants' argument "that the trial court granted more relief than was re-
quested [in the Appellees'] summary judgment motions").
244. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997) (reaffirming
that "[s]ummary judgment is proper if the defendant disproves at least one element of each
of the plaintiff's claims ... or establishes all elements of an affirmative defense to each
claim").
245. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (emphasis added); see also Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel,
997 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. 1999) (stating that the movant for summary judgment shoulders
the burden of proof).
246. See Randall's Food Mkts., Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex. 1995) (de-
claring that a defendant is entitled to summary judgment if she can negate an essential
element of a cause of action or conclusively establish the elements of an affirmative
defense).
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Unquestionably, both movants and nonmovants have additional
burdens247 after filing a traditional motion for summary relief. But
trial courts also have additional duties. After a movant files a
traditional motion, a court must accept as true all evidence favor-
ing the nonmovant.248 Furthermore, when deciding whether there
is a genuine issue of fact, a court must resolve all doubts in favor of
the nonmovant z49 Similarly, the trial judge must indulge every
reasonable inference to support the nonmovant's position.250 And
finally, a trial court may not grant a traditional summary-judgment
motion by default when a movant's summary-judgment proof is le-
gally insufficient or the nonmovant does not respond to the
motion. 1
When weighing whether to award a no-evidence motion, a trial
judge must review the record for evidence supporting the assertion
that the nonmovant presents "no evidence" to prove the essential
elements of the nonmovant's cause of action or defense.252 Of
course, the trial court also must determine whether the nonmovant
presented sufficient evidence to prove the existence of each ele-
247. See Rhone-Poulenc, 997 S.W.2d at 222-23 (holding that the non-movant need not
respond to the motion for summary judgment unless the movant meets its burden of
proof). But see Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995) (concluding
that if the movant meets its burden of proof, the non-movant must present summary-judg-
ment evidence to raise a fact issue).
248. See Science Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997) (stressing
that courts must accept all of the nonmovant's proof as true when reviewing a summary-
judgment motion).
249. See Johnson County Sheriffs Posse, Inc. v. Endsley, 926 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Tex.
1996) (declaring that trial courts must resolve all doubts about the existence of a genuine
issue of a material fact against the movant).
250. See Limestone Prods. Distribution, Inc. v. McNamara, 71 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex.
2002) (reaffirming that trial courts must indulge every reasonable inference in favor of the
nonmovant); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (concluding
that "[e]very reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any
doubts resolved in its favor").
251. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979)
(holding that a "trial court may not grant a summary judgment by default for lack of an
answer or response to the motion by the non-movant when the movant's summary judg-
ment proof is legally insufficient").
252. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (permitting a party to move for a no-evidence sum-
mary judgment if "there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a claim or
defense on which [the nonmovant] would have the burden of proof at trial" after adequate
time for discovery).
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ment.253 More important, the trial judge must consider all evidence
in favor of the nonmovant and totally discount any evidence that
may weaken or discolor the nonmovant's position. 4
And the law is equally clear regarding another matter: A court
may not grant a no-evidence summary judgment if the nonmovant
produces "more than a scintilla" of probative evidence that raises a
genuine issue of material fact regarding the disputed elements of a
cause of action or defense.2 5 5 "More than a scintilla of evidence
exists when the evidence 'rises to a level that would enable reason-
able and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.' ,2 56 But,
evidence that does no more than create a mere surmise or suspi-
cion of a fact is weak; therefore, it is "legally insufficient and con-
stitutes no evidence. 257
253. See Kelly v. Demoss Owners Ass'n, 71 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
2002, no pet.) (declaring that an appellate court's duty "is to ascertain whether the non-
movant produced any evidence of probative force to raise a fact issue on the material
questions presented"); see also Weiss v. Mech. Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 123-
24 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (holding that "the non-movant need not
'marshal its proof,'" but "need[s] only [to] point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the
challenged elements" (quoting TEX. R. Civ P. 166a(i))).
254. See Morgan v. Anthony, 27 S.W.3d 928, 929 (Tex. 2000) (concluding that "[when]
reviewing the summary judgment record to determine if there [is] legally sufficient evi-
dence to raise a fact question on the three elements of intentional infliction of emotional
distress ... raised in [the] motion, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to ... the nonmovant"); Kelly v. Demoss Owners Ass'n, 71 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (stating that courts must "consider all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary judgment was ren-
dered, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences"); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i)
cmt. (1997) (noting that "[t]o defeat a motion made under paragraph (i), the respon-
dent ... need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue").
255. See, e.g., Oasis Oil Corp. v. Koch Ref. Co., 60 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied) (quoting Zapata v. Children's Clinic, 997 S.W.2d 745, 747
(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.)) (ruling that "[t]he trial court may not grant a
no-evidence summary judgment if the respondent brings forth more than a scintilla of pro-
bative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact"); Flameout Design & Fabrication
Inc. v. Pennzoil Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
no pet.) (holding that "[a] trial court must grant [a no-evidence] motion unless the non-
movant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact
on the challenged elements").
256. Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997)).
257. Allen v. W.A. Virnau & Sons, Inc., 28 S.W.3d 226, 231 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
2000, pet. denied) (quoting Vallance v. Irving C.A.R.E.S., Inc., 14 S.W.3d 833, 836 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.)).
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On appellate review, Texas's courts of appeals also have certain
prescribed duties when reviewing lower courts' decisions to award
or deny a no-evidence summary judgment. First, when reviewing a
trial court's award, an appellate court must determine the disputed
elements of the movant's claim and then ascertain whether the
nonmovant presented sufficient evidence to prove the existence of
each element. Once more, the quantum of evidence must be more
than a scintilla, and it must rise to a level that permits reasonable
and fair-minded people to disagree about whether the nonmovant
proved the disputed element.258
Finally, appellate courts must:
determine whether the plaintiff has produced any evidence of proba-
tive force to raise fact issues on the material questions presented.
The appellate court must consider all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the no-evidence summary
judgment was rendered, every reasonable inference must be in-
dulged in favor of the nonmovant, and any doubts resolved in its
favor.259
B. Texas's Trial Judges' Discretionary Powers and Duties-
Whether to Award a Declaratory Judgment
Put simply, Texas's trial courts have broad discretionary powers
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. They have power
258. See Garrett v. Great W. Distrib. Co. of Amarillo, 129 S.W.3d 797, 799 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied) (concluding that a court of appeals must "assess the
legitimacy of the trial court's decision via the standard of review described in Kelly v. De-
moss Owners [Ass'n], 71 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.)," and ob-
serving that the Kelly "standard obligates [the court of appeals] to first determine the
elements of the claim placed in issue by the movant"); see also TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i)
(requiring the movant to specify the elements of the claim as to which there is no
evidence).
259. Green v. Gemini Exploration Co., No. 03-02-00334-CV, 2003 WL 1986859, at *3
(Tex. App.-Austin May 1, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reaffirming the view that "a no-
evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict, and we apply the
same legal sufficiency standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we apply
in reviewing a directed verdict" (quoting Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, 979 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1998, no pet.))); see also Flameout Design & Fabrication Inc. v. Pennzoil
Caspian Corp., 994 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.)
(stressing that when reviewing a summary judgment "[the court] must indulge every rea-
sonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolve any doubts in its favor").
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"to declare rights, status, and other legal relations. '260 Also, trial
courts have sound discretion to entertain an action for a declara-
tory judgment 261 as well as sound discretion to award or deny de-
claratory relief.262 But a trial court's discretion to award relief rests
on several conditions. First, declaratory relief is appropriate only if
a justiciable controversy exists regarding the parties' rights and sta-
tus and a declaration will resolve that controversy. 263 "To consti-
tute a justiciable controversy, there must exist a real and
substantial controversy involving genuine conflict of tangible inter-
ests and not merely a theoretical dispute.
264
In addition, trial courts may not consider or attempt to resolve
hypothetical or contingent controversies 265 in declaratory-judg-
ment trials. Also, judges may not use a declaratory-judgment hear-
ing to address moot controversies266 or to deliver an advisory
260. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 369, 190 S.W.2d 709, 714 (1945) (quoting lan-
guage appearing in the UDJA); see also Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465,
468 (Tex. 1995) (declaring that "[t]he authority to grant a declaratory judgment ... flows
from the 'general powers' of the courts to enter a declaratory judgment given under the
Declaratory Judgments Act"); accord Adams v. Cook, 101 P.2d 484, 489 (Cal. 1940)
(stressing that "[t]he powers of a court [under the UDJA to a grant] declaratory relief are
as broad and extensive as those exercised by [a] court in any ordinary suit in equity").
261. See K.M.S. Research Labs., Inc. v. Willingham, 629 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, no writ) (reaffirming the view that "the entertaining of a declaratory judgment
rests with the sound discretion of the trial court").
262. See Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex. 1995) (declaring
that "[a] trial court has discretion to enter a declaratory judgment"); United Interests, Inc.
v. Brewington, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 897,905 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (holding that the decision to award "a declaratory judgment rests within the discre-
tion of the trial judge").
263. See Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 SW.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)
(indicating that the general test for the granting of a declaratory judgment is whether a real
controversy exists between the parties); see also Hays County v. Hays County Water Plan-
ning P'ship, 106 S.W.3d 349, 358 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.) (adopting the principle
that a declaratory judgment "plaintiff must allege facts that demonstrate a real dispute in-
volving an immediate, concrete outcome-that is, a justiciable controversy must exist as to
the rights and status of the parties and the controversy must be resolved by the declaration
sought" (emphasis added)).
264. Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Bexar-
Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Medina Lake
Protection Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 778, 779-80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
265. See Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, N.J., v. Burch, 442 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex. 1968)
(stating that "the Declaratory Judgments Act [does not give a court] power to pass upon
hypothetical or contingent situations, or [to] determine questions [that are not part] of an
actual controversy, although such questions may in the future require adjudication").
266. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex. 1999) (embrac-
ing the view that "[a]ppellate courts are prohibited from deciding moot controversies"); see
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opinion. 261 Although there is no universal definition, some courts
embrace the view that an advisory opinion "decides an abstract
question of law without binding the parties. '2 6  Therefore, "[t]o
avoid rendering advisory opinions, a court should only decide cases
in which a live controversy exists at the time of the decision. "269
Without doubt, the majority of trial judges' responsibilities are
fairly clear when they contemplate whether to award declaratory
relief. There is, however, a serious conflict over whether Texas's
trial judges must always issue a declaration of rights-either grant-
ing or denying relief-after agreeing to try a declaratory-judgment
action. Stated more succinctly, the question is whether trial courts
must always enter a decree and declare rights formally during a
declaratory-judgment trial, even if (1) an opposing party files a mo-
also S.E.C. v. Med. Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403,406 (1972) (holding that a case
is moot when the allegedly wrongful behavior has passed and cannot be expected to recur);
Campus Communications, Inc. v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., No. 01-02-00378-CV, 2003 WL
21027936, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] May 8, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.)
(declaring that "[a] case is moot when (1) a party seeks a judgment to resolve a contro-
versy, but no controversy exists, or (2) judgment is sought on a matter which ... cannot
have a practical legal effect on an existing controversy" after a court issues the
declaration).
267. See, e.g., Coalson v. City Council of Victoria, 610 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex. 1980)
(ruling that courts may not give advisory opinions or decide cases upon speculative, hypo-
thetical, or contingent situations); Hays County Wafer Planning P'ship, 106 S.W.3d at 358
(citing Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993), and
declaring that "[t]he separation-of-powers doctrine prohibits courts from issuing advisory
opinions").
268. See Hays County Water Planning P'ship, 106 S.W.3d at 358 (describing how an
advisory opinion determines "an abstract question of law without binding the parties"); see
also Ala. State Fed'n of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. McAd-
ory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (holding that "[t]he requirements for a justiciable case or
controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment proceeding than in any other type
of suit. This Court is without power to give advisory opinions."); Laborers' Int'l of N. Am.,
Constr. & Mun. Workers Local Union No. 1253 v. Blackwell, 482 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, no writ) (declaring that a "court in an action for declaratory
judgment will not declare rights on facts which are uncertain, contingent and which facts or
events may never happen").
269. Campus Communications, Inc. v. Tex. A & M Univ. Sys., 2003 WL 21027936, at
*1 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] May 8, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Camarena
v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)); see also Camarena v. Tex.
Employment Comm'n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988) (embracing the view that "a case
is ... moot 'when the issues presented are no longer "live" or [when] the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome"' (quoting Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481
(1982))).
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tion to dismiss the action, or (2) one of the parties files a traditional
or a no-evidence motion for summary judgment during the trial.
To help illustrate the essence of the controversy, consider the
facts in Juliff Gardens, L.L.C. v. Texas Commission on Environ-
mental Quality.270 Juliff applied to the Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality for a permit to build and operate a landfill in
Brazoria County.271 While the application was pending, the Texas
Legislature enacted a bill that forced the commission to deny Ju-
liff's application.272 Shortly thereafter, Juliff commenced a declara-
tory-judgment action, asking the court to declare that the new
statute was an unconstitutional local or special law.273
The commission filed a motion to dismiss the action and, alterna-
tively, a traditional motion for summary judgment.274 The commis-
sion argued that it "had exclusive or primary jurisdiction to
determine the applicability of the statute before Juliff could chal-
lenge its constitutionality. '275 The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss the declaratory-judgment action.276 In the alternative, the
district court awarded the summary judgment, ruling that the
newly-enacted statute was not a local or special law.277 Juliff ap-
pealed. The Austin Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court im-
properly dismissed Juliff's action for declaratory relief.278 But the
270. 131 S.W.3d 271 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
271. Juliff Gardens, L.L.C. v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, 131 S.W.3d 271, 275
(Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.).
272. Id. at 274 (citing H.B. 2912 and the codified portion of that bill, Section 361.122
of the Texas Health and Safety Code, applicable to the circumstances of the case); see also
TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 131.122 (Vernon 2004) (giving the conditions under
which the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality cannot grant a permit to build the
type of landfill that the plaintiff hoped to construct). Under Juliff's original plans, the
landfill met all three statutory conditions, mandating that the building permit be denied.
Juliff Gardens, 131 S.W.3d at 275. As a result, Juliff moved the proposed site of the landfill
to avoid locating it within one hundred feet of a canal used as a drinking water source for
the public, thus eliminating one of the statutory requirements. Id. Presumably, Juliff
thought this would clear the way for approval, but the issue became whether another
water-holding topographical feature, located within one hundred feet of the changed site,
should be characterized as a canal for the purposes of the statute. Id. At the time Juliff
filed the declaratory-judgment action, the characterization of the land had not been de-
cided and its application for the permit was still pending. Id. at 276.
273. Juliff Gardens, 131 S.W.3d. at 274.
274. Id. at 276.
275. Id. at 275.
276. Id. at 274-75.
277. Id. at 275.
278. Juliff Gardens, 131 S.W.3d at 279-80.
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appellate court affirmed the lower court's decision to grant sum-
mary relief to the commission. 79
But consider the facts and the outcome in Zable v. Henry.280 J.I.
and Edith Zable, husband and wife, conveyed certain real property
to the Henrys.281 The deed to the property gave the Henrys an
option to purchase other real property that the Zables owned.
2 82
Edith Zable, however, neither signed nor participated in the execu-
tion of the deed. 8 3 Shortly thereafter, Mr. Zable discovered he
made a mistake: He gave the Henrys an option to purchase the
Zables' homestead. 84
Attempting to correct the blunder, the Zables filed a declara-
tory-judgment action; they asked the trial court to declare the op-
tion void as a matter of law. 85 In addition, both the Zables and the
Henrys filed a traditional summary-judgment motion.286 Like the
trial judge in Juliff, the judge in Zable dismissed the Zables' declar-
atory-judgment action.287 The trial court also denied the Zables'
motion for summary relief, but granted the Henrys' motion.288 To
We find that the Commission has neither exclusive nor primary jurisdiction to deter-
mine the constitutionality of section 361.122 and that Juliff was not required to allow
the Commission to ultimately determine the applicability of section 361.122 before
challenging the statute's constitutionality. We therefore hold that the district court
erred in granting the Commission's motion to dismiss.
Id.
279. Id. at 281. Like the commission, Juliff filed its own motion for summary judg-
ment. Id. at 276. On appeal, Juliff argued that because the district court decided it did not
have proper jurisdiction to issue a holding on Juliff's declaratory-judgment action, the trial
court also did not have jurisdiction to hear the competing motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 280. Juliff asserted that the district court's ruling on the competing motions for sum-
mary judgment amounted to an advisory opinion. Id. The appellate court disagreed and
affirmed the district court's holding on the merits of the summary-judgment motions. Id.
at 285.
280. 649 S.W.2d 136 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
281. Zable v. Henry, 649 S.W.2d 136, 136-37 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
282. Id. at 137.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 137-38. "[T]he Henrys conceded that the option property was the Zables'
homestead both at the time the deed was signed and as of the date of hearing ..... Id. at
137. "The only issue presented by this action is whether the option is presently void, and
not whether it is enforceable now or at some future time." Id. At oral argument, the
Zables argued that TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (Vernon 1975) required that the option
be judicially voided. Id. at 138.
286. Zable, 649 S.W.2d at 136.
287. Id.
288. Id.
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justify its rulings, the trial court found: (1) the dispute did not in-
volve a forced sale of a homestead; (2) it was not an action to en-
force the specific performance of an option; and (3) there was no
evidence suggesting that the Henrys would enforce the option
while Mrs. Zable continued to occupy the homestead.289
The Zables appealed their adverse rulings to the Dallas Court of
Appeals. Like the Austin Court of Appeals in Juliff, the court of
appeals in Dallas affirmed the trial judge's refusal to grant the
Zables' motion for summary judgment. 290 But unlike the Austin
Court of Appeals in Juliff, the Dallas Court of Appeals refused to
reverse the lower court's decision to dismiss the Zables' declara-
tory-judgment action.29' In fact, the Dallas Court of Appeals did
not even address the dismissal.292 More disquieting, even a cursory
discussion of the Zables' petition for declaratory relief does not
appear anywhere in the appellate court's opinion.293
So, we return to the question: Do Texas's trial courts have a
mandatory duty to enter a decree and declare rights-favorably or
unfavorably-in a declaratory-judgment trial? On one side of this
debate, several of Texas's appellate courts adopt the view that a
trial judge has no mandatory duty to issue a favorable or an unfa-
vorable declaration; therefore, the judge may dismiss a declara-
tory-judgment action outright without issuing a formal decree. For
example, as early as the mid-twentieth century, the San Antonio
Appellate Court concluded that a trial judge has discretion to enter
a decree in a declaratory-judgment hearing.294
More recently, the Eastland Court of Appeals embraced the po-
sition that whether a trial court will dismiss a declaratory-judgment
suit outright rests within the sound discretion of that court.295 Sim-
289. Id. at 137.
290. See id. at 139 (concluding "that the trial court did not err in holding that the grant
of an option to purchase property at some future time is valid, despite the fact that the
property is currently homestead and the grant was executed only by the husband").
291. See Zable, 649 S.W.2d at 139 (affirming the trial court).
292. See id. at 136-39 (omitting discussion of the dismissal).
293. See id. (neglecting a discussion of Zable's petition).
294. See Town of Santa Rosa v. Johnson, 184 S.W.2d 340, 340-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1944, no writ) ("Under the terms of section 6 of the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ment Act, the entry of a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the trial court.").
295. Harding Bros. Oil & Gas Co. v. Jim Ned Indep. Sch. Dist., 457 S.W.2d 102, 105-
06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970, no writ). "The general rule is that the trial court has
discretion concerning a declaratory judgment. In Town of Santa Rosa v. Johnson [the San
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ilarly, the Tyler Court of Appeals adopted the principle that a court
"may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or de-
cree." 296 The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals also ruled em-
phatically that a trial court has discretion to dismiss a declaratory-
judgment action. 97 Finally, in K.M.S. Research Laboratories, Inc.
v. Willingham,98 the Dallas Court of Appeals ruled as it did in
Zable and upheld the trial court's decision to dismiss the declara-
tory-judgment action without issuing a formal decree.299 Unlike its
omission in Zable, however, the Dallas Appellate Court explained
its decision in K.M.S. -concluding "that [a refusal] to enter a de-
claratory decree is discretionary with the trial court. 300
Antonio Appellate Court] held that the entry of a declaratory judgment is discretionary
with the trial court." Id. at 105 (italics added). "In our opinion the [trial court in the
present case] exercised sound discretion and properly dismissed this suit for a declaratory
judgment and for an injunction." Id. at 106.
296. S. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. City of Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (quoting Section 6 of the Declaratory Judgments Act).
Once jurisdiction of the subject matter has been established under the Declaratory
Judgments Act, however, it is discretionary with the trial court whether the declara-
tory relief prayed for is granted. Section 6 of that Act provides, "The Court may
refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree ... [which] would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding."
Id. (alteration in original).
297. See United Interests, Inc. v. Brewington, Inc., 729 S.W.2d 897, 906 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("Entry of a declaratory judgment is discretion-
ary. ... ); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Fraiman, 514 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (observing that "[tihe Texas cases dealing with the
propriety of the trial court granting a declaratory judgment are well settled that the court
may do so where the judgment would serve a useful, beneficial purpose").
298. 629 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
299. K.M.S. Research Labs., Inc. v. Willingham, 629 S.W.2d 173, 173 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1982, no writ).
Nancy P. Willingham filed a personal injury suit in Dallas County against The Hair
Jammer and KMS Research Laboratories, Inc. alleging she had been harmed by a
certain hair product .... KMS, being held to answer in Dallas, filed a counterclaim
under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 2524-1
(Vernon 1965), asking for a determination as to whether it was liable to Willingham.
Willingham then took a non-suit against KMS and filed a "Motion to Dismiss"
KMS'[s] counterclaim on the ground that KMS failed to state a cause of action. The
motion to dismiss was granted and KMS appeal[ed].
Id.; see also Zable v. Henry, 649 S.W.2d 136, 139 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ) (refus-
ing to grant declaratory judgment).
300. K.M.S. Research Labs., 629 S.W.2d at 174.
[B]y express legislative intent, our decision must be made in conformity with other
jurisdictions.
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Of course, jurists on the other side of this debate take a mark-
edly different view. First, there are jurists who argue strongly that
trial judges in Texas have a statutory duty to construe the UDJA
liberally30 1 and to make the act a useful tool for solving legal
problems and controversies. 30 2 For example, nearly a quarter cen-
tury ago, Robert Calvert-the learned jurist and former Chief Jus-
tice of the Texas Supreme Court-argued that trial judges always
have a mandatory duty under the UDJA to interpret, say, a con-
tract and issue a formal declaration of rights.30 3 According to Jus-
tice Calvert, "[Texas trial courts may] refuse to render a
declaratory judgment .. . [only] where the judgment 'would not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the
proceeding.' "304
Thus, following the express intention of the Act to harmonize the laws of Texas with
those other States and the federal laws, we hold that KMS improperly attempted to
litigate its liability to Willingham by seeking a declaratory judgment. Therefore it
could not have stated a cause of action under the Act and Willingham's motion to
dismiss was properly denied.
Furthermore, the entertaining of a declaratory judgment rests with the sound discre-
tion of the trial court.
Id.
301. See, e.g., TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(a)-(b) (Vernon 1997)
("This chapter may be cited as the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.... [It] is reme-
dial ... and [must] be liberally construed and administered."); Cobb v. Harrington, 144
Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945) (adopting the position that the Declaratory Judgments
Act's "scope should be kept wide and liberal, and should not be hedged about by technical-
ities" (quoting WALTER H. ANDERSON, ACTIONS FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS § 3, at
11-12 (1940))); see also Georgiades v. Di Ferrante, 871 S.W.2d 878, 880 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (reaffirming that the Act "[must] be liberally construed
and administered").
302. See Robert W. Calvert, Declaratory Judgments in Texas-Mandatory or Discre-
tionary?, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 12 (1982) (arguing that the Texas Supreme Court an-
nounced rules in Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 190 S.W.2d 709 (1945), that "marked
out very clearly the duty of Texas courts to make the Declaratory Judgments Act a useful
tool in the solution of legal problems and controversies, either before or after a legal wrong
has been committed"). Calvert further states that the act "was intended [to be a tool for]
courts to make a correct declaration of the matters at issue, once jurisdiction has attached."
Id.
303. See id. at 8 ("There are other sections of the [UDJA] which confer discretionary
powers, thus indicating that the general power to grant declaratory relief is mandatory and
not discretionary.").
304. Id. at 17.
Some courts have appropriated the language ... in Town of Santa Rosa v. Johnson ...
that "the entry of a declaratory judgment is discretionary with the trial court" as au-
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Several of Texas's appellate courts have adopted Chief Justice
Calvert's argument. For example, in Public Utility Commission of
Texas v. City of Austin," 5 the Austin Court of Appeals adamantly
reaffirmed one of its prior declarations: "[I]t is the duty of the trial
courts to make the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act ... [a] use-
ful tool[ ] in the resolution of legal problems and controversies. "306
"[And] if a declaratory judgment will terminate the uncertainty or
controversy [that produced] the lawsuit, the trial court is duty-
bound to declare the rights of the parties .... -307 The Beaumont,
Dallas, Houston, and Texarkana Courts of Appeals also have em-
braced308 and reaffirmed 30 9 the principle that trial courts have a
thorizing a trial court, which has accepted jurisdiction, to decline to grant declaratory
relief in other than section 6 situations. The increasing tendency to do so is best illus-
trated in K.M.S. Research Laboratories, Inc. v. Willingham ....
Id. at 15 (quoting Town of Santa Rosa v. Johnson, 184 S.W.2d 340, 340-41 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1944, no writ)).
305. 728 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. App.-Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
306. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. City of Austin, 728 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.-
Austin 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Bellegie v. Tex. Bd. of Nurse Examiners, 685 S.W.2d
431, 434 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ)); see also Vista Health Plan, Inc. v. Tex. Health
& Human Servs. Comm'n, No. 03-03-00216-CV, 2004 WL 1114551, at *6 (Tex. App.-
Austin May 20, 2004, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (reaffirming the view that "if a declaratory
judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to a lawsuit, the trial
court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the
parties join issue").
307. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex., 728 S.W.2d at 910.
308. See SpawGlass Constr. Corp. v. City of Houston, 974 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (adopting the position "that if a declaratory
judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the lawsuit, the trial
court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the
parties join issue"); Beadle v. Bonham State Bank, 880 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 1994) (adopting the principle that "[i]f a declaratory judgment will terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the lawsuit, the trial court is duty-bound to declare
the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties join issue"), affd in part
and rev'd in part, 907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Water Comm'n v. Lindsey, 850 S.W.2d
183, 186 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, no writ) (adopting the rule that "if a declaratory
judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the law suit, the trial
court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the
parties join issue" (quoting Bellegie v. Tex. Bd. of Nurse Examiners, 685 S.W.2d 431, 434
(Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ ref'd n.r.e.))); Heineken USA, Inc. v. Willow Distribs., Inc.,
No. 05-00-01519-CV, 2001 WL 1205340, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 12, 2001, no pet.)
(not designated for publication) (embracing the rule that "if a declaratory judgment will
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the law suit, the trial court is duty-
bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the parties join
issue").
309. See Securtec, Inc. v. County of Gregg, 106 S.W.3d 803, 809 (Tex. App.-Texar-
kana 2003, pet. denied) (reaffirming the view that "[i]f a declaratory judgment will termi-
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mandatory duty to enter a formal decree in a declaratory-judgment
trial.
Without doubt, the issue of whether trial judges have a
mandatory duty to enter a declaratory-judgment decree has re-
ceived serious analysis in other large states and, arguably, influen-
tial jurisdictions that have adopted the UDJA. For example,
consider the facts in Maurizzio v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty
Co. 310 Lumbermens insured Maurizzio under an automobile insur-
ance contract that had an underinsured motorist endorsement.311
During the policy period, Maurizzio's vehicle collided with a third
party's vehicle.312 The accident caused injuries and generated dam-
ages exceeding the policy limits of the third party's insurance con-
tract.313 Maurizzio filed a claim, citing the underinsured motorist
provision and demanding that Lumbermens cover the financial
losses.3
14
The insurer denied the claim and filed a declaratory-judgment
action, asking the court to declare that Lumbermens had a contrac-
tual duty to pay under the endorsement. 315 During the trial, the
insurer filed a motion to dismiss and the trial court granted that
motion.31 6 Maurizzio appealed the adverse ruling to a New York
intermediate appellate court, which affirmed the lower court's dis-
nate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the lawsuit, the trial court is duty bound
to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters on which the parties join issue");
Continental Cas. Co. v. Major Constructors, No. 14-49-0244-CV, 2000 WL 991601, at *1
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (re-emphasizing that "if a declaratory
judgment will terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the lawsuit, the trial
court is duty-bound to declare the rights of the parties as to those matters upon which the
parties join issue").
310. 538 N.E.2d 334 (N.Y. 1989).
311. Maurizzio v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 538 N.E.2d 334, 335 (N.Y. 1989).
312. Id. at 335.
313. Id.
314. Id. "[The insured] filed a claim under this underinsured motorist endorsement
after having allegedly sustained injuries in excess of $20,000 in an accident with another
vehicle, which had an insurance policy with a $10,000 limit for bodily injury." Id.
315. Id. "When defendant insurance company denied the claim, plaintiff commenced
the present lawsuit for a judgment declaring him entitled to coverage." Id.
316. Maurizzio, 538 N.E.2d at 335.
[The] [s]upreme [c]ourt dismissed the complaint [because the insured failed] to state a
cause of action . . . [U]nder the plain terms of plaintiff's policy, the underinsured mo-
torist coverage was unavailable where the .. .policy limits of the offending vehicle
were not less than the limits of [Maurizzio's] own [policy].
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missal. Then the insured asked New York's highest court-the
court of appeals-to hear the case and reverse the lower courts'
rulings. The New York Court of Appeals agreed to review the
case.
317
In a fairly intelligible and thoughtful opinion, the court of ap-
peals embraced the lower courts' general conclusion that Lumber-
mens had no contractual duty to reimburse Maurizzio under the
underinsured motorist endorsement.31 8 But the New York Court
of Appeals also declared:
[A]lthough the courts below correctly disposed of the merits of
plaintiff's claim, they erred in the form of the remedy they se-
lected .... [W]hen a court resolves the merits of a declaratory judg-
ment action against the plaintiff, the proper course is not to dismiss
the complaint, but rather to issue a declaration in favor of the de-
fendants .... Accordingly, the order from which plaintiff appeals
must be modified to include a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to recover on his underinsured motorist claim.3 19
The Ohio Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals
also have embraced the doctrine that courts must issue a formal
decree-whether that decree is favorable or unfavorable-after ac-
cepting a complainant's invitation to try a declaratory-judgment
317. Id. "The Appellate Division affirmed, and plaintiff now appeals by permission of
this court." Id. (citation omitted).
318. Id.
We agree that plaintiff is not entitled to recover under the terms of his underinsured
motorist endorsement. The coverage provided by that endorsement is definitionally
not available where, as here, the policy limits of the insured's vehicle do not exceed
the policy limits of the other vehicle or vehicles involved in the injury-causing acci-
dent. While it is true that a person who has purchased a policy with a $10,000 limit for
bodily injury may never have occasion to recover under an underinsured motorist en-
dorsement such as the one at issue here, that circumstance alone does not justify an
interpretation of the underinsurance clause that would create an entirely different
form of supplementary coverage than that defined by the Legislature in the State's
Insurance Law.
Maurizzio v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 538 N.E.2d 334, 335 (N.Y. 1989) (citations
omitted).
319. Id. at 336. The court concluded that it was erroneous for the trial court to dismiss
the declaratory-judgment action merely because the plaintiffs were not entitled to the dec-
laration that they sought. Id.; see also Bresky v. Ace Ina Holdings Inc., 731 N.Y.S.2d 791,
793 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (citing Maurizzio v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 538 N.E.2d
334, 335-36 (N.Y. 1989)) ("We note, however, that since plaintiff sought a declaratory judg-
ment in this action, the proper remedy should have been a declaration in favor of defen-
dant rather than the dismissal of the complaint." (citation omitted)).
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case. 320 But to repeat, Justice Calvert-the former Chief Justice of
the Texas Supreme Court-has highlighted the unfairness of this
practice in Texas where trial courts summarily dismiss a "justiciable
controversy" without issuing a decree. 321 Definitely, the same un-
320. See Walker v. Walker, 5 N.E.2d 405, 406 (Ohio 1936) (concluding that "[tihe
declaratory judgment act is a salutary, remedial measure [that] should be liberally con-
strued" and ruling indirectly that the act requires a court "to render or enter a declaratory
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would ...
terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding"); Weyandt v. Davis,
679 N.E.2d 1191, 1194 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (declaring that "[a declaratory judgment]
complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
only if (1) no real controversy or justiciable issue exists between the parties, or (2) the
declaratory judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy" (emphasis ad-
ded)); Fioresi v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 499 N.E.2d 5, 6 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(citing Walker v. Walker and reaffirming the view that "[t]here are only two reasons for
dismissing a complaint for declaratory judgment before the court addresses the merits of
the case: (1) where there is no real controversy or justiciable issue between the parties,...
or (2) when the declaratory judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or controversy");
Robert T. Foley Co. v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 389 A.2d 350, 354-55, 359 (Md.
1978) (vacating the circuit court's judgment). In Robert T. Foley Co., the plaintiffs wanted
the court to declare that certain sewerage charges were unconstitutional and declare that
the resolutions imposing the charges were invalid as violating contractual rights. Id. at 354.
On appeal, the plaintiffs complained that the trial court failed to issue a declaration of
rights vis-A-vis the latter question. Id. at 355. The Maryland Court of Appeals concluded
that the appellate court did not deal with this question and added that the circuit court's
decree recited "only that the defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted and
the plaintiffs' motion was denied .... [I]t is clear that the circuit court erred by failing to
set forth in its judgment a declaration of the parties' rights with regard to the issues
raised." Id. at 359. Therefore, the court of appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment
and remanded the cause for the entry of a new judgment, which would "include a declara-
tion of the rights of the parties." Id.; see also Dart Drug Corp. v. Hechinger Co., 320 A.2d
266, 274 (Md. 1974) ("While a declaratory decree need not be in any particular form, it
must pass upon and adjudicate the issues raised in the proceeding, to the end that the
rights of the parties are clearly delineated and the controversy terminated." (citations
omitted)).
321. See Robert W. Calvert, Declaratory Judgments in Texas-Mandatory or Discre-
tionary?, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 8-9 (1982) (observing that courts interpreting the UDJA in
other jurisdictions "have recognized and enforced the requirement of a duty to act"); see
also K.M.S. Research Labs., Inc. v. Willingham, 629 S.W.2d 173, 175-76 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1982, no writ) (Carver, J., dissenting) (concluding that the UDJA "is a proper vehicle for a
defendant's counterclaim seeking a declaration of non-liability to a particular tort claim as
asserted in a plaintiff's suit on file"). Justice Carver would have held "that the trial court
erred in dismissing the counterclaim on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action."
Id. "[T]here is no danger, as seen in the authorities relied upon by the majority, of depriv-
ing the injured party of the right to choose the time and forum to litigate one's claim." Id.
at 176. "To affirm this case is to nullify [KMS's] plain right [under] the Declaratory Judg-
ment Act .... " Id. "In view of the legislative expression contained within the Declaratory
Judgment Act that the act be liberally construed to serve its remedial purpose, the dismis-
sal should be reversed and KMS'[s] counterclaim tried." Id.
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fairness appears in declaratory-judgment hearings when trial courts
cursorily grant summary-judgment motions without carefully ad-
dressing the declaration-of-rights controversy. Perhaps it is time
for the Texas Supreme Court to address the conflicting rulings
among Texas's courts regarding this issue and, in the process, ad-
dress the concerns that Justice Calvert has documented and dis-
cussed so scholarly and thoroughly.
C. A Critique-Whether Texas's Courts Have Power to Decide
Both Questions of Fact and Law in a Declaratory-
Judgment Trial
Even if the Texas Supreme Court were to decide decisively
whether trial courts have a mandatory duty to enter formal decrees
in declaratory-judgment trials, another controversy still remains.
Once more, this Article advocates removing summary-judgment
practice from declaratory-judgment trials altogether. Allowing a
summary-judgment motion in such proceedings-where a court
only decides a question of law-is redundant. Moreover, the prac-
tice increases costs and significantly undermines the speedy and ef-
ficient administration of justice.
Categorically, disgruntled litigants may use a declaratory-judg-
ment trial to decide many, and a variety of, questions.322 And
Texas's trial judges have the necessary experience, temperament,
and expertise to decide both questions of law and fact in a declara-
tory-judgment trial. Certainly, the UDJA gives courts the clout to
decide questions of law. But, among Texas's courts, the debate
persists over whether trial judges have the authority to decide
questions of fact in a declaratory-judgment proceeding, notwith-
standing the Supreme Court of Texas's ruling in United Services
Life Insurance Co. v. Delaney3 23 and the language appearing in the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 37.007.324
322. See City of Beaumont v. West, 484 S.W.2d 789, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1972, writ refd n.r.e.) (Stephenson, J., dissenting) ("To state my position as simply as possi-
ble, this is an action under [the UDJA] to have the court construe a new statute .... It is
agreed that the interpretation of a statute is one of the many questions that may be raised
in an action brought under [the Act].").
323. 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
324. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.007 (Vernon 1997).
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Two years after the Texas Legislature enacted the UDJA, the
Dallas Court of Appeals declared in Lincoln v. Harvey:325 "A de-
claratory judgment on purely fact questions cannot be the basis for
[an] action ... [to determine] the rights of the parties. '326 Abso-
lutely, the questions-of-fact ruling in Lincoln was remarkable for
one important reason: The court did not cite any legal authority in
Texas or from any other jurisdiction to justify the ruling. If the
Dallas Appellate Court had examined cases thoroughly from other
jurisdictions, however, it would have found only minimal support
for its ruling.327
First, the court of appeals would have discovered that English
courts have a long tradition of deciding questions of fact in declara-
tory-judgment trials.328 One commentator has observed correctly:
"[There is a general perception] that the English courts will not
make a declaration of fact but only of a legal relation [or] that they
will determine facts incidental to legal results .... "329 However,
"[t]here are many cases in England where.., courts have entered
declaratory judgments upon disputed questions of fact [and those
facts] were incidental to legal relations. '330
Second, during the early-to-mid-twentieth century a number of
states gave trial courts the power to decide both questions of law
and questions of fact in a declaratory-judgment forum. For exam-
325. 191 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ).
326. Lincoln v. Harvey, 191 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ).
327. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Powell, 8 S.E.2d 619, 622 (N.C. 1940) (acknowl-
edging that necessity may force trial judges in some instances "to hear evidence in order to
determine . . . legal questions" in a declaratory-judgment proceeding, but ruling that a
litigant may not commence a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgments Act solely to
decide questions of fact); Ladner v. Siegel, 144 A. 274, 275-76 (Pa. 1928) (observing that
the Declaratory Judgments Act of 1923 gives courts the "power to declare rights, status,
and other legal relations between parties, where there is a real matter in controversy," and
holding that ordinarily a court "will not act where there [are disputed] facts, or such con-
troversy may arise" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
328. See Henry W. Simon, Declaratory Judgments-Questions of Fact, 11 TEx. L.
REV. 351, 352 (1933) (recognizing that "[d]eclaratory judgments have long been used in
England and most of the statutes in this country [were] copied in part, if not wholly, from
the English statute, passed in 1850"). "[T]he statute is silent on the question of the power
of Chancery to enter a declaratory judgment [on] a question of fact . I..." Id
329. Id. The article lists and discusses an array of English cases in which early English
courts decided purely questions of fact in declaratory-judgment proceedings.
330. Id. at 353. "In each of [those] cases the question was worded so that a legal
relation of the parties was placed in issue and then the operative facts determining that
legal relation were decided by the court." Id.
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ple, four years before Texas enacted the UDJA, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire decided Malloy v. Head331 and held that a court
could decide a question of fact in an insurance-defense contro-
versy. 2 One year after the Malloy decision, the Supreme Court of
Virginia decided Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff.333 In
Yukon, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that determining
whether "a justiciable controversy" exists in a declaratory-judg-
ment suit is in itself a question of fact; therefore, a trial court has
authority to decide that and other fact questions after examining
pleadings or other evidence.334
And just one year before Texas adopted the UDJA, the New
York Court of Appeals decided Rockland Power & Light Co. v.
City of New York 335 and held: "A declaratory judgment is ex vi
termini a judgment on the merits. [If a trial court does not settle or
determine] disputed questions of fact... it is plain that rights and
legal relations cannot be determined, defined and declared. 336
Still, in light of these authorities, the Dallas Court of Appeals de-
clared in Lincoln: Texas's trial courts have no authority to decide
purely questions of fact in a declaratory-judgment trial.337
Twenty years after the Lincoln ruling, the Texas Supreme Court
decided Delaney.338 Without citing English law or other state su-
preme courts' decisions and without presenting a sound legal anal-
ysis, the Delaney court simply stated: "The Uniform Declaratory
331. 4 A.2d 875 (N.H. 1939).
332. Malloy v. Head, 4 A.2d 875, 877 (N.H. 1939), overruled in part, Am. Employers
Ins. Co. v. Town of Swanzey, 237 A.2d 681, 682 (N.H. 1968). Whether an insured gave an
insurer written notice of an accident as soon as reasonably possible was a fact question for
the trial court in a proceeding for declaratory judgment. Id.
333. 8 S.E.2d 303 (Va. 1940).
334. Yukon Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Ratliff, 8 S.E.2d 303, 304 (Va. 1940).
In view of the pleadings and upon the record, [we must consider] whether ... the
facts alleged in the bill are sufficient to sustain this [declaratory-judgment] action. We
are here concerned with the right to the interpretation, rather than the interpretation
of the deed. The test of the right to an interpretation is the existence of an "actual
controversy". The interpretation is the solution of the controversy. It follows as the
result of the controversy. Whether ... there is a controversy is a question of fact, and
may be shown by the pleadings or by the evidence.
Id. (emphasis added).
335. 43 N.E.2d 803 (N.Y. 1942).
336. Rockland Power & Light Co. v. City of New York, 43 N.E.2d 803, 806 (N.Y.
1942) (internal quotation marks omitted).
337. Lincoln v. Harvey, 191 S.W.2d 764, 766 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ).
338. United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 396 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. 1965).
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Judgments Act ... provides a plenary remedy. A court having ju-
risdiction to render a declaratory judgment has power to determine
issues of fact .. . . 339 At first glance, it would appear that Delaney
soundly and unmistakably overruled Lincoln. But that conclusion
would be premature. To repeat, a careful analysis of Texas's case
law reveals appellate courts still cite Lincoln as controlling author-
ity. Even more significant, the ruling in Delaney has generated ar-
guably more confusion among Texas's courts.
To help illustrate the point, consider the Tyler Court of Ap-
peals's ruling in Emmco Insurance Co. v. Burrows34 0 -just two
years after the Texas Supreme Court decided Delaney. Citing Lin-
coln rather than Delaney, the court held:
[D]eclaratory relief is further inappropriate in this case because the
only issue involved is purely a question of fact .... [T]here is no real
dispute [about] the existence or meaning of the contract. [We only
must resolve a] purely factual question of whether... the defendants
acted in "consort" ..... If a factual dispute is the only issue to be
resolved, a declaratory judgment is not the proper remedy. 341
Now consider the El Paso appellate court's bewildering 1997 rul-
ing in Hill v. Heritage Resources, Inc.342 Embracing Delaney, the
court decided in Hill: "[A] trial [court with] jurisdiction to render a
declaratory judgment has the power to determine issues of fact. 343
Citing Lincoln and Emmco, however, the appellate court of El
Paso held:
[T]he power to determine an issue of fact does not concomitantly
carry with it the power to render such a finding of fact as a declara-
tory judgment. The determination of whether a party ... breached a
339. Id. at 858; see also Cal. Prods., Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 780,
783 (Tex. 1960) (adopting the principle that "a declaratory judgment should not be based
upon facts which are particularly subject to mutation and change" (quoting S. Traffic Bu-
reau v. Thompson, 232 S.W.2d 742, 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1950, writ ref'd
n.r.e.))).
340. 419 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no writ).
341. Emmco Ins. Co. v. Burrows, 419 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ).
342. 964 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet. denied).
343. Hill v. Heritage Res., Inc. 964 S.W.2d 89, 140 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1997, pet.
denied) (citing Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control & Improvement Dist. No.
I v. Medina Lake Protection Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982,
writ ref'd n.r.e.)). "[A] court [that has] jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment has
the power to determine issues of fact." Id.
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contract, while affecting a party's rights or status, is not a declaration
of a right or status and therefore, is not the proper subject of a de-
claratory judgment. [Here, the trial court only had to resolve
whether a breach occurred]. If a factual dispute is the only issue to
be resolved, a declaratory judgment is not the proper remedy.344
It has been forty years since the Texas Supreme Court decided
Delaney. Yet, as we have seen, some appellate courts still embrace
the position that trial courts may not award declaratory relief
where the only controversy involves a question of fact.345 On the
other hand, Houston's District Court of Appeals has read Delaney
literally and concluded, "[A court with] jurisdiction to render a de-
claratory judgment has power to determine issues of fact, issues of
state law, and issues of federal law if such questions be involved in
the particular case." '346 Furthermore, in Bexar-Medina-Atascosa
Counties Water Control & Improvement District No. 1 v. Medina
Lake Protection Ass'n,34 7 the San Antonio Court of Appeals cited
and embraced Delaney without qualification.348 This latter appel-
late court ruled that trial courts have power to decide purely ques-
tions of fact in a declaratory-judgment trial-without
simultaneously deciding other issues or questions of law.34 9
Moreover, the UDJA gives trial judges the authority to award
attorneys' fees.3  Therefore, in 1998, the Texas Supreme Court
344. Id.
345. See City of Watauga v. Taylor, 752 S.W.2d 199, 205 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988,
no writ) (citing Emmco Ins. Co. v. Burrows, 419 S.W.2d 665, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1967, no writ)) ("Declaratory relief is inappropriate where the only issue involved is a
question of fact .... This is clearly not a declaratory judgment case. This is a suit for
damages arising out of alleged negligence and an alleged unconstitutional taking, both
questions of facts.").
346. Chapman v. Marathon Mfg. Co., 590 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1979, no writ) (citing United Servs. Life Ins. Co. v. Delaney, 896 S.W.2d 855
(Tex. 1965)).
347. 640 S.W.2d 778 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. See Bexar-Medina-Atascosa Counties Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1
v. Medina Lake Protection Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (citing Delaney).
349. See id. at 780 (citing Delaney and embracing the view that "a court having juris-
diction to render a declaratory judgment has the power to determine issues of fact").
350. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997) (giving courts
the authority to award reasonable and necessary attorney's fees); see also Welder v. Green,
985 S.W.2d 170, 180 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet. denied) ("The Declaratory
Judgments Act provides that in any proceeding under the Act 'the court may award costs
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reached the following conclusion in Bocquet v. Herring:15 1 "[T]he
Declaratory Judgments Act entrusts attorney fee awards to the
trial court's sound discretion, subject to the requirements that any
fees awarded [must] be reasonable and necessary, which are mat-
ters of fact, and to the additional requirements that fees be equita-
ble and just, which are matters of law. '352  Because the San
Antonio Court of Appeals has cited Bocquet's narrow ruling in a
juvenile-delinquency controversy,353 arguably that appellate court
would use the ruling in Bocquet to accentuate or augment its
broader questions-of-fact holding in Bexar-Medina-Atascosa
Counties.
There is one final point. Courts that adopt the view that trial
judges may decide questions of fact in a declaratory-judgment pro-
ceeding cite the plain language appearing in Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code Section 37.007. That section reads: "If a pro-
ceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue
of fact, the issue may be tried and determined in the same manner
as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil actions in
the court in which the proceeding is pending. 354
In Aledo Independent School District v. Choctaw Properties,
L.L.C.,355 the Waco Court of Appeals cited Section 37.007 and
held:
The purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to settle
and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to
and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees as are equitable and just."' (quoting TEX.
Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997))).
351. 972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998).
352. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). "This multi-faceted review
involving both evidentiary and discretionary matters is required by the language of the
Act." Id.; see also Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1997) (holding
that "[tjhe award of appellate fees is a question of fact for the jury").
353. See In re K.T., 107 S.W.3d 65, 73 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (using
the Bocquet holding as an example of an appropriate "legal and factual sufficiency review
of the fact findings").
[I]f a trial court makes an award of attorney's fees under the Declaratory Judgment
Act, it resolves both questions of fact (whether the fees sought are reasonable and
necessary), as well as questions of law (whether an award of fees is equitable and just);
and, while the trial court's award is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, its
resolution of the fact questions is subject to sufficiency review.
Id.
354. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.007 (Vernon 1997).
355. 17 S.W.3d 260 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.).
[Vol. 36:535
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
rights, status, and other legal relations. It [must] be liberally con-
strued and administered. There is no provision in this act which for-
bids a determination of a fact question by declaratory judgment. In
actuality, the act contemplates the resolution of factual questions by
declaratory judgment. Specifically, Section 37.007 provides [for such
relief].... Whether the determination of a pure fact question may or
may not be a proper remedy from a declaratory judgment, is not
jurisdictionally dispositive of the cause of action.356
Perhaps the Waco Court of Appeals's analysis is the correct one,
reflecting the majority view among Texas's courts. But to repeat:
There is serious debate surrounding this issue, and the Texas Su-
preme Court's decision in Delaney is sufficiently void of any signifi-
cant direction. To be sure, it is time for the Texas Supreme Court
to revisit this question and issue a more definitive ruling.
V. INSURANCE DEFENSE AND THE ROLE OF DECLARATORY
JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS
A. Personal Injury Claims and the Scope of Insurers'
Obligations Under Liability and Indemnity Insurance
Contracts in Texas
Even a cursory search of various legal electronic databases
reveals that insureds and insurers file an inordinate number of de-
claratory-judgment actions in Texas's courts on a yearly basis.
Quite simply, those litigants ask courts to determine their respec-
tive rights and obligations under an assortment of first- and third-
party insurance contracts, such as automobile, health, homeown-
ers', commercial-liability, life, marine, professional liability, prop-
erty, and title insurance policies.
Put simply, first-party insurance covers an insured's person as
well as the insured's personal and real property.357 But the defini-
356. Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Choctaw Props., L.L.C., 17 S.w.3d 260, 265 (Tex.
App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (citations omitted). "[On appellate review,] Aledo [argued
that] the trial court ha[d] no jurisdiction over the third party action because Choctaw im-
properly [petitioned] the trial court to resolve issues of fact in its request for a declaratory
judgment." Id.
357. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Jim Stephenson Motor Co., No. 05-94-00858-CV, 1996
WL 135688, at *5 (Tex. App.-Dallas Mar. 26, 1996, writ denied) (not designated for publi-
cation) (reporting that commentators define first-party insurance as coverage for "the in-
sured's own property or person" and quoting various insurance dictionaries and
glossaries).
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tion of coverage under a first-party insurance contract differs sig-
nificantly from what an ordinary and reasonable insured might
define as coverage. For instance, under a property insurance con-
tract, an insurer covers losses only if clearly identified perils listed
in the insurance policy caused the losses. 8 On the other hand, if
an "excluded peril" caused the loss, there is no coverage under the
property insurance policy.3"9 Of course, these principles also apply
if the coverage controversies involve life, health, or title insurance
contracts.
Theoretically, third-party or liability insurance covers all dam-
ages for which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay for
injuring a third party's person or property.36 ° Without doubt, when
an insurer agrees to cover third-party injuries, the insurer agrees to
cover a broader spectrum of risks. However, the insured's negli-
gence-rather than some covered peril-must be the cause in fact
and proximate cause of the third-party injuries.361 Contrarily, a lia-
bility contract typically does not cover a third-party loss if an in-
sured's intentional act was the cause in fact of the injury, proximate
cause of the injury, or both.362
More relevant, when insurers in Texas agree to cover a variety of
risks under first- and third-party insurance contracts, they also ac-
358. See Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989,
writ denied) (explaining that coverage analysis of a property insurance claim examines the
relationship between covered perils and excluded ones). "Property insurance, unlike lia-
bility insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise assessing tort
liability." Id. (quoting Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704, 710 (Cal.
1989)). "Coverage in a property policy is commonly provided by reference to causation,
such as 'loss caused by . . .' certain enumerated forces .... It is precisely these physical
forces that bring about the loss." Id. (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710). "In Texas, if one
force is covered and one force is excluded, the insured must show that the property dam-
age was caused solely by the insured force, or he must separate the damage caused by the
insured peril from that caused by the excluded peril." Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 527 (citing
Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971)).
359. See McKillip, 469 S.W.2d at 162 (embracing the view that coverage analysis sur-
rounding property insurance examines the relationship between covered and excluded
perils).
360. See Warrilow, 791 S.W.2d at 527 (distinguishing liability insurance from property
insurance).
361. See Great Am. Ins. Co., 1996 WL 135688, at *5 (reviewing definitions of third-
party insurance from statutes, insurance dictionaries, and other sources).
362. See Superior Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 358 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1962, writ ref'd) (observing that the liability insurance contract clearly stated its inapplica-
bility "[t]o bodily injury or property damage caused intentionally by or at the direction of
the insured").
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cept a variety of contractual and statutory obligations. For sure,
those obligations are too numerous to list and discuss here. But
three broad categories of duties warrant a brief discussion in this
part: (1) the insurers' duty to settle a claim, (2) the carriers' duty
to indemnify, and (3) the insurers' duty to defend insureds against
third-party claims. By all objective measures, conflicts regarding
the extent to which insurers must perform these duties comprise
the overwhelming majority of insurance-related declaratory-judg-
ment actions and summary-judgment motions in Texas's courts.
First, Texas's law has long recognized a common-law duty of
good faith and fair dealing363 to process and pay claims under first-
party insurance contracts. 364 That same common-law duty also re-
quires insurers to settle first-party claims in a timely manner.365
Similarly, under Texas's Stowers doctrine, an insurer must behave
like an ordinary and prudent insurer and timely settle a third-party
claim against the insured.366 The test, however, is specific: The in-
surer must settle the claim when the third-party victim offers to
resolve the controversy for an amount of money that equals or is
less than the policy limits. 367
363. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. 1998) (citing
Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. 1997), and reaffirming Giles's holding
that "an insurer breaches its duty of good faith and fair dealing by denying [or delaying
payment of] a claim when the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear"); Giles, 950
S.W.2d at 56 (holding that "an insurer will be liable if the insurer knew or should have
known that it was reasonably clear that the claim was covered"); see also Republic Ins. Co.
v. Stoker, 903 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. 1995) (declaring that an insurer breaches the duty of
good faith and fair dealing when the insured establishes that "(1) there [was no] reasonable
basis for denying or delaying payment of benefits under the policy and (2) the carrier knew
or should have known that there was not a reasonable basis for denying the claim or delay-
ing payment of the claim" (citing Aranda v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 748 S.W.2d 210, 213 (Tex.
1988))).
364. See Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)
(holding that an insurer has a duty to deal fairly and in good faith with its insured in the
processing and payment of claims).
365. See Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 133 S.W.3d 320, 330 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2004, pet. filed) (concluding that the first-party insurer had a duty to make a good
faith effort to complete its investigation and settle the health-insurance claim promptly,
although the insurer was waiting for the insured's hospital records).
366. G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
367. See id. (holding that an insurer must conform to that degree of care and diligence
which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the management of his own business).
If an insurer refuses a settlement offer when it appears that an ordinary prudent person in
the insured's situation would have settled, the insurer will be held liable for damages. Id.;
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Moreover, under the Texas Insurance Code, insurers have a stat-
utory duty to settle both first- and third-party claims in a reasona-
ble manner.368 Texas's Unfair Competition and Unfair Practices
Act 369 and Unfair Claim Settlement Practices Act 370 allow insureds
to sue insurers when the latter refuse to make a good-faith effort to
settle first- and third-party claims promptly and equitably. Under
both statutes, the tests are identical: Insurers have a legislative
duty to settle claims when liability has "become reasonably
clear. ' 371 But more important, both statutes permit insureds to
commence a cause of action against insurers under Texas's Decep-
tive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).372
see also Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1987) (embracing
the Stowers doctrine and the view that an insurance carrier must exercise ordinary care
when considering whether to accept a third-party victim's settlement offer and whether to
offer the policy limits under the insurance contract).
368. See Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 77 S.W.3d
253, 260 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that a cause of action for failing to settle a third party
claim exists under Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code (citing Am. Physician Ins.
Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 847 n.10 (Tex. 1994), and Vail v. Tex. Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 754 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Tex. 1988))).
369. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art 21.21 (Vernon Supp. 2004). According to Article 21.21,
unfair settlement practices "with respect to a claim by an insured or beneficiary" include
"failing to attempt, in good faith, to effectuate a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a
claim with respect to which the insurer's liability has become reasonably clear." Id.
§ 4(10)(iii).
370. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004). The article states,
in pertinent part, that:
Any of the following acts ... shall constitute unfair claim settlement practices:
(2) Failing to acknowledge with reasonable promptness pertinent communications
with respect to claims arising under its policies ....
(4) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settlements
of claims submitted in which liability has become reasonably clear ....
Id.
371. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 4(10)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 2004); id. at 21.21-2,
§ 2(b)(4).
372. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
Any person who has sustained actual damages caused by another's engaging in an act
or practice declared . . . to be unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in the business of insurance or in any practice specifically enumerated
in a subdivision of Section 17.46(b), Business & Commerce Code, as an unlawful de-
ceptive trade practice may maintain an action against the person or persons engaging
in such acts or practices. To maintain an action for a deceptive act or practice enumer-
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Second, insurers often agree to indemnify insureds when the lat-
ter use out-of-pocket dollars to cover expenses associated with
first- and third-party losses. Certainly, the duty to indemnify ap-
pears in "true," or in first-party, indemnity contracts, but many
third-party liability insurance contracts also contain the insurer's
express promise to reimburse insureds. For example, a property
insurance contract provides first-party coverage. Therefore, under
Texas's law, a property insurer has a contractual duty to indemnify
the insured if a covered peril destroys373 or if thieves steal the in-
sured's property.374 Similarly, title insurance provides first-party
coverage; a title insurer has a contractual obligation to reimburse
the insured if a defect in title generates financial losses.375
An insurer's duty to indemnify under a third-party liability con-
tract is slightly different than its obligation under a true indemnity
contract.376 Under a first-party personal or property insurance
ated in Section 17.46(b), Business & Commerce Code, a person must show that the
person has relied on the act or practice to the person's detriment.
Id.; see also TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21-2, § 2(c) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (stating, in
pertinent part, that "an insurer who violates this subsection commits a deceptive trade
practice under Subchapter E., Chapter 17, Business & Commerce Code, and an affected
claimant is entitled to remedies under that subchapter").
373. See, e.g., Stillwagoner v. Travelers Ins. Co., 979 S.W.2d 354, 360 (Tex. App.-
Tyler 1998, no pet.) (declaring that "[p]roperty insurance is based on the principle of in-
demnity"); Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc. v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 480 S.W.2d 762, 765
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declaring that "[a] contract provides prop-
erty insurance if it binds the insurer to indemnify the insured for loss of identifiable prop-
erty described either specifically or by general language, such as property in a certain place
or within the possession of the insured").
374. See Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Moore, 206 S.W.2d 104, 108 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1947, writ ref'd) (discussing policies that insure against burglary). The Camden
court observed:
[T]hieves and burglars do not commit their crimes merely for the sake of defying the
law, but to deprive the owners of property. The provision in a policy insuring prop-
erty, located in a house, against direct loss or damage caused by the peril of burglary,
is intended to indemnify the owner against the loss or damage to the insured property
perpetrated by a burglar after he gets to the property, which is in the house.
Id.
375. See, e.g., Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. McDaniel, 875 S.W.2d 310, 311 (Tex. 1994)
(commenting that "the only duty imposed by a title insurance policy is the duty to indem-
nify the insured against losses caused by defects in title"); S. Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast,
494 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1973) (embracing the view that "[t]itle insurance is a contract of
indemnity and the insured is limited to recovery for actual damages sustained").
376. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over Whether Liabil-
ity Insurers Must Defend Insureds' Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Histori-
cal and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997,
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contract, an insurer has a duty to indemnify when the insured files
a claim "as soon as practicable" and presents proof of a covered
loss. 377 However, only the underlying adjudicated facts can trigger
an insurer's duty to indemnify in third-party cases.378 In fact, even
the insured's or the third-party victim's proffer of some legal the-
ory of recovery will not activate an insurer's duty to indemnify.379
Simply put, unless the underlying litigation establishes that the in-
sured is liable for third-party damages, a liability insurer has no
duty to indemnify the insured.38 °
Finally, whether liability insurers have a duty to defend insureds
against third-party lawsuits also generates an excessive number of
declaratory-judgment trials and summary-judgment motions in
Texas's courts. The typical title insurance contract, for example,
requires an insurer in Texas to defend its insured when a third-
party sues the insured to resolve a title dispute involving real prop-
erty.38 1 And occasionally insurers and insureds ask courts to de-
clare whether a title insurer has a duty to defend.
However, the overwhelming majority of duty-to-defend contro-
versies concern whether liability insurers are liable for failing to
47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1145-46 (1998) (comparing the significant distinction between
"true" indemnity insurance contracts and indemnity provisions under liability contracts).
377. See Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Roman, 498 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.
1973) (interpreting, under the policy at hand, that the insured give notice to the insurer).
Also, the court qualified that notice "be given ... as soon as practicable [as] a condition
precedent to liability" and that "[iun the absence of waiver or other special circumstances,
failure to perform the condition constitutes an absolute defense to liability on the policy."
Id. "This is so even though the insurer had actual notice of the accident and was not
prejudiced by the lack of formal written notice from the insured." id.
378. See Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. 1997) (declar-
ing that "[t]he duty to indemnify is triggered by the actual facts establishing liability in the
underlying suit").
379. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. McCarthy Bros. Co., 123 F. Supp. 2d 373, 377 (S.D. Tex.
2000) (stating that "[i]n Texas, the underlying liability facts, rather than the legal theory of
liability, trigger the duty to indemnify").
380. See Employers Cas. Co. v. Block, 744 S.W.2d 940, 944 (Tex. 1988) (holding that
"[a]n insured cannot recover under an insurance policy unless facts are pleaded and proved
showing that damages are covered by his policy"), disapproved on other grounds by State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996).
381. See S. Title Guar. Co. v. Prendergast, 494 S.W.2d 154, 156 (Tex. 1973) (holding
that the title insurer had a contractual duty to defend the insured against claimants who
present adverse claims regarding the title to property); Martinka v. Commonwealth Land
Title Ins. Co., 836 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied)
(declaring that the title insurer "was obligated to defend [the insured's] title against ad-
verse claims, and ... to indemnify [the insured] for his property loss").
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provide a legal defense. Under the standard boilerplate liability
insurance contract, an insurer has a duty to defend the insured in
an underlying third-party lawsuit.382 But in Texas, a liability in-
surer is not strictly liable for failing or refusing to defend its in-
sured. Instead, to decide whether an insurer has a contractual duty
to defend its insured, the Texas Supreme Court has embraced and
repeatedly instructed 38 3 lower courts to apply the so-called "eight-
corners" rule.384
Under the eight-corners doctrine, courts must compare the third
party's allegations in the underlying pleadings with the coverage
provision in the liability insurance contract.385 And courts must ex-
amine and consider those allegations without attempting to ascer-
tain whether those allegations are true or false. 386 "If a petition
382. See Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 205 (Tex.
2004) (embracing the court of appeals's conclusion and declaring that Utica had a duty to
defend its insured). But see N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Tex.
2004) (reversing the lower court's ruling and declaring that the insurer did not breach its
duty to defend its insured).
383. See Fid. & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. McManus, 633 S.w.2d 787, 788 (Tex.
1982) (declaring that "[ain insurer [must] defend only those cases within the policy cover-
age"). "Furthermore, the insurer is entitled to rely on the plaintiff's allegations in deter-
mining whether the facts are within the coverage." Id.; see also Am. Physicians Ins. Exch.
v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 847-48 (Tex. 1994) (stating that "APIE's duty to defend Garcia
is determined solely by the allegations in the pleadings filed against him" (citing Heyden
Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1965))); Argonaut
Southwest Ins. Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. 1973) (declaring that "[t]he [in-
surer's] duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the petition when considered in
the light of the policy provisions without reference to the truth or falsity of such allega-
tions" (citing Heyden Newport, 387 S.W.2d at 24)); Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S.
Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1965) (proclaiming that when determining "[an
insurer's] duty to defend a lawsuit[,] the allegations of the complainant should be consid-
ered in the light of the policy provisions without reference to the truth or falsity of such
allegations").
384. See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d
139, 141 (Tex. 1997) (announcing the application of the eight-corners rule to an insurer's
duty to defend its insured). The court stated that "[i]f a [third-party] petition does not
allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer is not legally required to defend a suit
against its insured." Id. "An insurer's duty to defend is determined by the allegations in
the pleadings and the language of the insurance policy." Id. "This is sometimes referred to
as the 'eight corners' rule." Id.
385. See King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002) (discussing the
duty of the insurer under the eight-corners rule).
386. Id. at 191.
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does not allege facts within the scope of coverage, an insurer [has
no duty] to defend a suit against its insured. 387
On the other hand, if the facts in the third-party complaint do
not clearly establish whether the liability policy covers the claim,
the insurer must defend the insured if the contract potentially cov-
ers the third-party allegation. 388 Stated differently, Texas's courts
must (1) interpret the meaning of the allegations in the underlying
complaint very liberally,389 (2) resolve all doubt regarding whether
an insurer has a duty to defend in favor of the insured, and (3)
compel the insurer to provide a legal defense. 390 Finally, after a
court applies the eight-corners doctrine and finds a duty to defend,
that obligation requires the insurer to defend the entire suit, in-
cluding mixed allegations391 and "causes of action that would not
alone trigger the duty to defend. 392
B. Texas's Declaratory-Judgment Trials: Insurance Contracts
and Rules of Construction and Interpretation
To repeat, the Texas Supreme Court fashioned the Stowers and
eight-corners doctrines for two purposes: (1) to determine whether
insurers have a duty to settle third-party claims, and (2) to decide
387. Id. at 187 (quoting Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex.
1997)).
388. See Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d at 141 (reviewing the eight-
corners rule and quoting Heyden in its explanation).
389. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 26 (Tex. 1965)
(declaring that "a liberal interpretation" of allegations in the pleading is required).
390. See Merchants Fast Motor Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d at 141 (discussing the liberal
interpretation of allegations in the petition under the eight-corners rule and explaining
that, "[s]tated differently, [if there is doubt regarding whether] the allegations of a com-
plaint against the insured state a cause of action within the coverage of a liability policy
sufficient to compel the insurer to defend the action, such doubt will be resolved in [the]
insured's favor" (quoting Heyden, 387 S.W.2d at 26)).
391. See Investors Ins. Co. of Am. v. Breck Operating Corp, No. Civ.A.1:02-CV-122-
C, 2003 WL 21056849, at *7 (N.D. Tex. May 8, 2003) ("That the Underlying Complaint also
alleges reckless, wilful, wanton, or knowing actions does not preclude the policy's potential
coverage of the claimed property damage."). "If an insurer has a duty to defend any por-
tion of a suit, the insurer must defend the entire suit." Id. (quoting Harken Exploration
Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir. 2001)).
392. Harken Exploration Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 261 F.3d 466, 474 (5th Cir.
2001). Harken held that the insurer "must defend [the insured] against the entire suit in-
cluding causes of action that would not alone trigger the duty to defend, regardless
whether the complaint is pled in the alternative or not because the [underlying plaintiffs']
factual allegations of negligence are sufficient to trigger the duty to defend." Id.
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whether insurers have a duty to defend its insureds against third-
party lawsuits. But insurance contracts appear in many forms.
Therefore, one can find a large diversity of coverage, exclusion,
condition, and warranty provisions, along with duty-to-settle and
duty-to-defend clauses. To help lower courts interpret disputed
language in any provision of an insurance contract, the Texas Su-
preme Court has embraced five doctrines.
First, under the traditional doctrine of contract construction and
interpretation, a court must evaluate an insurance contract as a
whole, giving effect and meaning to each part of the contract as the
parties intended.393 Second, under Texas's law, the terms in an in-
surance policy are unambiguous as a matter of law if a court can
give disputed words and phrases a definite legal meaning.3 94
Therefore, under the plain meaning doctrine, a court must enforce
an insurance contract according to the plain and ordinary meaning
of the language if the court finds no ambiguity in the policy.395
On the other hand, the doctrine of ambiguity requires Texas's
courts to construe ambiguous language in an insurance contract in
favor of the insured.3 96 However, a disagreement between an in-
surer and its insured over the meaning of words and phrases in a
coverage clause does not necessarily create an ambiguity, and
courts must not consider "[p]arole evidence ... for the purpose of
creating an ambiguity." 397 More relevant, if a court finds ambiguity
in an insurance contract's exclusion clause, Texas's law requires the
393. See, e.g., Balandran v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 972 S.W.2d 738, 740-41 (Tex. 1998)
(reiterating that "insurance contracts are subject to the same rules of construction as other
contracts"); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995)
(noting that "[i]nsurance policies are controlled by rules of interpretation and construction
which are applicable to contracts generally" and that "[tlhe primary concern of a court in
construing a written contract is to ascertain the true intent of the parties as expressed in the
instrument").
394. See CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d at 520 (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393
(Tex. 1983)).
395. See Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984) (asserting that
the court has a duty to give unambiguous words their plain meaning).
396. Compare Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555
(Tex. 1991) (re-emphasizing that ambiguous language in an insurance contract must be
construed in favor of the insured), with CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d at 520 (declaring that an
insurance contract is ambiguous if language in a policy or contract generates "two or more
reasonable interpretations").
397. CBI Indus., 907 S.W.2d at 520.
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court to construe the ambiguous language strictly against the
398insurer.
Finally, under the adhesion rule, a court must interpret disputed
insurance contract language in favor of the insured if the court
finds a severe disparity between the insured and insurer's bargain-
ing power. 399 And under the doctrine of reasonable expectation, a
court must give an ordinary or a commonsensical meaning to dis-
puted or undefined terms, considering those terms as a reasonable
person in the position of the insured might view them.40 0 There-
fore, to fulfill the expectations of the insured and irrespective of
the insurer's understanding, a court must declare that an insurance
contract provides coverage. 0 1
VI. INSURANCE DEFENSE AND THE ABUSE OF SUMMARY-
JUDGMENT MOTIONS IN TEXAS'S DECLARATORY-
JUDGMENT TRIALS
A. Texas's Trial Courts' Questionable Summary-Judgment
Rulings in Declaratory-Judgment Suits
As discussed at the outset, Texas's trial courts have a mandatory
duty under Texas's Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to either
grant or deny relief in a declaratory-judgment trial. Also, the
Texas Supreme Court has adopted five doctrines to help courts in-
terpret disputed language within various insurance contracts. Put
398. See Balandran, 972 S.W.2d at 741 (Tex. 1998) (emphasizing that courts should
adopt the insured's interpretation of ambiguous language in an exclusionary provision as
long as the insured's interpretation is reasonable and despite the insurer presenting an
even more reasonable interpretation).
399. See Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987)
(concluding, without deciding definitively, that insurance contracts are adhesion contracts
because they "arise[ ] out of the parties' unequal bargaining power" and they "allow un-
scrupulous insurers to take advantage of their insureds' misfortunes" during the bargaining
process).
400. See Kulubis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Underwriters Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 953, 954-55
(Tex. 1986) (permitting an innocent victim whose property had been destroyed to collect
under an insurance contract for loss reasonably expected to be covered). But see Forbau v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 876 S.W.2d 132, 134 (Tex. 1994) (refusing to accept a "reasonable
expectations" argument). In Forbau, the court would not address the "conflicting expecta-
tions" between insurer and insured. Id.
401. See Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d at 555 (declaring that a "court must adopt
the construction of an exclusionary clause urged by the insured as long as that construction
is not unreasonable, even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to be more
reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties' intent").
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simply, trial courts must employ those five doctrines before grant-
ing or denying declaratory relief. In addition, courts must apply
the eight-corners rule and Stowers doctrine in a declaratory-judg-
ment trial when the facts require such application.
But a careful review of Texas's reported cases reveals a dis-
turbing practice. Both insurers and insureds regularly commence
declaratory-judgment actions in Texas's trial courts, and the liti-
gants ask judges to declare whether insurers have a duty to defend
or a duty to indemnify insureds. An unacceptably large number of
Texas's trial judges, however, do not apply the eight-corners doc-
trine, and they do not apply the five settled doctrines for interpret-
ing insurance contracts. Instead, Texas's trial judges are
significantly more likely to issue extremely undecipherable and
poorly written summary-judgment motions in those declaratory-
judgment trials.
To illustrate the point, consider the facts and ruling in Cluett v.
Medical Protective Co.4"2 Rose and Walter Cluett selected Dr. An-
tonia Capino to be their children's pediatrician.40 3 During the pro-
fessional relationship, Antonia Capino and Rose Cluett became
sexually involved.4 °4 Thereafter, Walter Cluett sued Antonia
Capino for alienation of affection.4" 5 When the third-party suit
commenced, Medical Protective Company insured Capino under a
medical-malpractice insurance contract.40 6 Dr. Capino contacted
the insurer, demanding that Medical Protective defend her and pay
402. 829 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
403. Cluett v. Med. Protective Co., 829 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied).
404. Id.
405. Id. (reviewing the petitioner's underlying cause of action). "In his second
amended original petition, [Walter] Cluett alleged [that] Dr. Capino consciously and know-
ingly gained the affections of [his wife], Rose Cluett, to the detriment of [Walter Cluett]
and the family interests . I..." d  at 830. "Alienation of affection is an intentional tort
arising out of the impairment of consortium between the spouses of a marriage." Id. This
cause of action, however, is no longer viable in Texas. See id. at 824 n.1 ("Although section
4.06 of the Texas Family Code abolish[ed] the cause of action for alienation of affection,
that statute did not affect claims for alienation of affection filed before its effective date,
September 1, 1987.") "Because [Walter] Cluett filed his claim for alienation of affection
against [Dr.] Capino in 1984, his claim was not affected by the family code's abolition of
that cause of action." Id.
406. Cluett v. Med. Protective Co., 829 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ
denied).
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all damages, up to the policy limits, that might be assessed against
her in the underlying lawsuit.4"7
Medical Protective agreed to defend Antonia Capino against
Cluett's action.4 °8 The malpractice insurer, however, refused to in-
demnify Capino for any potential damages. 40 9 From the insurer's
perspective, the alienation-of-affection claim fell outside the pol-
icy's coverage clause. 410 Alternatively, Medical Protective argued
that the insurance contract's various exclusion provisions excluded
indemnification for this type of third-party claim.411 After consid-
ering the malpractice insurer's offer, Capino rejected it outright
and obtained independent legal counsel.412
Medical Protective then commenced a declaratory-judgment ac-
tion to determine whether it had a duty to defend and indemnify
Dr. Capino, and Cluett intervened in the declaratory-judgment
suit.413 Along the way, Capino assigned her contractual rights
under the medical-malpractice insurance contract to Cluett.414 All
parties filed respective motions for summary judgment.41 5
Ostensibly, Medical Protective only wanted the trial court to in-
terpret the disputed duty-to-defend and duty-to-indemnify lan-
guage in the contract and deliver a favorable declaration. The
relevant provision stated:
[T]he Company hereby agrees to DEFEND and PAY DAMAGES,
in the name and on behalf of the INSURED or his Estate (a) in any
claim for damages at any time filed, based on professional services
rendered or which should have been rendered by the insured .... in











414. Id. "While the declaratory judgment action was pending, Cluett and Capino en-
tered into an agreed judgment rendering [Dr. Antonia] Capino liable to [Walter] Cluett for
$875,000. Capino then assigned her policy rights to Cluett, and Cluett intervened in the
declaratory judgment action." Id.
415. Id.
416. Cluen, 829 S.W.2d at 827 (brackets in original).
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Without doubt, the medical-malpractice insurer did not present
the court with any unduly burdensome requests. After applying
the eight-corners rule, the trial court only had to examine the facts
in Cluett's pleadings and the duty-to-defend language to determine
whether Medical Protective had a duty to defend Dr. Capino. And
if Cluett's allegation reasonably fell within the scope of that provi-
sion, the insurer had a duty to defend.417
Yet the trial court refused to perform a thorough eight-corners
analysis. Moreover, the trial judge did not cite a single settled doc-
trine of contract interpretation to reach a conclusion. Very likely,
Medical Protective would have prevailed if the trial court had ap-
plied the doctrine of plain meaning or the traditional rules of con-
tract interpretation, and Dr. Capino probably would have
prevailed if the court had applied the doctrines of ambiguity and
reasonable expectation. Instead, the trial court cavalierly granted
the insurer's summary-judgment motion without giving any expla-
nation for its ruling.
But there is more. Again, the law in Texas is clear: The duty to
defend and the duty to indemnify "are distinct and separate du-
ties." '418 An insurer's duty to defend arises when an alleged third-
party victim's petition alleges facts that a liability insurance con-
tract could potentially cover. Conversely, an insurer's duty to in-
demnify generally arises after a trial on the merits and proven and
adjudicated facts have established the insured's liability in the un-
derlying suit.419 Also, under certain circumstances, an insurer's
417. See Feed Store, Inc. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 774 S.W.2d 73, 74-75 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied) (embracing the view that the eight-corners rule
only requires a court to look at the pleadings and the insurance policy to determine
whether the duty to defend exists).
418. See Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex.
2004) (citing King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185, 187 (Tex. 2002)); see also Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Cowan, 945 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tex. 1997) (citing Am. Alliance Ins.
Co. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 788 S.W.2d 152, 153 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ dism'd)).
419. See Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex. 1997)
(declaring that "sometimes [it might] be necessary to defer resolution of indemnity issues
until the liability litigation is resolved" and that "[i]n some cases, coverage may turn on
facts actually proven in the underlying lawsuit"); Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen.
Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 25 (Tex. 1965) (declaring that actual facts establishing liability in
the underlying suit trigger the duty to indemnify).
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duty to indemnify may arise before a trial court or a jury tries the
underlying, third-party lawsuit.4 20
In Cluett, Dr. Capino gave Cluett $875,000 to settle the aliena-
tion-of-affection suit,421 and she asked the insurer to reimburse her
for that amount. Therefore, Medical Protective's petition for de-
claratory relief also asked the trial court to declare whether Medi-
cal Protective had a duty to indemnify. But the trial court neither
discussed nor addressed this question.4 2 In fact, the case does not
present any evidence establishing, or even suggesting, that the trial
judge addressed the duty-to-indemnify issue. Nevertheless, the
trial court issued a broad summary-judgment ruling that covered
this issue.423
More disquietingly, on appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals did
not directly address the duty-to-indemnify question, and certainly
did not present a thorough, careful, intelligible, and independent
analysis of the declaration-of-rights issue: Did the insurer have a
duty to indemnify? 424 In its conclusion, the appellate court simply
embraced the trial court's summary-judgment ruling and stated:
"Medical Protective did not owe Capino . . . a duty to
indemnify. 425
Occasionally, some of Texas's trial courts genuinely try to ex-
plain their summary-judgment rulings, even though it would be
considerably easier to apply a settled legal doctrine and issue intel-
420. See Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84 (observing that the scope of district court jurisdic-
tion was significantly broadened by Article V, Section 8 of the Texas Constitution). "The
language of the amended version is broad enough to allow district courts jurisdiction to
resolve declaratory judgment actions on the duty to indemnify." Id. The Gandy decision
handed down after the amendment "hinted that indemnity issues are not always nonjusti-
ciable before liability is resolved." Id. (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925
S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex. 1996)); see also Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas ex rel. Grahmann
v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co. 133 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied)
("Although litigation on the duty to indemnify is often pursued after liability against the
insured has been established in the underlying case, the insurer can resolve the indemnity
issue before the establishment of liability in the underlying case by proving coverage is
impossible in the underlying case." (citing Griffin, 955 S.W.2d at 84)).




424. See id. (noting that the court, on appeal, would only review and decide (1)
whether Cluett's suit for alienation of affection fell within the policy coverage, (2) whether
the insurer had a duty to defend Capino, and (3) whether the insurer acted in bad faith).
425. Id. at 830.
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ligible declarations regarding whether an insurer has a duty to de-
fend or indemnify an insured. But even then, those summary-
judgment explanations are highly suspect and less than sound be-
cause trial courts often misapply common-law or statutory rules.
In other instances, trial courts cite the absence of a genuine issue of
fact to justify an adverse summary judgment in declaratory-judg-
ment trials. After a careful analysis, however, one discovers that
explanation is flaccid because the trial court simply ignored or re-
fused to consider probative summary-judgment evidence.
To help support this point of view, consider the facts and dis-
putes in Julian v. Mid-Century Insurance Co. of Texas.426 On Octo-
ber 21, 1995, Omar Escamilla and several other young men
murdered Darlene Julian's son. Two years later, Julian filed a law-
suit against Margarito and Amalia Escamilla, Omar's parents. In
Julian's complaint, she alleged that the Escamillas's negligent
parenting was the cause in fact and proximate cause of her son's
murder.427
When Julian commenced her lawsuit, Farmers Insurance Ex-
change (Farmers) insured the Escamillas under a homeowners' in-
surance contract.4 21 Mid-Century Insurance Company of Texas
(Mid-Century) insured the same allegedly negligent parents under
an auto insurance policy.429 Curiously, and without explanation,
Farmers and Mid-Century waited until July 6, 2000-nearly three
years after Julian commenced her action-to file a combined de-
claratory-judgment action against the Escamillas.430 The insurers
asked the trial judge to declare that they had no duty to defend or
indemnify the Escamillas in the underlying lawsuit.43
The Escamillas answered and Julian intervened in the declara-
tory-judgment action, maintaining that both insurance contracts
426. No. 05-01-00613, 2002 WL 1870441 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 15, 2002, no pet.)
(not designated for publication).
427. Julian v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 05-01-00613, 2002 WL 1870441, at *1
(Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 15, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Julian argued
that the parents' negligence "included (i) [a] failure to properly supervise, monitor, con-
trol, discipline, and raise Omar; (ii) [a] failure to secure, lock, remove, or limit access to
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covered her negligence claim against the Escamillas.432 Shortly
thereafter, Farmers and Mid-Century filed a joint motion for sum-
mary judgment against the Escamillas and against Julian.4 33 The
trial judge granted the insurers' motion for summary judgment, rul-
ing "that neither Farmers or Mid-Century [had] a duty to defend or
indemnify the Escamillas in the underlying lawsuit. 434
The Escamillas did not appeal any of the trial court's summary-
judgment rulings, and Julian did not contest the trial court's deci-
sion to award summary relief to Mid-Century. In addition, she did
not protest against the trial court's award of summary relief to
Farmers with respect to the duty-to-defend issue. However, on ap-
pellate review, Julian challenged the trial judge's decision to grant
Farmers's summary-judgment motion regarding whether the home-
owners' policy required Farmers to indemnify the Escamillas when
the latter became liable.435
Undeniably, the trial court did not explain its duty-to-defend
summary-judgment rulings. In fact, the trial court did not even
mention or employ the "eight corners" rule or any of the other
doctrines that courts should use to interpret disputed language in
homeowners' and automobile insurance contracts.4 36 Also, evi-
dence proving or suggesting that the trial court carefully read and
deciphered the duty-to-defend language in both insurance con-
tracts is painfully absent.437 On the other hand, the trial court at-
tempted to present a cogent analysis and explanation of its
summary-judgment ruling regarding whether Farmers had a duty to
indemnify the Escamillas.438
First, the trial court reviewed the pertinent provision in the
homeowners' policy, which stated:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages
because of bodily injury or property damage caused by an occurrence
[to] which this coverage applies, we will ... pay up to our limit of
liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable. Dam-




436. See Julian, 2002 WL 1870441, at *2-4 (noting the absence of justification or reli-
ance on any standard doctrine of an insurer's duty to defend or indemnify).
437. Id.
438. Id. at *2.
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ages include prejudgment interest awarded against the
insured .... "'
Second, the trial court observed that the homeowners' contract
defined an "occurrence" as "an accident, including exposure to
conditions, which results in bodily injury or property damage dur-
ing the policy period."440 On its face, this language would arguably
cover Julian's deceased son's bodily injuries. Still, Farmers moved
for summary relief, asserting that Julian's lawsuit against the Es-
camillas did not arise out of an "occurrence."'' 41 More specifically,
Farmers argued that an occurrence must be accidental, not inten-
tional.442 The insurer cited the Fifth Circuit's precedent and sev-
eral intermediate state appellate courts' rulings, arguing that
Texas's "related and interdependent" doctrine outlaws coverage
when an alleged third-party victim claims that the insured is liable
for engaging in intentional conduct.4 43
Put simply, the "related and interdependent" doctrine states that
an insurer has no duty to defend or indemnify an insured if the
third party's claims are related to or depend on the insured's and
another's intentional acts-those which are not covered under the
insurance contract.4 " But the trial court could have easily applied
the doctrine of ambiguity, concluded that the "occurrence" lan-
guage was ambiguous, construed the ambiguity against Farmers,
and declared that the insurer had a duty to indemnify. Alterna-
tively, the trial court could have cited the doctrine of plain meaning
and declared that Farmers had no duty to indemnify because the
language in the clause was extremely clear and the Escamillas had
not become "legally liable" for any damages.
439. Id.
440. Id. (quoting the policy).
441. Julian v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. of Tex., No. 05-01-00613, 2002 WL 1870441, at *2
(Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 15, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
442. Id.
443. See Folsom Invs., Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 26 S.W.3d 556, 561 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2000, no pet.) (embracing the view that where negligence claims against an em-
ployer and the employee's intentional conduct are related and interdependent, the em-
ployee's intentional misconduct does not fall within the definition of an "occurrence");
Thornhill v. Houston Gen. Lloyds, 802 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no
writ) (holding that the supervising employees were not covered under an insurance policy
that contained a liquor liability exclusion where allegations of negligence concerning the
sale of alcohol were related and interdependent).
444. Julian, 2002 WL 1870441, at *2.
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Instead, the trial court decided to award summary judgment. In
the process, the court embraced and applied the highly dubious
"related and interdependent" doctrine and issued a poorly rea-
soned and highly questionable analysis, thereby causing the dis-
gruntled party to appeal the adverse ruling.4 5  Clearly, that
conduct was an unnecessary waste of limited judicial resources.
But more important, when the trial court applied the "related and
interdependent" doctrine, the Texas Supreme Court had neither
embraced nor reviewed that doctrine.
More interestingly, the supreme court decided to review the
merit and applicability of the doctrine right after Julian appealed
the trial court's summary-judgment ruling.446 And after a thought-
ful and an intelligible analysis, the Supreme Court of Texas re-
soundingly rejected the "related and interdependent" doctrine.447
Therefore, in light of the supreme court's decision, the Dallas
445. Id.
Farmers argued that although the claims against the Escamillas [concerned] negligent
parenting, the injury for which Julian sought recovery would not have occurred but for
the intentional conduct of Omar, [namely] Shawn's murder. The trial judge concluded
that the related and interdependent doctrine applied to the facts of this case and
granted the motion for summary judgment.
Id.; see also Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 371-73 (5th Cir. 1998) (declaring
that "[u]nder Texas law, where a third-party's liability is related to and interdependent on
other tortious activities, the ultimate issue is whether the underlying tortious activities are
encompassed within the definition of 'occurrence"'). The court then decided that "[an
insurer has no duty to defend or to indemnify its insured against claims that could not be
brought absent the underlying and excluded tortious activities." Bailey, 133 F.3d at 371-73.
446. See Julian, 2002 WL 1870441, at *3 ("After submission of this appeal, the Texas
Supreme Court issued an opinion rejecting the application of the related and interdepen-
dent doctrine in Texas.").
447. See King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185,190-91 (Tex. 2002) (explaining the
Texas Supreme Court's rejection of the doctrine). "The Fifth Circuit holds there is no duty
to defend, using a 'related to and interdependent' rule." Id. "[It] reasons that the claims
against the employer are wholly derivative from the underlying intentional conduct." Id.
"Essentially, the Fifth Circuit's position is that negligent actions derived from an inten-
tional incident do not exist in the abstract and would not exist but for the intentional
conduct." Id. "[The Fifth Circuit's] decisions ... have relied on the district court's 'related
and interdependent rule,' erroneously presuming this reflects Texas law." Id.
Texas law requires us to look at the pleadings' allegations and the insurance policy's
language from the separate insured's standpoint to determine the duty to defend.
Those allegations are to be considered "without reference to the truth or falsity of
such allegations." And, when we do, we conclude the Fifth Circuit's rule improperly
imputes the actor's intent to the insured.
Id.
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Court of Appeals declared that the trial court erred when it
granted Farmers's motion for summary judgment.448
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for fur-
ther proceedings and ordered the lower court to apply any one of
the settled principles of law and declare whether Farmers had a
duty to indemnify under the insurance contract.449 Without doubt,
Julian presents an excellent example of an extraordinarily ineffi-
cient, litigious, lengthy, and costly summary-judgment process.
The ordinary insured or insurer files a declaratory-judgment action,
only asking the trial judge to issue a simple declaration of rights or
obligations under an insurance contract. By any objective mea-
sure, that request requires-but it should not-a party's investing
an inordinate amount of time and resources to achieve that end.
Finally, along with being highly inefficient, burdensome, and
costly, summary-judgment proceedings lend themselves to abuse,
either wittingly or unwittingly. And when abuse occurs, one is
likely to find litigants employing some very unsavory litigation tac-
tics and trial judges granting decidedly unwarranted summary judg-
ments. To help prove the point, consider the facts and conclusion
in Armendariz v. Progressive County Mutual Insurance Co.450 Ar-
guably, Armendariz represents one of the most egregious examples
of a Texas trial court's abusing its discretion and awarding a highly
questionable summary judgment.
The facts in Armendariz are not complicated. Alejandro and
Alma Armendariz, brother and sister, each owned an automo-
bile.451 Progressive sold an automobile insurance contract to Ale-
jandro and listed Alejandro as "the named insured on the
policy. ' 452 In addition, the insurance contract identified Alma as
one of two "listed drivers. '453 And although Alma was not a
"named insured" under the automobile policy, the policy covered
448. Julian, 2002 WL 1870441, at *3. "In light of the supreme court's discussion in
King, we conclude the trial judge erred in granting Farmers's motion for summary judg-
ment on the sole ground that the underlying lawsuit did not give rise to a duty to indemnify
based on application of the related and interdependent doctrine." Id.
449. Id.
450. 112 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
451. Armendariz v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
452. Armendariz, 112 S.W.3d at 737.
453. Id. "Additionally, Alejandro's parents, who lived with him, and Alma were
named as 'listed drivers' on the policy." Id.
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both Alejandro and Alma-the "named insured" and a "listed
driver," respectively.4 54 Also, Progressive's "automobile insurance
policy . . . covered two vehicles"-both Alejandro's and Alma's
car.
455
Four months after Alejandro purchased the insurance contract,
Alma was involved in an extremely serious and heart-wrenching
accident.456 While driving her parents' uninsured van, Alma put
the van in reverse and accidentally drove the van over her father.457
Given his severe injuries, Alma's father died.458 Later, Alma's
mother filed a wrongful-death action against Alma, claiming that
her daughter's negligence was the proximate cause of the father's
death.459
After discovering the wrongful-death lawsuit, Progressive
dashed to the courthouse and filed a declaratory-judgment action,
ostensibly to determine whether the insurer had a contractual duty
to defend and indemnify Alma in the underlying wrongful death
suit.460 Yet, after a careful reading of the reported facts, one
quickly realizes that Progressive was not really interested in secur-
ing a declaratory judgment. The insurer did not cite any disputed
or ambiguous language in the insurance contract's duty-to-defend
and duty-to-indemnify clauses. In fact, there is no evidence of Pro-
gressive even mentioning those clauses in its petition for declara-
tory relief.461
Instead, facts abound indicating that Progressive commenced the
declaratory-judgment action so that it could file a traditional sum-
mary-judgment motion and secure relief regarding another issue:
whether the insurance contract covered Alma and her parents' van.
In its motion for summary relief, Progressive argued that no genu-
ine issue regarding a material fact existed to justify a declaratory-
judgment hearing. From the insurer's perspective, "Alma was not
454. Id. at 738.
455. Id. at 737.
456. Id.







an insured" under the insurance contract and the contract did not
cover the van.462
To further support its summary-judgment argument, Progressive
cited language in the policy's exclusion clause, which stated in rele-
vant part: "We do not provide Liability Coverage for the owner-
ship, maintenance or use of [a]ny vehicle, other than your covered
auto, which is ... owned by any ... family member, or ... fur-
nished or available for the regular use of any family member. 463
To counter Progressive's arguably abusive tactic, both Alejandro
and Alma Armendariz argued "that Alma was clearly a 'covered
person' [under] the Progressive policy, although she was not the
named insured. ' 464  After considering both summary-judgment
motions and evidence, the trial court granted Progressive's motion
for summary relief.465
But the trial court's award of summary relief is problematical for
two important reasons. First, let us assume that Alma was indeed
an absolute stranger and that she and Progressive did not have an
insurer-insured contractual relationship. Still, the record is com-
pletely void of any evidence demonstrating that the trial judge and
appellate court were curious enough to explain why Progressive-a
highly efficient 466 and thoroughly sophisticated467 insurer-would
462. Armendariz v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co. 112 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.)
463. Id. at 738.
464. Id. at 738 n.1.
465. Id. at 737.
466. See Joan E. Rigdon, Retooling Lives: Technological Gains Are Cutting Costs, and
Jobs, in Services-Employment Starts to Plunge As Productivity Increases; Good News for
Consumers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 24, 1994, at Al, available at 1994 WL-WSJ 303592 (describ-
ing the efficiency of Progressive).
[Miore and more companies are learning to use computer networks to cut out work
altogether instead of simply doing it faster-the basic idea of the much-discussed cor-
porate re-engineering. For example, an innovation as simple as a call-switching sys-
tem, among other efficiencies, enabled Progressive Corp., a Mayfield Heights, Ohio,
insurance company, to eliminate 1,000 workers, 17% of its work force, last year. Out
went entire groups of workers who wrote, designed, folded, stuffed and mailed lists of
phone numbers of various claims offices for customers to call in case of an accident.
Now, customers call a single toll-free number and are automatically routed by MCI
Communications Corp. computers to the nearest open claims office.
Id.
467. See Christopher Oster, Auto Insurers Cut Rates-for Some: After Years of In-
creases, New Pricing Tools Let Carriers Tailor Premiums to Individuals' Risks, WALL. ST.
J., Apr. 22, 2004, at Dl, available at 2004 WL-WSJ 56926763 (illustrating the relative so-
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spend and waste shareholders' funds4 68 to determine whether it
had a contractual duty to defend or indemnify a complete stranger.
To repeat, Progressive filed the declaratory-judgment action to
determine its obligations as well as Alma's rights under the auto-
mobile insurance contract. Therefore, assuming that Alma was in-
deed a total stranger, the insurer had no justifiable reason to
petition the court for declaratory relief, because Texas's law is
painfully clear: A complete stranger to an insurance contract may
not collect any proceeds under the contract.4 69
phistication of Progressive and the insurance industry). "The current upswing in auto-in-
surance profits is the first since the companies developed highly sophisticated pricing tools,
led by Progressive Corp." Id. "[A Progressive product development manager] says that as
the company became more sophisticated, it was able to offer more appropriate prices to its
customers." Id.
468. See Robert McGough, Sequoia Fund Warns Holders About Speculation in Stock
Market, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1997, at Cl, available at 1997 WL-WSJ 14178070 (warning of
stock market speculation and corporate responsibility). "One of the great stock mutual
funds of the past quarter century is loudly warning its shareholders that stock-market spec-
ulation has reached such a frenzy that it 'could eventually lead to a disruptive effect on' the
U.S. economy." Id. "[M]anagers at Sequoia revere the 'value' school of investing in inex-
pensive stocks .... " Id. "Sequoia managers have also invested in high-quality companies
at not-so-cheap prices . I..." d  "The fund's second-largest holding, at 14.2% of assets,
was Progressive Corp., an auto-insurance company." Id.; see also Christopher Oster, After
Reg FD, Progressive Sets Bold Move, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2001, at CI, available at 2001
WL-WSJ 2863250 (discussing Progressive's new approach to divulging information to Wall
Street). "In one of the boldest moves of the post-Regulation FD era, Progressive... plans
to begin reporting a slew of detailed financial data on a monthly, instead of quarterly,
basis. The fast-growing Cleveland auto insurer will hand out the information to Wall
Street ... " Id. "[I]t will reveal premium volumes and ratios of underwriting profitability,
among other details of its operations." Id. "Progressive's more frequent reporting, mean-
while, may pose a problem for its rivals. If Progressive's numbers look bad, analysts say,
other auto insurers. . . may see their stock prices sink, on the assumption the same trends
apply." Id. "'Clearly, whatever trends you glean from Progressive, every comparable
company will have investors going to them and asking whether they had similar issues,'
says Alice Schroeder, a property-casualty insurance analyst at Morgan Stanley." Id. "Un-
questionably, the decision to go with monthly updates 'is vintage Progressive' behav-
ior .. " Id. "This, after all, is a company that uses a satellite tracking system to determine
how often some of its Texas customers drive, when they drive and whether this driving is in
the city or the country, as a way to help determine their premium payments." Id.
469. See Duren v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 579 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979,
no writ) (declaring that "a party who is a complete stranger to the contract is not in a legal
position to recover any interest in the policy proceeds"); Travelers Fire Ins. Co. v. Stein-
mann, 276 S.W.2d 849, 851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref d n.r.e.) (holding that
"the insurer [was not liable] beyond the interest of the insured in the property, [and that] a
stranger to the contract cannot collect [proceeds]").
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Additionally, under settled law in Texas, an insurance contract is
a personal contract between the insurer and the named insured.4"'
Consequently, a stranger may not routinely sue the insurer under
any theory of recovery471 unless the stranger is an assignee 472 or a
third-party beneficiary.47 3 Furthermore, a contractual relationship
between two parties does not create any duty or obligation for an-
other who is not a party to the contract.474 Therefore, any sugges-
tion that these settled principles were foreign to Progressive's
defense attorneys before they filed the declaratory-judgment law-
suit is unfounded.
Second, in its motion for summary judgment, Progressive admit-
ted that Alma was a "listed driver" on the automobile insurance
contract.47 5 That fact alone should have compelled the trial court
to dismiss Progressive's motion for summary relief. To be sure, de-
termining whether the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify
involved genuine, disputed issues of material fact, requiring a full
declaratory-judgment trial. But Texas's law is exceptionally clear
regarding the legal rights of "listed drivers" under an automobile
insurance contract. In fact, on several occasions, litigants have
asked Texas's courts of appeals to determine whether an automo-
bile policy covers the "listed drivers" whose names appear on the
policy even though the drivers are not the "named insured." And
470. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Nelson, 479 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (recognizing "the general rule that a fire insurance policy is a per-
sonal contract between the insurer and the insured").
471. See id. (addressing Farmers's points of error). "Farmers assails the judgment ...
asserting ... that plaintiff has no right to recover directly from Farmers since he is ... a
complete stranger to the policy in question .... Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
"In their briefs, the parties recognize the general rule that a fire insurance policy is a per-
sonal contract between the insurer and the insured named in the policy, and that a stranger
to the policy may not ordinarily maintain a suit on it." Id. (citing Steinmann, 276 S.W.2d at
851).
472. See State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Ollis, 768 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tex.
1989) (per curiam) (reaffirming that an injured assignee has a right to sue a liability insurer
under an assignment contract).
473. See Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 775 (Tex. 1983)
(reasserting that, under Texas law, "a third person not a party to a contract will still have a
cause of action to enforce the contract if the contract was made for that person's benefit").
474. See City of Beaumont v. Excavators & Constructors, 870 S.W.2d 123, 129 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1993, writ denied) (confirming that "a contract between other parties
cannot create an obligation or duty on a non-contracting party" (emphasis omitted)).
475. Armendariz v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 736, 737 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
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the decisions have been unanimous among courts that consider this
question: An automobile insurance contract covers "listed drivers"
if the contract, an endorsement to the contract, or the insurance
contract's declarations page identifies persons as "listed drivers."
The Amarillo,476 Dallas, 477 and El Paso 478 Courts of Appeals have
embraced this principle.
In addition, when appellate courts in other jurisdictions have
considered this coverage question, they reached the same conclu-
sion. For example, courts in Delaware,479 Louisiana, 480  New
Jersey,481 and Ohio 482 have ruled that vehicle liability insurance
476. See Kain v. Northland Ins. Co., 472 S.W.2d 304, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, no writ) (determining that the policy did not extend coverage to drivers not listed in
the endorsement, but the policy did allow newly hired drivers to be added if certain proce-
dural requirements were followed).
477. See Farmer Enters., Inc. v. Gulf States Ins. Co., 940 S.W.2d 103, 110 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1996, no writ) (considering a similar clause).
478. See Hopkins v. Highlands Ins. Co., 838 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Tex. App.-El Paso
1992, writ denied) (stating that Magnolia's insurance policy defined "insured" as those
drivers that Magnolia employed).
[T]he insurance policy define[d] "insured" to include those truck drivers employed by
Magnolia. The truck drivers are listed individually and, thus, have individual coverage
for bodily injury and property damage caused by the individual driver [and] for ex-
penses in defending any claims .... Although [one trucker] was not a named insured,
there is evidence that the names of all drivers were submitted to [the insurer] along
with the application for insurance. Consequently, at the time the liability policy was
issued, all drivers were covered.
Id. (emphasis added).
479. See Reese v. Wheeler, No. Civ.A.99C04002RFS, 2003 WL 22787629, at *5 (Del.
Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2003) ("Given that a Schedule of Drivers was included with the policy
documents, the insured reasonably expected the . . . coverage to extend to those listed
drivers.... [W]here language in a policy is ambiguous, an interpretation finding coverage
will be applied given the sound public interest for UMIUIM coverage .... ").
480. See Smith v. Terrebonne Parish Consol. Gov't, 858 So. 2d 671, 674 (La. Ct. App.
2003) (dealing with similar facts).
481. See Lehrhoff v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 638 A.2d 889, 894 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1994) (permitting the listed driver to recover in order to protect the insured's reasona-
ble expectations of coverage). The court questioned "whether the typical automobile poti-
cyholder would understand and expect from the declarations page of [the] policy that each
of the listed drivers was entitled to all of the coverages and all of the protections afforded
by the policy." Id. at 893.
482. See Roelle v. Coffman, No. 13-97-17, 1997 WL 722775, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov.
17, 1997) (suggesting that, although the insurance company claims that a named driver's
coverage is limited compared to a named insured's coverage, because the insurance com-
pany drafts the policy, it has the opportunity to distinguish the coverage given to named
drivers, and therefore any failure that results in confusion should be held against the
insurer).
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contracts cover both "named insureds" and "listed drivers."
Therefore, in light of this settled legal principle, the trial court's
decision in Progressive to grant the insurer's summary judgment on
the ground that the contract did not cover Alma is extremely be-
wildering and legally incorrect.
Again, the trial court should have denied Progressive's motion
for summary judgment and issued instead a formal declaration out-
lining both Progressive's and Alma's rights and duties. And the
trial judge should have conducted a declaratory-judgment hearing,
even though Progressive argued that the uninsured van, an "ex-
cluded peril" under the contract, was the proximate cause483 of the
father's death.4 8
4
Arguably, there were two concurrent causes of the father's alleg-
edly wrongful death: The van was the "excluded peril" and Alma's
negligence was the "covered peril." Texas's doctrine of concurrent
causation 485 is clear regarding one matter: "[W]hen ...covered
and non-covered perils combine to create a loss, the insured is enti-
tled to recover only that portion of the damage caused solely by
the covered peril(s). 486 Without question, this doctrine does not
prevent a trial court from declaring whether Progressive or any in-
surer has a duty to indemnify an insured.
More important, even if the uninsured van was a concurrent
proximate cause of the wrongful death, that does not address
483. See, e.g., Stroburg v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 464 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Tex. 1971) (assert-
ing that the term "proximate cause" in insurance cases carries essentially the same meaning
as in negligence cases, except in the case of insurance, the foreseeability of the injury as a
reasonable result of the risk insured against is not necessary, and therefore a remote cause
does not equate to proximate cause); Fed. Life Ins. Co. v. Raley, 130 Tex. 408, 411-12, 109
S.W.2d 972, 974 (1937) (expressing that if the insurance policy does not expressly state
terms of liability, liability arises when the loss results from the risk insured against, creating
proximate causation). "Moreover, . . . the term 'proximate cause' as applied in insurance
cases has essentially the same meaning as that applied by our own courts in negligence
cases, except that in the former the element of foreseeableness or anticipation of the injury as
a probable result of the peril insured against is not required." Id. (emphasis added).
484. See Armendariz v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 112 S.W.3d 736, 738 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) ("Because Alma caused the accident while driv-
ing her father's uninsured van, the exclusion, if valid, precludes liability coverage.").
"[E]ven if she were a covered person, the exclusion would still preclude liability coverage
because the uninsured van belonged to a family member." Id. at 738 n.1.
485. See Wallis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 2 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied) ("Texas recognizes the doctrine of concurrent causes.").
486. Wallis, 2 S.W.3d at 302-03 (citing Travelers Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d
160, 163 (Tex. 1971), and Paulson v. Fire Ins. Exch., 393 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. 1965)).
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whether Progressive had a duty to defend Alma in the underlying
lawsuit. Once more, the policy covered Alma, and presumably the
policy contained a duty-to-defend clause. Certainly, Progressive
could avoid defending Alma, but Texas's law requires a trial judge
to apply the eight-corners doctrine to reach that conclusion. Sadly,
in Progressive, the trial judge decided to ignore the eight-corners
rule altogether. Instead, the judge awarded an exceptionally un-
warranted and unfair summary judgment in favor of Progressive.
B. Declaratory-Judgment Disputes and Texas Courts of Appeals'
Questionable Summary-Judgment Decisions
To further complicate matters, Texas's trial judges participate in
another unsettling practice. Instead of conducting full-blown de-
claratory-judgment trials, trial judges regularly grant or deny sum-
mary-judgment motions without giving intelligible, meticulous, or
studious explanations of their rulings.487 As a consequence, Texas's
appellate courts must spend an enormous amount of time and lim-
ited judicial resources exploring various plausible theories to deter-
mine whether an unexplained summary-judgment ruling was sound
or erroneous.
Texas's courts of appeals must engage in such costly, wasteful,
and unnecessary conduct whenever a party challenges any unfavor-
able summary-judgment ruling because the Texas Supreme Court
has been consistently clear regarding one particular summary-judg-
ment issue: When a trial court does not specify the ground for a
summary judgment, the appealing party may proffer multiple theo-
ries to establish that the judgment was erroneous.4 88 In other
words, to generate more costs and ensure that appellate courts con-
487. See, e.g., Carr v. Brasher, 776 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. 1989) (observing that the
"trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants without specifying the ground
or grounds on which it relied"); Simmons v. Healthcare Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 55 S.W.3d 674,
680 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2001, no pet.) (observing that "the trial court [did] not specify
on what ground it granted summary judgment"); Robles v. NME Hosps., Inc., No. 05-93-
01721-CV, 1994 WL 679315, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 6, 1994, no writ) (not desig-
nated for publication) (observing that the "trial court's order granting summary judgment
[did] not indicate the reasons for the court's decision").
488. See Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995) (citing Malooly
Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970)) ("In challenging a summary judg-
ment, it is sufficient that an appellant broadly assert the trial court erred in granting sum-
mary judgment .... Under this point of error, the appellant may argue all the reasons the
trial court erred in granting the summary judgment.").
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sume even more judicial resources, an appellant may present an
assortment of reasons to explain why a summary judgment was
unwarranted.
But there is more. The practice of appealing adverse summary-
judgment rulings to Texas's courts of appeals does not necessarily
increase insurers' and insureds' likelihood of receiving a thorough,
thoughtful, and formal declaration of their rights and duties under
an insurance contract. More specifically, there is no guarantee that
appellate courts will apply settled rules of contract interpretation
and issue a quick, scholarly, and comprehensible declaration of
rights and obligations, particularly in duty-to-defend and duty-to-
indemnify cases.
To support this point, one needs only to review the widespread
evidence appearing in reported cases. For example, consider the
facts and controversy in Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. v. Execu-
tive Risk Specialty Insurance Co. 48 9 Briefly put, Provider sells vari-
ous services to an array of managed-care administrators and
professionals.4 90 Unexpectedly, one of Provider's customers, a
physician, filed a lawsuit against Provider, listing several causes of
action including defamation, fraud, and breach of contract.49'
When the underlying lawsuit arose, Provider was the "named in-
sured" under two insurance contracts. 492 Hartford Casualty Insur-
ance (Hartford) insured Provider under a general liability policy,
while Executive Risk Specialty Insurance Company (Executive) in-
sured Provider under an errors and omissions insurance con-
tract.493 After learning about the physician's plight, Hartford
contacted Executive and urged the "errors and omissions" insurer
to help defend Provider against the physician's lawsuit.494 Execu-
tive refused.495
489. No. 05-03-00546-CV, 2004 WL 2404382 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 28, 2004, no
pet.) (mem.).
490. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co., No. 05-03-00546-CV,





495. Hartford, 2004 WL 2404382, at *1.
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Executive argued that it was the excess insurer and asserted that
Hartford was the primary carrier.496 Consequently, from Execu-
tive's perspective, only the primary liability insurer was responsible
for defending Provider.497  Responding to Executive's intransi-
gence, Hartford filed a declaratory-judgment suit.4 98 The liability
insurer asked the trial court to declare whether Executive and
Hartford had a joint duty to defend Provider under their respective
insurance contracts.499
Predictably, Hartford filed a summary-judgment motion.5 0 The
liability insurer argued that a genuine question of fact did not exist
because Executive was clearly responsible for defending Provider
and paying a part of the defense costs.50 1 Equally predictably, Ex-
ecutive also sought summary relief, claiming there was no genuine
issue of fact regarding its legal status.50 2 From Executive's view-
point, the "other insurance" language in its errors and omissions
contract clearly proved Hartford and Executive were the primary
and excess insurers, respectively.5 3 The trial court granted and de-
nied, respectively, Executive's and Hartford's motions for sum-
mary judgment, and the insurers appealed.50 4
Again, unsurprisingly, the trial judge issued a summary-judg-
ment order in favor of Executive, without stating the basis for the
order.50 5 Of course, when this happens, the parties that challenge
the order on appeal must prove that each independent argument
outlined in the movant's motion does not sufficiently support the
496. Id.
497. Id. "Executive refused to share in the cost of defending Provider Network based
on the wording of the 'other insurance' clauses in the Hartford and Executive policies.
Executive claimed the 'other insurance' clause in its policy made Hartford the primary
insurer and Executive an excess insurer." Id.
498. Id.
499. Hartford, 2004 WL 2404382, at *1.
500. Id.
501. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co., No. 05-03-00546-CV,
2004 WL 2404382, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem.) ("Hartford
[claimed that the facts clearly indicated that it] was entitled to be reimbursed by Executive
on a pro-rata basis.").
502. Id. at * 2.
503. Id. "Executive argues the 'other insurance' clause makes it an excess insurer and
confirms Hartford's status as the primary insurer." Id.




order. °6 Therefore, at the outset, the court of appeals reviewed
the "other insurance" language in Executive's errors and omissions
policy. The relevant clause stated:
Other Insurance; Other Indemnification: (1) This Policy shall be ex-
cess of and shall not contribute with: (a) any other existing insurance
or self-insurance (whether collectible or not), unless such other in-
surance or self-insurance is specifically stated to be in excess of this
Policy; and (b) any indemnification to which an Insured is entitled
from any entity other than another insured.507
After reviewing this language, the appellate court simply ac-
cepted Hartford's argument and issued a less than ideal memoran-
dum opinion, concluding that "the 'other insurance' clause in
Executive's policy was ...inapplicable. ' 508  To repeat an earlier
observation, the Texas Supreme Court has embraced five doctrines
to interpret disputed words and phrases in all sorts of insurance
contracts. 5 0 9 More important, the Dallas Court of Appeals is ex-
ceedingly familiar with these settled rules.510 Yet, inexcusably, this
506. See Hartford, 2004 WL 2404381, at *1 (citing Jones v. Hyman, 107 S.W.3d 830,
832 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.), and Williams v. City of Dallas, 53 S.W.3d 780, 784
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.)) (declaring that when no grounds for summary judgment
are given, the challenging party "must show that each of the independent arguments al-
leged in the motion is insufficient to support the order").
507. Id. at *2.
508. Id. "Hartford argues, the 'other insurance' clause is inapplicable to the situation
at hand in which Executive's policy and Hartford's policy cover completely different risks.
For the reasons that follow, we agree with Hartford." Id.
509. See supra Part IV(B) and accompanying notes. Again, these settled doctrines are
the adhesion, ambiguity, and reasonable expectation doctrines, plus the plain meaning rule
and the traditional rule of contract interpretation.
510. See, e.g., Vest v. Gulf Ins. Co., 809 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ
denied) (citing Kelly Assoc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 681 S.W.2d 593, 596 (Tex. 1984))
(embracing the rule that "[a] court will interpret and liberally construe insurance policies
in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer, especially when dealing with excep-
tions and words of limitation," but "this rule applies only when an ambiguity exists in the
policy"); Maxus Exploration Co. v. Moran Bros., Inc., 773 S.W.2d 358, 364 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989) (stressing that "the trial court could have, just as we, used the traditional rules
of contract interpretation [to interpret the insurance contract] without resorting to [a
party's] affidavit"), affd, 817 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1991); Baldwin v. New, 736 S.W.2d 148, (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied) (embracing and applying the plain meaning rule, and cit-
ing Sun Oil Co. (Del.) v. Madeley, 626 S.W.2d 726, 732 (Tex. 1981), which held that sur-
rounding circumstances may be considered to determine the meaning of ambiguous terms
in contracts, but if the contract is not ambiguous, a party's construction is immaterial); see
also Cent. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Stemmons Northwest Bank, N.A., 848 S.W.2d 232, 240
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (embracing the view that under certain circumstances
insurance policies are adhesion contracts); Allen v. Brewster, 172 S.W.2d 192, 193 (Tex.
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appellate court did not cite, apply, or even mention a single doc-
trine to interpret the "other insurance" provision and reach its
conclusion.
Perhaps the most egregious outcome in Hartford involves the
manner in which the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the central
question appearing in Hartford's declaratory-judgment complaint.
Again, the liability insurer asked the trial court to determine
whether Executive also had a contractual duty under Executive's
errors and omissions policy to defend Provider. The duty-to-de-
fend language in Executive's insurance contract stated in relevant
part: "[Executive has] the right and duty to defend any Claim
made against any Insured which is covered by this Policy, even if
the allegations of such Claim are groundless, false or
fraudulent." '511
Here, the Dallas Court of Appeals's interpretation of Texas's
"eight corners" doctrine is warranted and instructive. In Gehan
Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co.,51 that tribunal
outlined the following rules and instructions for a lower court:
The insurer's duty to defend arises when a third party sues the in-
sured on allegations that, if taken as true, potentially state a cause of
action within the terms of the policy .... This standard is referred to
as the "eight corners" rule .... The court may not read facts into the
pleadings, look outside the pleadings, or "imagine factual scenarios
which might trigger coverage. ". . . If the pleadings do not state facts
sufficient to bring the case clearly within or without the coverage, the
general rule is that the insurer is obligated to defend if potentially
there is a case under the pleadings within the coverage of the pol-
Civ. App.-Dallas 1943) (embracing one version of the doctrine of reasonable expecta-
tion), rev'd, 142 Tex. 127, 176 S.W.2d 311 (1943). But see Mary Kay Cosmetics, Inc. v. N.
River Ins. Co., 739 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied) ("[A]ppellants
assert that they should have been granted a partial summary judgment based upon J & J
Pump's 'reasonable expectation' that they were covered under the terms of the policy.")
The appellants asked the court "to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations in order
to impose coverage under the insurance policy based upon the reasonable expectations of
coverage," but that was not the question before the court. Id.
511. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Executive Risk Specialty Ins. Co., No. 05-03-00546-CV,
2004 WL 2404382, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Oct. 28, 2004, no pet.) (mem.) (quoting the
policy).
512. 146 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed).
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icy .... A duty to defend any of the claims against an insured re-
quires the insurer to defend the entire suit.5 13
However, when one carefully reviews the Dallas Court of Ap-
peals's duty-to-defend ruling in Hartford, one point becomes read-
ily and painfully obvious: The appellate court did not even cite any
of the rules highlighted in Gehan Homes. But more important, the
court did not perform the same kind of rigorous duty-to-defend
analysis that it demands from "inferior" trial court judges. In fact,
like the trial court in Hartford, the Dallas Appellate Court behaved
arguably inappropriately. Specifically, the court of appeals did not
even attempt to perform a proper declaratory-judgment analysis
using the "eight corners" doctrine to resolve the duty-to-defend
question.
Instead, the Dallas Court of Appeals simply concluded "the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Execu-
tive. '"514 Then, the appellate court stated, without presenting an
intelligible analysis or explanation, that "both Executive and Hart-
ford have the duty to defend" the underlying claims, and that "Ex-
ecutive and Hartford... must bear a pro rata share of the costs of
[defending against] the underlying suit. '5 15 After presenting these
conclusions, the Dallas Court of Appeals remanded the case to the
trial court with further instructions.516 To repeat, if Texas had out-
lawed summary-judgment motions in declaratory-judgment trials
and required a full-blown hearing on the merits, it is very unlikely
that the waste and superficial analyses appearing in Hartford would
have materialized.
Finally, it is fitting to highlight the general conflict and ancillary
legal issues appearing in Duke Energy Field Services Assets v. Na-
tional Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.517 Duke illus-
513. Gehan Homes, Ltd. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 146 S.W.3d 833, 838 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 2004, pet. filed) (most emphasis added) (citation omitted).
514. Hartford, 2004 WL 2404382, at *2.
515. Id. (citing Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 110 S.W.3d
450, 458 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 141 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2004))
(concluding that "[w~here multiple insurers have a duty to provide a complete defense,
neither must pay all of the defense costs because they share the duty until one has either
exhausted its policy limits or is declared impaired").
516. See id. at *3 ("We reverse the trial court's summary judgment in favor of Execu-
tive, render judgment in favor of Hartford, and remand for the trial court to determine the
amount of attorney's fees incurred by Hartford in prosecuting the underlying action.").
517. 68 S.W.3d 848 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
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trates two unsettling practices: (1) a trial judge's grant of a
questionable summary judgment in a declaratory-judgment hear-
ing, and (2) an appellate court's failure to rectify the harm by
awarding declaratory relief in a timely manner when the opportu-
nity clearly presented itself.518
Briefly, Zaval-Tex is a pipeline construction and maintenance
company with its principal place of business in Beaumont, Texas.519
During the 1990s, Centana Intrastate Pipeline Company was a sub-
sidiary520 of PanEnergy Corporation, a Texas corporation.521 At
that time, Centana owned and operated a gas plant in Port Arthur,
Texas.522 Centana later sold the plant to PanEnergy Field Services,
Inc., another PanEnergy subsidiary.523
Duke is one of the nation's largest gatherers, producers, and
marketers of natural gas liquids, and has its principal place of busi-
ness in Denver, Colorado.524 In the late 1990s, Duke purchased
PanEnergy Corporation-including Centana-and changed the
name to Duke Energy Field Services, Inc.525
After acquiring Centana, Duke neither terminated nor amended
the construction services contract between Zaval-Tex and
Centana.526 In fact, Zaval-Tex continued to provide workers and
deliver identical services to Duke, the gas plant's new owner. 527
Even more relevant, the construction agreement between Zaval-
Tex and Centana-the former owner of the Port Arthur gas
plant-required Zaval-Tex to purchase insurance and list Centana
as an "additional insured. ' 528 To comply, Zaval-Tex purchased a
liability insurance policy from National Union Fire Insurance Com-
518. Duke Energy Field Servs. Assets v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa.,
68 S.W.3d 848, 848 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied).
519. http://www.zavaltex.com/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
520. Duke Energy Field Servs. Assets, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Uhlon Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa., 68 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ("At that time,
Centana was a corporate subsidiary of PanEnergy Corporation.").
521. http://www.business.com/directory/energy-and-environment/naturalgasutili-
ties/panenergy-corp/profile/.
522, Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 849.
523. Id. at 850.
524. See http://www.defieldservices.com/about.html (giving background on Duke
Energy).
525. Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 850.
526. Id.
527. Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 849-50.
528. Id. at 850-51.
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pany.5 29 Perhaps sooner than Duke expected, the company found
itself needing National's assistance.
One of Zaval-Tex's employees, Rafael Chavez, was injured while
working at the Port Arthur gas plant.53 ° Shortly thereafter, Chavez
commenced a personal injury lawsuit against Duke, the undisputed
owner of the plant.53' Duke asked National to provide a legal de-
fense against the underlying claims, but National Union refused. 32
Duke filed a declaratory-judgment action, asking the trial judge
to declare that National had an obligation to defend Duke in Cha-
vez's underlying lawsuit. Immediately thereafter, both Duke and
National engaged in the all-too-frequent and highly unnecessary le-
gal ritual: Each filed a traditional motion for summary judgment.
Uncharacteristically, the lower court gave a sentence-long explana-
tion for awarding National's motion for summary relief. The trial
judge found no disputed fact, concluding that Zaval-Tex's liability
insurance contract required a "written contract" between Duke
and Zaval-Tex. But Duke could not produce an original "written
contract." Therefore, the trial judge granted National's summary-
judgment motion, concluding that the liability insurance contract
did not cover Duke, Centana's successor-owner. 533  Duke
appealed.
Again, Duke petitioned the trial court for a timely and a rela-
tively inexpensive declaratory judgment and lost. On appeal, the
Texarkana Court of Appeals also had the same excellent opportu-
nity to perform a decidedly warranted, comprehensible, and timely
eight-corners analysis and then declare whether National had a
contractual duty to defend Duke. But the court of appeals did not
want to address that declaratory-judgment issue. Instead, the Tex-
arkana Court of Appeals only wanted to address the summary-
529. Id. at 849.
530. Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 849.
531. Id. at 850.
532. Id. at 849.
533. Duke Energy Field Servs. Assets, L.L.C. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pitts-
burgh, Pa., 68 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ("The trial court
based its summary judgment on its conclusion that Duke was not an additional insured
within the terms of Zaval-Tex's policy because there was no 'written contract' between
Duke and Zaval-Tex as required by National Union's policy.").
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judgment issue-whether Duke was an "additional insured" under
the Zaval-Tex's liability insurance contract.534
To help accomplish that end, the court of appeals reviewed the
coverage provision in National's insurance policy. In pertinent part,
that clause stated: "It is agreed that Additional Insureds are cov-
ered under this policy as required by written contract, but only with
respect to liabilities arising out of the operations performed by the
Named Insured. 535
Undeniably, rather than spending an inordinate amount of time
writing a long summary-judgment opinion, the court of appeals
could have written a one-paragraph response and reversed the trial
court's ruling, for Texas's predecessor-successor principles are in-
credibly clear: Generally, a successor corporation assumes the
predecessor corporation's rights and burdens.53 6 Similarly, when a
subsidiary forms a contractual relationship with a third party and
that subsidiary merges into a parent corporation, the parent-by
operation of law-forms a contractual agreement with the third
party.537
Actually, when any Texas business acquires another business en-
tity in its entirety, the acquisition transfers the predecessor's rights
and liabilities to the successor unless specific terms or exceptions
state otherwise. 538 But there is more. Texas's law also is exception-
534. Id. at 849-50.
535. Id. at 850.
536. See, e.g., Volvo Petroleum, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 717 S.W.2d 134, 139 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (embracing the view that a "successor" corpora-
tion assumes the liabilities and obligations of its predecessor); N. Am. Land Corp. v.
Boutte, 604 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
(embracing the principle that a surviving or new corporation is liable for the merged or
consolidated corporation's liabilities and receives all the latter's benefits.); see also TEX.
Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.06(A)(3) (Vernon 2004) (providing that merging companies'
liabilities and obligations will be distributed to the surviving or new entities of the merger).
537. See TXO Prod. Co. v. M.D. Mark, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (supporting the principle that "the merger of a wholly-
owned subsidiary into its parent does not constitute a sale of the subsidiary," and therefore
does not terminate the parent's affirmative duty to honor the subsidiary's contractual obli-
gations under outstanding contracts).
538. See, e.g., Procter v. Foxmeyer Drug Co., 884 S.W.2d 853, 861 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1994, no writ) (observing and embracing the principle that "'[s]uccessor' does not ordina-
rily mean an assignee, but is normally used in respect to corporate entities, including cor-
porations becoming invested with the rights and assuming the burdens of another
corporation by amalgamation, consolidation, or duly authorized legal succession"); En-
chanted Estates Cmty. Ass'n Inc. v. Timberlake Improvement Dist., 832 S.w.2d 800, 802
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ally clear regarding another matter: Liability or title insurers-pri-
mary, excess, and reinsurers-have a common-law duty to extend
coverage to a purchaser-successor if a third-party contractor com-
plied with its contractual duty539 and purchased insurance for the
sole benefit of the insured-predecessor.540
Therefore, in light of these fairly well-known and settled princi-
ples, it is rather disconcerting that the Texarkana Court of Appeals
invested so much time, ink, and paper addressing the "coverage"
issue. Once more, National argued and the trial court agreed that
Duke was not an "insured successor" under the liability insurance
contract because a "written contract" did not bind Duke and
Zaval-Tex. Clearly, the lower court's ruling was erroneous. The
court of appeals should have acknowledged the same quickly and
adamantly, and then spent the bulk of its analysis addressing the
central question: Did National have a contractual duty to defend
Duke, the successor-purchaser and the additional insured under
the insurance policy?
But to repeat, the Texarkana Appellate Court decided not to
perform an "eight corners" analysis or any other analysis that uses
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (finding that "[the successor] assumed the
rights and obligations of [the predecessor] under the contract"); Thompson v. N. Tex. Nat'l
Bank, 37 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1931, holding approved) (declaring that the
guaranty contract was a continuing contract that gave the successor and assign exactly the
same rights that were given to the predecessor).
539. See Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 850 (noting that "if Zaval-Tex had a written contract to
provide construction work for another company, and ... that company required Zaval-Tex
to obtain insurance, National Union's policy would provide that coverage"). Importantly,
"National Union [did not deny that the] written contract sufficed to make Centana an
additional insured [under] the policy. At that time, Centana was a corporate subsidiary of
PanEnergy Corporation." Id.
540. See FDIC v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 585 S.W.2d 756, 760 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (declaring that the successor-receiver or "the
insureds' successor in interest had a legal right to renew the policy," the same legal right
that the insured predecessor-bank could have exercised under the insurance contract);
Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Freeman, 100 S.W.2d 145,146-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beau-
mont 1936, writ dism'd w.o.j.) (finding that a reinsurer reinsured a primary carrier's title
insurance policies, and concluding that (1) the reinsurer, as successor to the primary in-
surer, assumed the primary carrier's liabilities and (2) the reinsurer also had an obligation
to cover the successor to the insured under one of the primary insurer's original title insur-
ance contracts); see also P.G. Bell Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 853 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (embracing the settled principal, by implication, that
a subcontractor's insurance company has a "special relationship" with the contractor when
the subcontractor's liability policy "lists" the contractor "as a named insured on the pol-
icy,... an additional insured or [an intended] beneficiary" under the insurance contract).
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settled rules to interpret insurance contracts. Instead, the court of
appeals took the remarkably inefficient, costly, and litigious route:
The court simply reversed the trial judge's erroneous summary-
judgment ruling and cavalierly "remand[ed] the cause to the trial
court" for a non-jury declaratory-judgment trial.541
VII. CONCLUSION
At this point, some earlier observations are worth repeating.
First, among Texas's judges and practitioners, there is general con-
sensus: When used properly, a declaratory-judgment trial is an ef-
ficient way to interpret and declare rights and obligations under
statutes, ordinances, and contracts, including insurance contracts.
Recognizing and embracing this truth, the Texas Legislature
adopted the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) to en-
sure that Texans receive relatively swift and conclusive "relief from
uncertainty and insecurity [regarding Texans'] rights, status, and
other legal relations. 542
To help courts to reach that end, the legislature encouraged trial
judges to construe and administer the UDJA "liberally. 543
Among other liberties, trial courts may consider and resolve both
questions of fact and questions of law during the process. But
more important, a declaratory-judgment hearing allows judges to
consider those questions considerably more attentively, soundly,
and less expensively. Therefore, in light of these positive attrib-
utes, the proffered reasons for allowing and encouraging summary-
judgment motions in Texas's declaratory-judgment trials is pain-
fully difficult to comprehend and even harder to justify.
In fact, as discussed and documented throughout this Article,
summary-judgment motions severely undermine the purported
reasons for enacting the UDJA: "to facilitate the administration of
justice more readily, 544 to foster timely "preventative justice" long
before a wrong has occurred,545 and to serve as a "speedy and ef-
fective remedy for the determination of rights. 546
541. Duke, 68 S.W.3d at 853.
542. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.002(b) (Vernon 1997).
543. Id.
544. Cobb v. Harrington, 144 Tex. 360, 367-68, 190 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1945) (quoting





Furthermore, when trial judges award or deny summary relief in
a declaratory-judgment suit, they often do not explain their rulings.
Very likely, this outmoded or questionable judicial practice pro-
duces some unwarranted consequence: Judges that fail to explain
their rulings cause Texans generally, as well as insurers and in-
sureds in particular, to believe that Texas's courts are biased in
favor of one party or the other. Arguably, such perceptions of ju-
dicial bias would be considerably less if trial courts would conduct
full-blown declaratory-judgment hearings, perform a sound legal
analysis of both questions of fact and law, and issue more well-
reasoned declarations.
Second, as we discovered, even when trial judges issue summary-
judgment explanations rather than learned declaratory-judgment
rulings, many of the former are completely strained and poorly
written. More important, large numbers of those summary-judg-
ment explanations are stripped disappointingly of any evidence
suggesting that trial judges have a real understanding of settled
substantive laws. Also, an unacceptable number of summary-judg-
ment explanations present little evidence suggesting that trial
judges apply settled principles soundly and consistently. Undenia-
bly, these substantive omissions are excruciatingly conspicuous in
cases where insurance litigants compete for declaratory relief in
duty-to-defend, duty-to-indemnity, and duty-to-settle-the Stowers
doctrine-controversies.
Assuredly and expectedly, many jurists-judges and practition-
ers-will question the wisdom of removing the summary-judgment
procedure from Texas's declaratory-judgment trials. And such
skepticism or reservation is very healthy and warranted, even
though this Article has highlighted and documented major sum-
mary-judgment limitations. Therefore, the commentator invites
the reader to consider the following closing arguments in favor of
the proposition.
First, as mentioned earlier, summary-judgment rulings in declar-
atory-judgment suits produce more-not less-litigation. Why?
Presently, one finds that both parties in declaratory-judgment con-
troversies have an equal probability of petitioning a trial judge for
summary relief when a formal declaration is all that each one
wants. More unsettling, even a cursory examination of Texas's re-
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ported cases involving just insurance law disputes supports this
assertion.547
But even more unsettling, the same evidence reveals that "mov-
ants" and "nonmovants" are equally likely to appeal adverse sum-
mary judgments.548 Obviously, such a constant flood of appeals
involving arguably minor declarations of rights and obligations
comes with a hefty price. In many instances, Texas's courts of ap-
peals spend or waste an undue amount of precious judicial re-
sources attempting to find reasons for trial courts' decisions to
award or deny summary relief.
To repeat an earlier observation, Texas's trial judges do not have
to give summary-judgment explanations, and an excessive number
do not. However, when trial judges provide explanations for deny-
ing or awarding summary relief in a declaratory-judgment trial, ap-
pellate courts still must invest a considerable amount of effort
trying to deconstruct many nearly indecipherable rulings. Either
way, courts of appeals must invest multiple hours to justify af-
firming or reversing trial courts' allegedly "erroneous summary
judgments." But even after investing those resources, appellate
courts simply remand the cases to the same judges and instruct
them to conduct a full-blown declaratory-judgment trial.
Second, even a cursory examination of reported cases reveals
that a good number of Texas's trial judges have considered and
decided both highly contentious questions of fact as well as ques-
tions of law in declaratory-judgment trials without finding a con-
comitant need to review, award, or deny a motion for summary
judgment. 54 9 To illustrate, consider the duty-to-defend controversy
547. To reach this conclusion, the author searched Westlaw's TXIN-CS database, us-
ing the following query: (DECL! /3 RELIEF JUDG!) DECL! /120 (BOTH /9 "SUM!
JUDG!") (last visited Nov. 24, 2004).
548. Id.
549. See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 556 S.W.2d 242, 243
(Tex. 1977) (recognizing the trial court's finding that "a truck and flatbed trailer were 'bor-
rowed' . . . under the provisions of a comprehensive automobile liability insurance pol-
icy"-a question of fact-and the trial court's judgment that "Liberty's policy created a
duty to defend"-a question of law); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp.,
16 S.W.3d 418, 422-24 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (commenting about the trial
judge's finding that a "hostile fire" was the efficient proximate cause of the bodily injury-
a question of fact-and the lower court's declaration that the insurer had a contractual
duty to defend under the eight-corners doctrine-a question of law); Mid-Century Ins. Co.
of Tex. v. Childs, 15 S.W.3d 187, 188 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (recalling the
trial court's finding that the insurer failed to include all potential claimants in the settle-
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in Heyden Newport Chemical Corp. v. Southern General Insurance
Co.550
In Heyden, Newport Chemical employed a hauling company to
collect and transport tree stumps to Newport's plant-an operation
that made turpentine. 551 Newport supplied the trucks and driv-
ers.55 2 Southern General insured Raymond Pickering, one of the
drivers, under an automobile liability insurance contract. 553
Briefly put, Pickering's truck collided with a third party's pickup
truck, killing the third party.5 5 4 The deceased's survivors com-
menced a wrongful-death action against Newport and the haul-
ers.555 The turpentine maker asked Southern General for a legal
ment, thereby creating a conflict of interest-a question of fact-and the trial court's dec-
laration that the insurer had a duty to defend under the eight-corners doctrine-a question
of law); Safeway Managing Gen. Agency for State & County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Cooper,
952 S.W.2d 861, 866-68 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1997, no writ) (noting the trial court's find-
ing that "the application form [did] not 'accompan[y]' the policy [thereby rendering] the
named driver exclusion on the form ... ineffective"-a question of fact-and that court's
conclusion that the insurer had a duty to pay reasonable and equitable attorneys' fees-a
question of law); Hofland v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1995, no writ) (noting the trial judge's finding that the insured's act of at-
taching a trailer to his truck, which came loose and caused severe bodily injury, was negli-
gence under the policy-a question of fact-and the judge's declaration that the insurer
had no duty to defend or indemnify-questions of law); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Rainbow
Drilling Co., 748 S.W.2d 262, 263-64 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ) (not-
ing the trial court's finding that "Rainbow was 'using' the vehicle in question so as to make
Rainbow an 'insured' under the policy"-a question of fact-and the court's declaration
that the insurer had a duty to defend-a question of law); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Protec-
tive Ins. Co., 661 S.W.2d 291, 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ) (com-
menting about the trial judge's erroneous finding that "Atlas was an omnibus insured
under Walker's insurance policy"-a question of fact-and the lower court's holding that
the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify Atlas in the underlying third-party law-
suit-a question of law); Gonzales v. Am. States Ins. Co. of Tex., 628 S.W.2d 184, 186 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ) (noting the trial judge's finding that "the evidence...
conclusively show[ed] that the 'completed operations hazard' exclusion [applied to the
facts of this case]"-a question of fact-and the judge's declaration that the insurer had a
duty to provide a legal defense-a question of law); Evans v. Gen. Ins. Co. of Am., 390
S.W.2d 818, 820-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1965, no writ) (noting the trial judge's finding
that "[Evans's injury] arose from his employment within the meaning of the policy"-a
question of fact-and the judge's declaration "that General Insurance [did] not owe a duty
to defend the damage suit"-a question of law).
550. 387 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. 1965).
551. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. S. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1965).
552. Id.
553. Id. "The defendant, Raymond Pickering, carried an automobile liability insur-
ance policy with the Southern General Insurance Company .... " Id.
554. Id.
555. Id.
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defense, claiming that Newport was an additional insured under
Pickering's policy.556 The insurer refused, asserting that a "covered
vehicle," as required under Pickering's liability contract, was not
involved in the accident. 7
To get satisfaction, Newport filed a declaratory-judgment ac-
tion. 8 During the deliberations, the judge decided a question of
fact-whether the truck involved in the accident was a "covered
vehicle" under Pickering's automobile policy.55 9 The trial judge
concluded that the truck was not covered. 6 ° The lower court then
turned to the disputed question of law-whether Southern General
had a duty to defend Newport in the underlying wrongful death
lawsuit because Pickering was Newport's agent "at all material
times. "561
Ultimately, the insurer had to defend Newport.562 That revela-
tion, however, is not the purpose of this illustration. More signifi-
cant, the trial court considered and decided both questions of fact
and law. But even more important, the trial judge awarded sub-
stantive relief-a declaratory judgment-for one of the parties,
rather than some tentative procedural relief following a motion for
summary judgment.
Finally, at the very outset, this Article observed that the Texas
Supreme Court refused to adopt entirely the federal summary-
556. Heyden, 387 S.W.2d at 23. "Newport Industries demanded that Southern Gen-
eral furnish it a defense in such prior suit, claiming to be an additional insured under the
omnibus provision of the policy covering Pickering." Id.
557. See id. at 26 ("[Southern General] contends further that [Southern General] is
not liable in any event because the trial court found that the truck involved was not cov-
ered by the policy of insurance .... It is true the trial court made such finding ... .
558. Id.
559. Id. at 26.
560. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp. v. s. Gen. Ins. Co., 387 S.w.2d 22, 26 (Tex. 1965).
But the Texas Supreme Court reversed, stating: "We think these pleadings are sufficient to
permit proof on a trial that Marks was hauling stumps to Newport Industries in a truck
belonging to Pickering at the time of the collision." Id.
561. See id. at 24 (noting the petitioners' claim that they were entitled to a defense
under their insurance policy).
The petitioners contend that Newport Industries was entitled to be defended under
respondent's policy [because] the allegations in the [underlying] suit [stated] that Pick-
ering was an agent of Newport Industries at all material times, and that therefore
Newport Industries was legally responsible for the use of the automobile involved in
the collision causing the death of Sam Traylor.
Id.
562. See id. (reversing and remanding to the trial court).
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judgment rule.563 Although embracing the 1938 version of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Supreme Court of Texas "ignored
the [1948] amendments to the federal rule. '564  Consequently,
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(a) does not mirror either the
original or the amended version of Federal Rule 56, and the differ-
ences are significant. 565  Also, in fairly recent years, some jurists
and commentators have encouraged the Texas Supreme Court to
adopt "current" federal summary-judgment procedures. But the
supreme court has declined to do So.566
In light of these disclosures, one point becomes unquestionably
clear: Federal Rule 56567 is not sacrosanct or unalterable in any
respect, and there is little credible evidence suggesting the Su-
preme Court of Texas has adopted a contrary position. Therefore,
563. See supra Part II(B) (illustrating Texas's traditional summary-judgment motion
and Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure).
564. Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEx. L. REV. 285, 286 (1952). Mc-
Donald explained that "the supreme court elected to adopt, with minor textual changes,
the language of Federal Rule 56 as promulgated in 1938." Id.
565. See David Hittner, Summary Judgments in Texas, 22 Hous. L. REV. 1109, 1133
(1985) (observing differences between summary-judgment practice in Texas and in the fed-
eral system); Sheila A. Leute, Comment, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment: A
Comparison of Federal and Texas Standards, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 617, 619, 635-37 (1988)
(outlining major differences between summary-judgment practice in Texas's and federal
courts); see also Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEX. L. REV. 285, 293-94 n.40
(1952) (illustrating the difference between the Texas and federal rules). "Rule 166-A, sub-
division (a) provides that 'a party seeking ... to obtain a declaratory judgment may' move
for summary judgment 'at any time after the adverse party has appeared or answered."'
Id. at 293.
While a motion for summary judgment is not a pleading, the filing by the defendant of
a motion... presumably will be held to be an appearance. Hence the plaintiff appar-
ently may move for summary judgment at any time after the defendant has so moved
or after the defendant has taken any other step which constitutes an appearance, even
though he has not answered. This was not allowed under the federal rule as originally
promulgated....
Rule 166-A, subdivision (b) [is] unchanged from the federal rule, [permitting] "a party
against whom ... a declaratory judgment is sought" to move for summary judgment
"at any time."
Id. at 294.
566. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989) (finding no overriding policy
reason "to adopt the current federal approach to summary judgments generally").
567. FED. R. CiV. P. 56. The pertinent language in paragraphs (a) and (b) of the rule
reads:
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking.., to obtain a declaratory judgment may ... move
with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor
upon all or any part thereof.
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given the highlighted abuses, problems, costs, waste, and ineffi-
ciency associated with summary-judgment practice in Texas declar-
atory-judgment trials, this commentator invites the supreme court
to weigh seriously the evidence and arguments outlined in this Ar-
ticle. And after a careful examination, the Article encourages the
Supreme Court of Texas to abandon the federal practice of al-
lowing summary judgments in declaratory-judgment proceed-
ings. 6
8
Irrefutably, the Texas Supreme Court's decision to delete the de-
claratory-judgment language from the relevant sections of Texas
Rule 166a would be a relatively bold move. 569 But more impor-
tant, the supreme court's decision would be extremely fitting be-
cause it would remove an extraordinary amount of waste and
inefficiency from declaratory-judgment trials. But assuming the su-
preme court adopted this recommendation, that decision and the
accompanying justifications certainly would not be novel.
As recently as 1993, the Texas Supreme Court discarded a widely
recognized independent cause of action-a prima facie case for the
negligent infliction of emotional distress.57 0 In Boyles v. Kerr,57'
the supreme court held that an aggrieved victim may recover
mental-anguish damages under other recognized theories of recov-
ery, 572 but abandoned the negligent-infliction cause of action by de-
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom ... a declaratory judgment is sought
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment
in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (b) (emphasis added).
568. Id.
569. The commentator respectfully and strongly encourages the Texas Supreme Court
to delete or seriously consider deleting the phrases "or to obtain a declaratory judgment"
and "or a declaratory judgment is sought" from TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(a) and 166a(b),
respectively.
570. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 597 (Tex. 1993) (refusing to recognize a right
to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress); see also Wilson v. Norfolk & W. Ry.
Co., 718 N.E.2d 172, 176 (I11. 1999) (observing that "a right to recover for negligently in-
flicted emotional distress ... is nearly universally recognized among the states today").
571. 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993).
572. See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593, 595-96 (Tex. 1993) (overruling "the language
of Garrard to the extent that it recognizes an independent right to recover for negligently
inflicted emotional distress" and stating that "mental anguish damages should be compen-
sated only in connection with [the] defendant's breach of some other duty imposed by
law"); Segura v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. 04-99-00876-CV, 2001 WL 387995, at *3
(Tex. App.-San Antonio Apr. 18, 2001, no pet.) ("Home Depot moved for summary judg-
ment on Segura's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim on the ground that there is
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claring that a separate mental-distress cause of action was too
broad in its scope and wholly unnecessary. 73
Or stated differently, the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-dis-
tress action was too inefficient, consuming unacceptable levels of
"judicial resources" and generating excessive waste to achieve its
intended purpose. 574 Without doubt, summary-judgment practice
in Texas's declaratory-judgment trials is producing identical results.
Therefore, economic necessity and expanding dockets, as well as
the need to reduce any appearance of judicial bias or unfairness,
argue for removing summary-judgment practice-specifically from
declaratory-judgment trials in Texas.
no cause of action in Texas for negligent infliction of emotional distress. We agree."); see
also Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress In
Texas: Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455, 467-68 (2002) (emphasizing
the serious legal distinction between commencing and proving a prima facie case-the in-
dependent cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress-and recover-
ing damages for emotional-distress (tort) claims under other causes of action; Boyles
outlaws the former, but not the latter.).
573. See Boyles, 855 S.W.2d at 601-02 (commenting on its rejection of the cause of
action).
In rejecting negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of ac-
tion, we stated in the original opinion that "[t]ort law cannot and should not attempt
to provide redress for every instance of rude, insensitive or distasteful behavior, even
though it may result in hurt feelings, embarrassment, or even humiliation."...
The tort system can and does provide a remedy against those who engage in such
conduct. But an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress would encompass conduct far less outrageous than that involved here, and such a
broad tort is not necessary to allow compensation in a truly egregious case such as this.
Id. (quoting the court's original opinion) (brackets in original).
574. See id. at 612-13 (Doggett, J., dissenting) (questioning the court's opinion).
And why the rush to retreat? The majority declares with vigor that "judicial re-
sources" would be "strained" . .. with the insignificant, the trivial, with other mere
"intimate" affairs of the heart. How can anyone view what happened here as just
another "instance of rude, insensitive or distasteful behavior"? When a surreptitiously
produced videotape of a woman participating in sexual intercourse makes her the fo-
cus of public discussion, how can her injury be dismissed as unworthy of protection?
How can the majority's purported difficulty in "distinguish[ing] severe from nonsevere
emotional harm ... justify denying relief to Susan Kerr for the humiliation and life-
long disabling psychological disorder she suffered? How can Boyles' conduct be so
callously condoned by the majority's announcement that they and other judges are
just too busy to handle such matters?
Id. (citations omitted) (brackets in original).
